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(*Overleaf*) Arrival of the party led by Cortés on the Mexican shore prior to the march to Tenochtitlán, 1519. By a sixteenth-century Aztec artist. From Arthur Anderson and Charles Dibble, *The War of Conquest* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1978), p. 1.

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
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(Overleaf) Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India addresses the United Nations General Assembly, 1960. United Nations Photo Library, courtesy Instructional Resources Corporation.

16 Legacies

Identifying the legacies of European rule is fraught with conceptual and methodological perils. I construe colonialism narrowly as control of a territory's public sector by a metropole. Instances in which informal influence was exercised apart from formal governance are not considered. I focus on what Europeans did in trying to carve out and consolidate dominant positions for themselves. If one broadened the definition of colonialism and equated it with westernization or modernization, its impact would be considerably greater than claimed here. But so many things would have been tossed into the causal side of the equation that sorting out which aspect of westernization had which effects would become an unmanageable operation.¹ Likewise, if one considered everything that occurred during the colonial era, including responses and initiatives of colonized peoples, the independent variable would be too comprehensive and complex to generate meaningful cause-effect statements. It is more appropriate, for instance, to treat anticolonial nationalism as a significant legacy of colonialism than to regard the two as part and parcel of the same thing.

To assert that colonialism had consequence X or Y is not to claim that it is the only cause of X or Y. Indeed, a safer assumption is that outcomes noted here were shaped by many factors. Clearly, the greater the time gap between the end of colonial rule and events or patterns one wants to explain, the less plausible the claim that colonialism was the sole or even principal cause. The colonial impact on today's world is more obvious and direct for phase 5 states than for those gaining independence in phase 2. Effects on the latter have been filtered through personalities, events, and trends in postindependence decades that had little or nothing to do with the time when Europeans were formally in charge.

No one can confidently assert what kind of world would have emerged had Europeans *not* projected power to other continents. To identify legacies of empire is implicitly to contrast what occurred in modern world history with speculation about

what would have happened in the absence of empire. Different scenarios of the likely course of counterfactual history account for many of the differences in people's assessments of European rule. Counterfactual thinking is inherently contestable. But can efforts to account for the past do without it? "We can avoid counterfactuals only if we eschew all causal inference . . .," assert Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin. "Everyone [carrying out historical analysis] does it and the alternative to an open counterfactual model is a concealed one."² Where appropriate, assumptions about alternative pasts are made explicit rather than concealed.

European rule affected more than colonies. It helped shape Europe's own development and eventually influenced worldwide patterns of thought and action. Propositions about each of these categories are arranged in the same sequence: impacts on society, politics, economics, religion, culture, and psychology. References to politics, economics, and religion parallel the analysis of the triple assault.

IMPACTS ON COLONIZED PEOPLES AND TERRITORIES

—European rule led to large-scale redistributions of the world's peoples. The population of many colonies—and of their new-state successors—was far more racially and culturally diverse than in precolonial times.

Prior to the fifteenth century all or almost all inhabitants of a given continent could trace their ancestry to people from that continent. Formation of European empires made possible, and greatly facilitated, massive flows of people from continents of origin to other regions. Over a five-century period tens of millions of Europeans emigrated, substantial settler communities being established only in areas claimed by metropolises. Over a four-century period tens of millions of Africans were transported as slaves to plantation-based colonies in the Americas. In phase 3 Indians and Chinese migrated as indentured servants to colonies in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean.

These movements altered the demographic composition of many regions. Especially affected were areas in which diseases carried by newly arriving groups decimated indigenous peoples. The New World and Oceania were radically changed in this respect, Africa and Asia far less so.

To the extent that race denotes continental origin, European empires made race relations a persistently significant issue for the modern world. The multiracial character of many colonies profoundly affected the way social relations and political life were organized after independence. It was difficult for people visibly unlike each other as well as culturally diverse to feel part of the same country, with citizenship rights in common. In phase 2 states it was impossible for indigenous peoples and those of African descent to belong to the country in which they lived because people of European descent denied them basic political and legal rights. This exclusivist

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attitude to citizenship postponed until the twentieth century a serious commitment by most phase 2 states to incorporate non-European groups into national life.

In European countries religious, class, and regional cleavages have historically been sources of conflict. Not so with race. In sharp contrast, colonies were arenas of interracial contact and conflict from the moment the first Europeans arrived. Race relations was a contentious issue that could not be ignored and did not go away, particularly in territories with large settler populations.

By phase 5, however, metropolises were no longer insulated from the racial pluralization their presence and policies produced elsewhere. Whereas the state spread from Europe to the colonies, the plural society spread from the colonies to Europe. Since the end of World War II hundreds of thousands of people have migrated from newly independent countries to former metropolises. Extensive communities from the West Indies, India, and Pakistan now reside in Great Britain; likewise Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, and Malians in France, Zaireans in Belgium, and Indonesians in Holland. As "the empire strikes back" through these migrations, Britain and France above all have wrestled with problems arising from growing heterogeneity. Contemporary Europe has a great deal to learn from former colonies about how to manage the subtle tensions and overt conflicts experienced by multiracial societies.

—*The racially based stratification system of the colonial era is a primary determinant of social relations today.*

In European history struggles for equality occurred among people with the same racial background. These struggles were bitter at times. But they lacked the emotional intensity of comparable struggles in colonies and their independent successors, where race not only marked observable biological differences but also signified economic and status inequalities. Close links between difference and inequality produce an unusually durable stratification system. Once a racial category becomes a socioeconomic caste it is extremely difficult for those at the scale's lower end to move up, and potentially explosive of social relations if they do. In territories where settlers were preoccupied with maintaining racial purity, sexual anxieties and rivalries added fuel to an already combustible mix. Where settlers inherited the public sector at independence—as in phase 2 states and South Africa—non-Europeans found it even more difficult to raise their collective position because the power of government was used to reinforce colonial-era inequalities.

—*Colonial rule begat anticolonial nationalism and hence eventually undermined itself. But since virtually all nationalists wished to retain key aspects of the public sector Europeans put in place, many features of colonial government carried over to successor regimes. The territorially bounded, bureaucratic, sovereign state is the joint product of colonialism and nationalism, a dialectical synthesis of two apparently opposed forces.*

Metropolises turned colonies into protostates by transferring many of their public sector institutions. Metropolises also spread the idea that a state was the most advanced political form devised by humanity. The one thing colonies lacked—sovereignty—was the one thing nationalists demanded. In effect, nationalists criticized not the fact of public sector transfer but its incompleteness, insisting on nothing less than full replication of the metropole's status. At one level the demand for independence was a rejection of foreign rule. At another level it was a ringing affirmation of the structural and ideological form foreign rule took. The goal was to capture the protostate, not to dismantle or fundamentally rearrange it. Hence a paradox: The result of the nationalists' success at terminating European global dominance was global diffusion of Europe's governance model.

The spread of this model has produced a far more homogeneous pattern of political organization than would have existed in the absence of overseas empires. Five centuries ago many of the world's peoples lived in stateless societies, small-scale chiefdoms, and self-governing cities. These forms became increasingly rare as they were encompassed by colonial boundaries and their autonomy undercut by externally imposed bureaucracies. Today's world is a collection of states; its peoples define themselves, among other things, as citizens of states.³ That this observation is now little more than a truism underlines the distance humanity has traveled in a few centuries, from many governance modes to one overwhelmingly predominant one.

—The colonial origin of public sector institutions often reduces their effectiveness and legitimacy.

An imperial legacy in many parts of the world is a lack of fit between social structure and political institutions. Society has become more heterogeneous owing to demographic changes noted earlier. But public sector institutions have become more homogeneous, in the double sense that the same institutions govern citizens with diverse racial and cultural backgrounds within a country and that governing institutions in very different countries resemble each other. Where government has been shaped more by external forces than by its own society, rulers may not consider themselves accountable to those they rule, and citizens may regard government procedures and policies as illegitimate.

In countries where colonial administrators, judges, and police were harsh and unpopular, retention of the institutions that employed them can undermine legitimacy even when the offending foreigners have been replaced by local personnel. The perception that government is an alien force can last a long time. It can encourage pillage of public funds for private purposes, pillagers regarding the treasury as the possession not of the nation but of foreign exploiters who deserve to be robbed.⁴ This practice further lowers support for government by diverting resources officials might have devoted to the collective good.

—Whether colonywide representation or independence. Within later years, its authoritarian rule.

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— *Whether a new state becomes democratic depends in large measure on whether colonywide representative institutions were in place and functioning effectively before independence. While the presence of colonial legislatures cannot ensure democracy in later years, its absence appears to be a sufficient condition for maintenance of authoritarian rule.*

By their nature colonial regimes were authoritarian: bureaucracies carried out decisions made by foreigners who were unaccountable to local people. The top-down character of government was bequeathed to new states. The Nigerian historian Stephen Akintoye's description of the African scene applies to other regions as well: "The isolation of the government from the governed, the refusal to tolerate opposition or criticisms, the fear of delegating authority, the branding of all virile opposition as treasonable action—all these were learned from Africa's colonial masters by the Africans who took over African governments at independence."⁵

The most effective counterweight to authoritarian rule after independence was an elected legislature capable of restraining the executive branch. If a legislature was in place at independence and had shown that it could influence decisions of colonial authorities, then it had a reasonable chance of survival. In this respect Britain's possessions differed significantly from the rest. That the Westminster model should have been transferred to settlers is not surprising; that it was eventually transferred to occupation colonies at the insistence of nationalists is more so. But importing this particular foreign institution made sense because, unlike a bureaucracy, a legislature comes ready-made for rapid capture.

How long the Westminster model lasted after Britain left depended on many factors, including the personalities and values of political leaders. Jawaharlal Nehru was committed to a multiparty electoral system and open parliamentary debate. Kwame Nkrumah was not, and by the mid-1960s he had become a dictator eagerly fanning the flames of his own personality cult. The opposing strategies of the two men account in part for the diverging political trajectories of India and Ghana. An effectively functioning colonial legislature does not guarantee competitive electoral systems, as the large number of undemocratic ex-British colonies in 1980 shows (table 16.1).

But *absence* of such a legislature is virtually a sufficient condition for *failure* of competitive elections to take root. To confine discussion to the quarter century after independence, these two negative features are found in all phase 2 countries except the United States and in such phase 5 countries as Vietnam, Indonesia, Zaire, Algeria, and Angola. (Spain permitted settlers representative government at the local level but not in larger administrative units.)

Further support for the double negative hypothesis comes from an analysis of patterns in phase 5 new states. Freedom House's annual survey *Freedom in the World*

TABLE 16.1.
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN PHASE 5 NEW STATES AS OF 1980

Former metropole	Number of ex-colonies ranked	Rankings					
		1 or 2		3 or 4		5, 6, or 7	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Britain	53	22	42	7	13	24	45
France	25	0	0	5	20	20	80
Portugal	5	0	0	0	0	5	100
Belgium	3	0	0	0	0	3	100
Holland	2	0	0	0	0	2	100
Italy	2	0	0	0	0	2	100
Spain	1	0	0	0	0	1	100

Source: Raymond Gastil, *Freedom in the World* (1980), tables 1, 3, pp. 14–18.

ranks countries on a 1–7 scale according to political rights their citizens exercise. Countries rated 1 and 2 conduct regular competitive elections. Those rated 5 through 7 lack formal mechanisms for meaningful electoral choice and are typically governed by single parties or despots. Countries ranked 3 and 4 lie between these extremes. In 1980 all former colonies of metropolises ruling in a clearly authoritarian manner—Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Spain—scored in the 5–7 range. The same applies to all these countries as of 1990. Britain's former colonies are about evenly divided between the 1,2 and 5,6,7 categories. The ratio improves to 22:18 if one excludes the six Arabian peninsular quasi colonies whose domestic affairs Britain never firmly controlled. France occupies an intermediate position, consistent with an intermediate pattern of representation in the Fourth Republic: colonies could send delegates to the Assemblée Nationale in Paris, though not until the late 1950s were territorial legislatures with any real authority established.

To know what leads new states toward or away from democracy, a starting point is to examine what kinds of representative institutions, if any, were established by former metropolises.

—Colonial administrative boundaries have proven unusually durable. With few exceptions they constituted territorial borders at independence, and they define the size and shape of the great majority of states today.

Among phase 2 countries the United States is a partial exception to this generalization. It is a postcolonial invention, both because the shift from confederation to a federal system did not occur until the late 1780s and because boundaries steadily

expanded westward. Boundaries mattered, the union's formative years. Haiti and the Dominican Republic ruled portions of the island as viceroys. Bourgeois instances replica

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One reason administer the functional scope their interest to are famous for disposal to protect agencies fully compatible installed in government. Central state as it was, no Ambitious or ideological collective weight

The most Africa. Here one postindependence bore no relation. African states might Or they might haology and with the viable. Instead of nationalist movements: the name of ethnic Katanga, Nigeria been arbitrarily

expanded westward for decades after independence. But even here the old boundaries mattered, for it was the thirteen ex-colonies that debated and authorized the union's formation and became its original constituents. As for other phase 2 states, Haiti and the Dominican Republic retain the border between French- and Spanish-ruled portions of Hispaniola. Brazil closely resembles the late phase 1 Portuguese vicerealty. Boundaries of ex-Spanish states were drawn along familiar lines, in some instances replicating viceroalties, in others captaincy-generals and *audiencias*.

The generalization fits phase 5 states. Major exceptions are in South Asia: the last-minute partition of India that produced Pakistan, followed in 1971 by secession of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh. Separate colonial units were consolidated when Cameroon, Somalia, and Malaysia were formed. But consolidation efforts such as the Guinea-Ghana Union, Mali Federation, and East African Federation lasted only a short time before the territorial units of colonial days reasserted themselves as separate states.

One reason for continuity is that a colony's public sector was structured to administer the territory demarcated by its boundaries. Once the geographic and functional scope of their activities was fixed, bureaucrats found it convenient and in their interest to maintain the status quo. They also did what bureaucrats everywhere are famous for doing: fighting with skill, determination, and the resources at their disposal to protect their turf. With independence the personnel of central government agencies changed. But discontinuity in a bureaucracy's staffing patterns was fully compatible with continuity in its geographic scope. If anything, people newly installed in government posts were determined to preserve inherited job descriptions. Central government employees generally favored keeping the independent state as it was, neither dividing it into smaller units nor merging with other states. Ambitious or idealistic politicians might on occasion call for such changes, but the collective weight of national bureaucracies was arrayed on the side of conservatism. The most striking evidence of boundary continuity comes from sub-Saharan Africa. Here one would expect the greatest change in the number, size, and shape of postindependence states, because borders were externally imposed and in most cases bore no relationship to social and political realities on the ground. Independent African states might have fragmented into units based on ethno-linguistic identities. Or they might have joined to form larger entities, consistent with pan-African ideology and with the argument that existing states were far too small to be economically viable. Instead old patterns were maintained virtually intact into the 1990s. Secessionist movements in the Congo, Nigeria, and the Sudan failed. Rebels fought not in the name of ethnic autonomy but on behalf of multiethnic administrative units—Katanga, Nigeria's Eastern Region (Biafra), Southern Sudan—whose boundaries had been arbitrarily set by Europeans. Had secession succeeded, the new boundaries

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would have been just as artificial and externally imposed as the old ones. Almost all efforts at supranational political integration also failed.

A plausible explanation is that civil and military bureaucracies, entrenched at independence, constituted a country's most powerful domestic interest group. Rapid personnel growth immediately following independence gave these institutions additional clout.⁶ There was little political leaders could do when confronted by the preference of strategically placed groups for existing boundaries.

The experience of the first independence movement supports this argument in a reverse way. Of all the colonies Europeans formed, the thirteen in BNA had perhaps the most rudimentary bureaucracies. The colonies thus lacked interest groups that might have pressed successfully for thirteen separate territories following England's defeat at Yorktown. In these circumstances politicians had an unusually high level of freedom to experiment with new forms of government, including changes in boundaries. The least bureaucratized of Europe's colonies generated the most far-reaching challenge to inherited institutions and boundaries.

—A substantial majority of new states retained the language of the former metropole when they conducted official business.

One would expect linguistic continuity in countries governed by people of European descent. Since independence English has been the sole language of central government in the United States and Australia, Spanish in Mexico and Argentina, Portuguese in Brazil. Countries with a dual-settler heritage retained both languages: Canada (English and French) and white-ruled South Africa (Afrikaans and English). Of greater interest is that many states ruled by non-European elites opted to retain the colonial language. These include Asian and African countries in which a substantial majority do not speak a European tongue. In about half of the more than eighty phase 5 states for which information is available, the only language accorded official status is that of the former metropole. In an additional sixteen countries it shares that status with an indigenous language.⁷

One reason for retaining the colonial language in a multilingual country is that it may be the only one known to everyone in the political and bureaucratic elite. And some ex-colonies are exceedingly multilingual: in fifteen more than a hundred languages are spoken.⁸ Another reason is that selecting a non-European alternative can prove contentious, alienating speakers of languages not chosen. That Arabic is the sole official language of the Sudan has long angered those in the three southern provinces, only about 1 percent of whom speak it. This grievance figures prominently in the civil war afflicting the country for most of the last four decades. The Indian government's commitment to Hindi as a co-official language with English met tremendous resistance in southern regions, where Hindi was not commonly spoken. Mauritania's adoption of Arabic in 1966 as a co-official language with French trig-

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gered riots by non-Arab speakers. Togo removed two indigenous languages shortly after independence and has kept only one—French—ever since.⁹

A consequence of retaining the colonial language in countries where most people do not speak it is that only a minority of the population is eligible for election or appointment to central government posts.¹⁰ This limits the pool of talent available to serve the public at home and abroad. And it raises the question posed of educated nationalists in an earlier period: whether leaders are so acculturated to Western ideas, values, and consumption patterns that they poorly represent the interests of people on whose behalf they speak.

—Colonial rule spread the idea that continuous economic development is possible and desirable.

The explore-control-utilize worldview impelled much European activity overseas and contributed hugely to colonial economic development. Europeans vastly increased the volume and range of marketable output. They did so by assembling a transformational package of available natural resources, a local and imported labor force, imported plants and animals, capital, new technologies, profit-driven organizations, and intercontinental trade networks.

Phase 2 settler nationalists shared this commitment to realize the economic potential of their environment—they were, after all, themselves bearers of European attitudes to distant frontiers. But non-European nationalists in phases 4 and 5 adopted the same stance. Their education, their awareness of economic and technological advances in other parts of the world, and their knowledge of wealth-generating activities in their own territories led them to place high priority on development. Colonizers were criticized not for trying to stimulate growth but for imposing so many of its costs on the colonized population and allotting most of its benefits to themselves. If anything, twentieth-century nationalism had a more ambitious transformational agenda than its phase 2 predecessor. The greater the economic gap separating imperial centers from peripheries, the more pressing the need to catch up.

Industrialization was attractive to non-European nationalists because they felt the value added from factory production had been appropriated by metropolises and deliberately denied the colonies. The radical demand to bring heavy industry and hydroelectric power to new states was also conservative, in the sense that its goal was to emulate the most advanced countries' experience. Just as nationalists embraced the European state as a political model while rejecting European control of the state, so they embraced European industrialization as an economic model while rejecting European appropriation of gains from mass-production technologies.

Japan's and Russia's launching of industrialization drives in phase 3 reinforced nationalists' arguments that independence was a precondition for industrial

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development. Meiji and tsarist reformers took advantage of their countries' sovereignty to promote rapid defensive modernization. Such policies could not be adopted in colonies because control over economic affairs lay in the hands of metropolises threatened by defensive modernization.

The explore-control-utilize syndrome was conducive to imperial expansion. Its diffusion to colonized peoples contributed to imperial decline. Diffusion also affected postcolonial relationships. Because colonized peoples became more like Europeans in adopting a developmental stance to Nature, the basis was laid for extensive international economic ties after political ties were severed. Phase 5 new states, like their phase 2 predecessors, wanted European capital and technology. The desired transfers were primarily through the private profit sector for phase 2 states (portfolio investment) and largely through the public sector (foreign aid) for phase 5 states. But behind different modes of transfer lay the fundamental similarity that transfer was taking place, and on terms both sides could live with. Ex-metropolises learned they could deal profitably with ex-colonies because ex-colonies wanted what was needed to catch up to them. The shared commitment to make nature useful moderated old antagonisms and made postcolonial relations more congenial and interdependent than might have been expected.

Cutting political ties with a metropole made it possible to arrange economic exchanges with numerous European countries. The independence of South American countries enabled British private interests to invest profitably in the continent's mines, railroads, and utilities. Phase 5 states negotiated aid agreements with many European countries as well as with the two superpowers. As transnational European institutions developed, diplomats from new states negotiated with people representing the region and not simply its individual countries. Several rounds of negotiations between the European Economic Community and African, Caribbean, and Pacific states produced conventions governing trade, investment, and aid.¹¹ In both decolonization phases the end of empire meant that Europe mattered more to ex-colonies even as ex-metropolises mattered less.

—Colonial-era patterns of extraction, production, transport, and trade carried on into independence. In general, this economic legacy was even more durable than the political one.

Earlier chapters noted the emergence of open colonial economies with high ratios of trade to gross domestic product and exports consisting mainly of unprocessed or semiprocessed primary products. When new-state elites had little interest in changing this arrangement, as in nineteenth-century Latin America, the fact that it continued should not be surprising. But even phase 5 nationalists committed to reversing inherited patterns found it difficult if not impossible to do so once they came to power. Earlier investments in mines, plantations, roads, railways, and port

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facilities constituted sunk costs that could be recovered and generate profits only if they continued to operate much as they had. New governments anxious to industrialize had to decide how to finance the heavy up-front costs of new factories and related infrastructure. Borrowing abroad was risky, especially if loans could not be repaid. High debt levels could lead not only to economic crisis as scarce resources were diverted to repayment but also to loss of sovereignty as lenders imposed macro-economic policy conditions on "structural adjustment" bailout packages. Foreign exchange generated through the existing export base had the advantage of preserving a semblance of policy autonomy. Thus, in order to change the composition of imports and domestic output many new states found they had little choice but to retain the composition of exports. A planned break with the past entailed unexpected continuity with the past. Only in rare instances was a phase 5 country able substantially to increase the manufactured component of exports within the first quarter century of independence.

New states generally avoided lowering the levels of external exposure they inherited. In rare cases such as Haiti and Burma small countries turned inward. India had a sufficiently large domestic market and industrial base to shift toward self-reliance after 1947. But these are exceptions. Most new states remained highly vulnerable to external economic trends. They benefited if terms of trade rose but lost out if terms declined, as happened over the long term for many countries. The elaborate multiyear plans announced with fanfare by phase 5 states were in effect efforts to hide, through largely symbolic rituals, inability to chart the economic future.

Once large-scale colonial operations like mines, plantations, and ranches were in place, there were strong economy-of-scale arguments to retain them after independence. It made little difference in this respect if ownership passed from private to public hands. Nationalization might be politically radical. But it was economically conservative, in the sense that new public sector owners only confirmed colonial-era patterns of commodity production. Returning to small-scale, localized, kin-based units of precolonial days was out of the question, at least for goods traded on the world market.

—Imperial rule helped Christianity become a world religion.

What I have termed Euro-Christianity spread with the dispersal of settler communities, and some version of it was adopted as the official faith of most phase 2 regimes. But it spread as well among non-Europeans in response to the work of missionaries. The sectoral autonomy of religious bodies and their calling to go out to all the world meant that they did not confine their work to areas incorporated into overseas empires. But it is in these areas that their campaigns were most successful over the long term, in large part because public sector resources and protection sustained missionary endeavors. Who governed the state affected how people

worshiped. Euro-Christianity's spread was hindered in noncolonized areas like Japan and China, where ruling elites saw its doctrine and its followers as political threats.

—*For many intellectuals and other opinion leaders in new states, the struggle for psychological independence was more protracted and emotionally exhausting than the struggle for political independence. Images people held of themselves and their abilities continued to be affected by negative stereotypes derived from the colonial era.*

The superiority complex was a legacy centuries of global dominance bequeathed to Europeans. The inferiority complex was a legacy with which many residents of colonies and ex-colonies have had to grapple. One response of people to being told repeatedly that they were inadequate was angrily to deny the charge. Resentment at being humiliated by colonial authority figures was salient in the discourse of nationalist movements. One sees it in the reaction of Spanish American creoles to the slights of *peninsulares*, and even more so in the rage non-Europeans expressed over racially based taunts and acts of discrimination.

In general, leaders of independence movements did not try to replace one superiority complex with another. They argued not that the colonial nation was morally, intellectually, or culturally better than the metropole but rather that it deserved to be treated as the equal of nations elsewhere. Phase 5 movements phrased the crusade for equality in universalistic terms. All human beings possessed certain rights, above all the right not to be treated as subhuman. Independence was the political manifestation of the fundamental claim to dignity, as well as a way of ensuring that the claim would not be violated again. In Nkrumah's words, "It is only when people are politically free that other races can give them the respect that is due to them. It is impossible to talk of equality of races in any other terms. No people without a government of its own can expect to be treated on the same level as peoples of independent sovereign states."¹²

Another response, found among non-Europeans who attended Western-style schools, was to concede that the colonizer's civilization was superior but to insist that they be offered opportunities to become part of it through cultural assimilation. This approach internalized the inferiority complex at the collective level of indigenous culture while rejecting it at the individual level. In territories in which colonial rulers adopted assimilationist policies, postcolonial elites consisted primarily of individuals who had struggled to cross the cultural line—and succeeded. These people might use populist rhetoric on appropriate public occasions. But how plausible was their national leadership when they had devoted so much effort to rejecting the culture of their fellow citizens? Neither were they inclined to ask how indigenous ways of thinking and acting might resolve their country's problems. Intent on modernization, they tended to regard traditional rulers, folk religions, herbalists and

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their remedies, old patterns of dress, traditional handicrafts and the like as relics of a primitive past that did not deserve to survive.

Another response among non-Europeans was to believe the claim that they were individually and collectively inferior. This was of course a deeply disturbing thought. Subconscious internalization of the inferiority complex was the most pernicious outcome of all.

The inferiority complex could coexist with other responses, including anger at the way one's people were being humiliated and exploited. Frantz Fanon writes bitterly in *The Wretched of the Earth* of the evils of colonialism, urging the colonized to take up arms against their white oppressors. The same author, in *Black Skin, White Masks*, writes in tortured prose about the self-hatred he cannot escape because his whole social environment relentlessly conveys the message of black inferiority.

However they coped with accusations of inadequacy, non-Europeans had to devise coping mechanisms of some sort, which took time and emotional energy. The existential challenge of battling what the Indian cultural theorist Ashis Nandy calls "the intimate enemy: the loss of self" threatened to distract individuals from the challenge of making the most of their country's newly won independence.¹³ Excitement about shaping a better future was less intense when demons from the past had to be exorcised.

Stephen Jay Gould eloquently describes the effects of doubting one's competence and feeling ashamed of a group with whom one is identified. Gould's words apply to more than colonial and postcolonial situations. But European overseas rule did more than anything else to shape the racial and cultural forms self-hatred takes in the modern world. "We only get to go through this world once, as far as we know," Gould writes, "and if our lives are thwarted, if our hopes are derailed, if our dreams are made impossible by limitations imposed from without, but falsely identified as residing within us, then in a way that's the greatest tragedy one can imagine. And millions—hundreds of millions—of human lives have been so blighted."¹⁴

IMPACTS ON WESTERN EUROPE

—State formation was accelerated.

Empire building abroad had to await formation of centralized states at home. But the two processes became mutually reinforcing once some measure of control was gained in overseas lands. When colonies yielded net gains to a metropole's treasury, extra resources were available to strengthen its bureaucracy and armed forces. In effect, an increase in a state's international extractive capacity raised its ability to regulate domestic affairs.¹⁵ Castile's Queen Isabella and England's Queen Elizabeth I were skilled at using foreign initiatives to enhance their power. Spain's

Philip II liberally dispensed Mexican silver pesos to influential Portuguese to bolster his successful claim (1581) to the Portuguese throne.¹⁶ Access to overseas resources gave monarchs an edge over local nobles, whose resource base was confined to their own domains. Colonies gave rulers valuable patronage opportunities.¹⁷ A land grant charter or governorship could reward supporters. Overseas posts could buy off rivals or dispatch them to virtual exile. Such forms of patronage typically came at no cost to the metropole, as colonies were expected to cover their own administrative expenses.

Charles Tilly's assertion that in western Europe "war made the state, and the state made war"¹⁸ should be complemented by the observation that the European state made the overseas empire, and the empire helped make the European state.

—*Domestic political stability was enhanced.*

Overseas possessions and issues relating to empire enabled rulers to deflect, divert, and undercut domestic opposition. This reduced the likelihood of unrest and revolt from below and made it easier for those in power to retain it.

Absorption of settlers by selected colonies probably increased metropolitan stability by lowering population pressures in overcrowded areas and removing troublesome minorities, notably Puritans, Baptists, and Quakers to BNA and French Huguenots to Dutch South Africa. Moreover, all imperial powers used colonies as dumping grounds for persons convicted of criminal offenses. "With rare exceptions after the initial conquest of Ceuta in 1415," writes Gerald Bender, "every [Portuguese] ship involved in the discoveries and conquests held a contingent of *degradados* (convicts). . . . Laws governing the use of *degradados* in the conquests date back to 1434." The overwhelming majority of Angola's Portuguese residents from the initial explorations to the early twentieth century were exiled convicts.¹⁹ Britain found it convenient to establish Georgia and Australia as penal colonies at a time when private enclosure of communally shared lands and the rapid growth of newly industrializing urban centers produced enormous social dislocation and economic inequality.

Following the massive workers' uprising in Paris in 1848, "the Second Republic felt itself called upon to solve the underlying social problem," writes Charles-Robert Ageron, "and the Assembly voted 50 million francs to clear the capital of subversive elements. Unemployed artisans and labourers made over 100,000 applications for free grants of land in Algeria; in the end there were 20,000 such emigrants, 15,000 of them from Paris, who settled in Algeria in forty-two new villages."²⁰ Ex-revolutionaries quickly became reactionaries, ardently supporting French rule in Algeria. In one stroke the government turned enemies at home into agents of expansion abroad.

A long-term effect of Britain's industrial development was a surge in population. Having to absorb all entrants to the labor force would have been difficult, particularly when the business cycle turned downward in the 1870s. More than twelve

million people left the United States, with a racial legacy; other nations in the absence of these emigrants experienced unrest and a morass of dominions in turn of power to Britain, making it feed itself.

When political power was used to generate economic performance at home, it was designed primarily for the 1830s.²¹ Politicians like Benjamin Disraeli, James Callaghan, and others were unclear whether the empire had backfired on him or whether the expectation that it would

If expansionism had not been, the empire could destroy itself. The Fourth Republic was a government over a world of movements. Both the empire and the republic were ship and hence republic.

—*How metropolitan power was used in the European interstate system to promote war and peace.*

Having overthrown the empire, the republic disappeared. Profoundly, the Holland win the status as a player in something when the accident are all five state metropolises of politics that failed to enclaves outside the coastal port. In one to loss of sovereignty, the Battle of El Ksar-el

million people left Great Britain in the nineteenth century. Most emigrated to the United States, where the predominance of English-speakers was an enduring colonial legacy; others went to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. In the absence of these vents for surplus population, Britain might have experienced urban unrest and a more radical working-class movement. The United States and the white dominions in turn sent vast quantities of wheat, beef, lamb, and dairy products to Britain, making staple foods available at low cost to a country no longer able to feed itself.

When politics took a populist turn in phase 3 the quest for overseas territory was used to generate mass support or to mute or deflect criticism of a government's performance at home. Among the earliest examples of an overseas "circus" designed primarily for domestic consumption was the French invasion of Algiers in 1830.²¹ Politicians seizing on imperial issues for electoral purposes included Benjamin Disraeli, Jules Ferry, Otto von Bismarck, and Joseph Chamberlain.²² It is unclear whether their actions had the desired effect. Ferry's Vietnam policy, in fact, backfired on him. But major expansionist initiatives were taken in phase 3 in the expectation that they would increase popular support for the government of the day.

If expansion helped stabilize metropolitan regimes, the impending loss of empire could destabilize them, as occurred twice in phase 5, with the fall of France's Fourth Republic in 1958 over Algeria and the coup in 1974 against the Caetano government over the Portuguese armed forces' inability to defeat African nationalist movements. Both instances involved a change of regime as well as of national leadership and hence represented a major break with politics as usual.

—How metropolises fared overseas influenced membership and status in the European interstate system and affected procedures for handling relations among states in war and peace.

Having overseas possessions may have influenced whether a polity survived or disappeared. Profits generated by the Dutch East India Company doubtless helped Holland win the long struggle for independence from Habsburg rule. Holland's status as a player in Southeast Asian trade and politics must have counted for something when independence was internationally acknowledged in 1648. Not by accident are all five phase 1 metropolises still functioning as states, as are the three new-state metropolises of phase 3. On the other side of the ledger, of hundreds of phase 1 polities that failed to survive only two made halfhearted efforts to establish trading enclaves outside the Mediterranean basin.²³ None administered territories back of a coastal port. In one case noted earlier, failure to capture overseas territory led directly to loss of sovereignty: Portugal's incorporation into Spain following its defeat at the Battle of El Ksar-el-Kabir.

Metropolises with access to colonies during wartime enjoyed a strategic edge. In this respect the distribution of imperial power influenced the outcome of hegemonic wars. England's victories over France in the Seven Years' and Napoleonic Wars owe a great deal to its ability to trade with far-flung colonies while using seapower to curtail France's ability to do likewise. Writing after World War I, the French colonial administrator Albert Sarraut stressed how important France's possessions had been:

When after the attack of 1914 the first battalions of black troops arrived, immediately followed by those disembarking from Asia, Antilles, and Madagascar, when our industries became full of hardworking and silent Indochinese workers, when our harbors and storehouses were stocked with abundant products from our overseas possessions, when successive war borrowing recorded hundreds of millions of subscriptions by French and indigenous peoples from our colonies, everyone noticed suddenly that the efforts of our soldiers and administrators and colonizers, ignored until then, were not worthless.²⁴

Germany and its allies could not extract comparable resources from outside the war theater.

Did competition for colonies raise the propensity of European states to go to war? This was quite likely the case in phases 1 and 2 but not in phase 3, so the evidence is mixed. The answer appears to depend on whether mechanisms were in place for resolving a wide range of interstate conflicts. The limited number of such mechanisms in phase 1 may have caused competition overseas to intensify and lengthen wars fought on European soil. The greater number of diplomatic mechanisms in phase 3 may have had the opposite effect, permitting territorial scrambles to deflect rivalries to areas of the world not threatening any metropole's vital interests.

A colony could stabilize international relations by being used as a pawn in diplomatic negotiations. Exchanges of non-European territory in the last decade of phase 3 reduced the level of tension among great powers and postponed the day of reckoning. After the French declared a protectorate over Morocco very little additional real estate was available, either to reward the winner of a peaceful great-power confrontation or to compensate the loser. The competition for colonies did not cause World War I, as Lenin argued; more likely the termination of the scramble for colonies depleted available buffers against the resort to violence and made war more likely.

Europeans gained valuable diplomatic experience as they negotiated overseas claims. They attended conferences and signed treaties—as at Tordesillas (1494), Brussels (1876), Berlin (1885), and Algéciras (1906)—that addressed disputes over foreign lands. Formal settlements of major European wars in 1714, 1763, 1815, and 1914 contained protocols redistributing governance rights over colonies. Imperial issues

enabled diplomatic management of conflict, and governments to i

Possession enhancing the status of the larger world, aspiring to become a power with empire and England. But in subsequent phases, the role of the metropole was far more limited within Europe than in the reluctant imperial phase. It would not be as significant outside the region.

—The private

Capitalism: the profit sector inspired by empire in the more firmly established metropolitan-overseas trading shipping, and plantations. Effects, and export portion of gains from resources in Europe.

Colonial government security, protecting port networks, and (12). In these ways raised profit making occurred had the colony's public revenue close to subsistence.

A legacy of private investment in the New World gained handsomely from folio loans to na

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enabled diplomats to hone their skills, develop widely accepted procedures for conflict management in their own region, and learn about the capacity and will of other governments to implement agreements.

Possession of territories outside the European system had symbolic value, enhancing the status of countries so obviously able to make their presence known in the larger world. Not all metropolises were great powers. But all European countries aspiring to become great powers acquired colonies. The tendency to associate greatness with empire can be traced to the major metropolises of phase 1: Spain, France, and England. But once the association was made it affected foreign policies of states in subsequent phases. This is best shown by Germany under Bismarck. The chancellor was far more interested in consolidating and preserving Germany's leadership within Europe than in extending its power overseas. But the fact that he became a reluctant imperialist only demonstrates the point: he came to believe that Germany would not be acknowledged a great regional power until it acquired possessions outside the region.

—The private profit sector was strengthened.

Capitalism and imperialism were mutually reinforcing enterprises. Private profit sector institutions played leading roles in founding and consolidating empire. Empire in turn strengthened the sector and set west European countries even more firmly along the path of capitalist development. Not all, but a great many metropolitan-owned colonial ventures turned a profit. These included firms handling shipping, insurance, wholesale and retail trade, corporations owning mines and plantations, banks lending large sums to governments for infrastructure projects, and exporters of capital goods like railroad equipment and structural steel. A portion of gains from overseas activities was presumably invested in profitable ventures in Europe, thereby fortifying the sector in its home base.

Colonial governments helped capitalist institutions by providing physical security, protecting property claims, financing construction of port facilities and transport networks, and ensuring access to desired amounts of low-cost labor (see chapter 12). In these ways governments lowered the risks and costs of private ventures and raised profit margins. In many cases overseas private investment would not have occurred had the government not been run by Europeans. When the bulk of a colony's public revenue was generated by non-Europeans, a subject population living close to subsistence involuntarily subsidized wealthy foreign enterprises.

A legacy of colonial rule was ex-colonies whose elites eagerly sought European private investment. Phase 3 offers an instructive contrast between former colonies in the New World and colonies-to-be in the Old. European investors in the Americas gained handsome profits from assets like mines and utilities and returns on portfolio loans to new governments. They saw no need to recolonize New World states

because, with elites of European descent running government, the political conditions were in place for outsiders to make secure, profitable transactions. At the same time many European investors pressured their governments to claim territory in Africa and Asia. There the desired political conditions were absent because rulers of indigenous polities were ambivalent toward foreign investment or hostile to it. The different attitude of European private sectors toward ex-colonies and what might be called prospective colonies partly explains why phase 3 metropolises did not try to reconquer independent countries in the Americas while simultaneously sponsoring conquest in Africa and Asia. An apparently inconsistent foreign policy was in fact quite consistent. It followed the maxim that profit seekers could do far better in areas that were colonies or had been so than in places never brought under metropolitan rule.

Some of the gains capitalists made from the colonies were spent for political ends at home. Money financed electoral campaigns and, whether placed on top of the table or under it, swayed politicians in their decision making. Lobbying efforts helped ensure that restrictive regulations and high tax rates were not imposed or, if on the books, not assiduously enforced.²⁵ In these ways business interests maintained the high level of influence over—and autonomy from—the public sector that has long marked west European societies.

—European economic development was stimulated.

It is beyond the scope of this book to estimate how much the colonies contributed to European economic growth. Some scholars conclude that the impact was significant, others that on balance it was negligible.²⁶ The more modest goal here is to trace how resources extracted from colonies stimulated metropolitan growth and structural change. At issue is the nature if not the magnitude of the contribution.

Two caveats are in order. Colonies varied enormously in the capacity to assist development outside their borders. Clearly, much depended on factor endowments, population, location, and the role (if any) of settlers. Moreover, the most a colony could contribute were *potentially* productive resources. There was no guarantee that potential would be realized. For evidence of missed opportunities one has only to observe the Habsburgs, who squandered vast supplies of New World bullion on wars and anti-Reformation propaganda campaigns. Whether a metropole made good use of its empire's resources depended on how its society, polity, and economy were structured.

An obvious rationale for colonies was that they supplied valued commodities unobtainable at home. Cinnamon, pepper, tobacco, tea, coffee, cocoa, and cane sugar were consumed by growing numbers of Europeans. Other commodities were inputs in manufacturing operations. Cotton and tropical dyes were essential compo-

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nents in Britain's early textile-based industrialization. Tin, rubber, chrome, copper, bauxite, and petroleum were likewise crucial at later stages of European industrial development. Gum arabic was used in the manufacture of textiles, paper, medicines, confections, and cosmetics. Palm oil literally lubricated the wheels of industry and, as an ingredient in soap, kept the industrial work force clean. Colonies were important sources of all these commodities, in some instances the only areas where they could be obtained. Political control over the source increased assurance of future access and made it easier for metropolitan manufacturers to invest large sums in factories dependent on imported inputs.

Slave labor in phase 1 plantation colonies kept production costs of sugar, indigo, tobacco, and cotton artificially low, enabling the emerging European middle class to consume more of these commodities. In *Capitalism and Slavery* Eric Williams shows how profits amassed by slave traders and owners of West Indian sugar plantations were invested in new technologies. Capital from the West Indian trade financed Boulton and Watt, the first firm to manufacture the steam engine.²⁷

Government policies regulating trade between Britain and India gave early industrialization a boost. Lightweight, brightly colored cotton cloths imported from India, known as calicoes, became popular in the early eighteenth century and threatened English wool interests. Responding to pressure, Parliament in 1721 passed the Calico Act prohibiting display or consumption of printed cotton goods. This constructed a barrier behind which the infant industry of cotton textile manufacturing, using imported raw cotton, got its start.²⁸ Given the critical importance of cotton textiles to the first Industrial Revolution, what might have happened had free-trade principles been applied and Indian competition not been restricted? A century later the East India Company took the opposite approach and removed duties on British textiles entering India. This assured Lancashire's mills a valuable overseas market and further undercut competition from Indian handloom weavers. Had Indians set tariffs on goods entering their country they would presumably have acted to protect endangered domestic interests in the way that Parliament did. But the British were in charge at home *and* in India. Tariff policies in both settings had the effect of industrializing one country and pushing the other toward rural stagnation.

In both the colonial and independence eras, settler communities were closely tied to the European economy as exporters of primary products and avid importers of the latest consumer goods. To the extent that settlers and their descendants became wealthier overseas than if they had not emigrated, they stimulated Europe's development by spending additional income on its exports.

—*Empire helped create and reinforce a superiority complex.*

In many situations Europeans quickly and easily subdued indigenous peoples.

Those early encounters took place not simply across lines of racial and cultural difference but also across the gap of power inequality. Europeans found it difficult to separate observations about difference from those about inequality—and many observers had an active interest in blurring that very distinction. It was but a short mental leap for people superior in power to infer that they were superior in intellect, morality, and civilization as well. The superiority complex served as a rationalization for colonial rule and, by reducing qualms over the rightness of dominating other people, was empowering in its own right.

The inequality built into cross-cultural encounters affected what European observers saw, did not see, and imagined or fantasized that they saw. More important, it affected the meaning of the observers' experience, which was then conveyed through words and pictures to a broad reading public at home. Edward Said's influential study *Orientalism* emphasized how perceptions shaped by power and self-interest distorted Europeans' views of themselves and the colonized Other. This idea is a leitmotif in the rapidly growing field of cultural and postcolonial studies.²⁹

Power asymmetry reinforced a recurring human tendency to describe real or imagined cultural dissimilarities in normatively loaded language. European travelers sometimes used complimentary terms to describe people they met. Political theorists relying on travelers' reports sometimes emphasized positive features, as when they referred to the nobility and generosity of New World peoples. But more often what was strange to the traveler and armchair philosopher was described as repulsive, barbaric, irrational, and uncivilized. Or unfamiliar customs were deemed bizarre, implying that their practitioners were not fully human.

Colonial rule made negative stereotyping easy and relatively costless. The deepening and broadening of dominance described in part 4 increased the range of settings in which Europeans could express a superiority complex without fear of retaliation. Their control of the means of coercion made it dangerous for colonial subjects to question, much less confront, the complex's assumptions and claims. When Europeans could largely shape the form cross-cultural interaction took, they came to believe that negative stereotypes were not instances of self-serving prejudice but documentable matters of fact. The ruling caste's prejudices, in other words, were reinforced by judgments made after observing group relations in the colonial situation.

How the superiority complex was phrased and justified varied over time and from one metropole to another. But a theme constantly emphasized from phase 1 well into the twentieth century was that Europeans were especially skilled at governance. They took pride in a long tradition of founding polities, ranging in scale from Greek and Italian city-states to postfeudal national states to the vast Roman empire. A colonial administration, once installed, gave Europeans additional cause to believe

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they were good rulers. For not only did they know how to govern themselves; they also knew how to rule alien people in places far from the civilizational center. What is more, went the claim, Europeans knew how to govern others better than others could ever govern themselves. Colonial rule did its subjects a favor for which they should be grateful.

Sentiments and values nurtured on imperial frontiers were conveyed to people who never left home. Colonial rule shaped Europe's self-image by juxtaposing its civilized self to the uncivilized existence of subordinate peoples abroad.

This legacy carried over to the postcolonial era. Just as formerly colonized peoples struggled to throw off an internalized inferiority complex, so those who once ran the world found it difficult to abandon the belief that they were truly superior to everyone else.

—*Empire contributed to a guilt complex.*

Some Europeans appealed to core values of Western civilization in bitterly criticizing what their compatriots were doing overseas. There is a long tradition of carefully documented attacks by insiders on European greed, cruelty, exploitation, sexual misconduct, and hypocrisy. It dates to the first years of settlement in the Americas with the sermons of Father Antonio Montesino and the impassioned lobbying of Bishop Bartolomé de Las Casas. It can be traced through the writings of William Wilberforce and other Abolitionist crusaders to the nineteenth-century Dutch administrator and novelist Eduard Douwes Dekker to twentieth-century critics like E. D. Morel, André Gide, Norman Leys, Fenner Brockway, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Critics did not necessarily conclude that the colonial enterprise should be abandoned: Las Casas and Morel called for reform despite impressive evidence they themselves amassed that human rights abuses were intrinsic to foreign rule. In some cases, however, Europeans supported movements for independence against their own countries. Annie Besant and Rev. Charles Andrews were active in Indian nationalist circles in phase 4. Sartre and Brockway were articulate, impassioned critics of French and British colonial policies, respectively.

With the final collapse of empire in phase 5, a desire to atone for past sins has probably played a role, however sublimated, in the foreign policy of former metropolises. It may have been a factor in the establishment of foreign aid programs. It may also account for reluctance by many European officials and intellectuals to criticize the human rights violations of new-state leaders.³⁰ One sees this, for example, in the cordial relations between France's presidents—from de Gaulle through Mitterrand—and leaders of repressive military and one-party regimes in francophone Africa.

A sense of guilt does not entail the absence of a sense of superiority. The two may coexist, as when Europeans (or westerners generally) use demanding moral

standards to criticize their own countries' domestic and foreign policies and lower standards to evaluate non-European regimes. That the superiority complex continues into the present is most unmistakable in the rhetoric of some on the political right. The complex is more subtly manifested but nonetheless present in the double moral standards sometimes employed by the left.

GLOBAL IMPACTS

—An interstate system once confined to Europe has been enlarged to cover the world.

The combination of European imperialism and anticolonial nationalism globalized the idea and institutions of the territorial, bureaucratic, sovereign state. The original interstate system, whose existence was so conducive to imperialism, was transformed by the addition of polities whose very formation signaled imperial decline. Yet characteristics of the old system persist in the new, expanded version: the exchange of diplomats, for example, the principle of diplomatic immunity, and treaty-drafting conventions. International negotiations are for the most part conducted in metropolitan languages. The idea that sovereign states are equal in key respects despite glaring inequalities in others is universally accepted. Thus, state *A* is accorded the legal and moral right not to be invaded by state *B* even if *A* is small, poor, and weak while *B* is a great power. This egalitarian feature of the old system is particularly welcomed by new states, the great majority of which are far poorer and weaker than their former rulers. Application of the *one state—one vote* principle in international meetings gives each unit a sense that it matters, whatever its resources or the capacity of its rulers to govern.³¹ Today's global system, like the old European one, is ultimately anarchic and potentially unstable. Yet widespread acceptance of multiple sovereignties tends to reduce insecurity and routinizes relations among the system's component parts.

Colonialism had contradictory effects on the numbers of units in the interstate system. As just noted, it led eventually to a far larger and more geographically dispersed membership than obtained in a system initially confined to one region. But European rule decimated hundreds of polities by incorporating them, often *summarily and brutally, within colonial boundaries*. Among the most obvious instances were New Spain, British India, the Dutch East Indies, Nigeria, and German East Africa. Had the system evolved to include all indigenous polities functioning when Europeans first encountered them, there might be one or two thousand states today. It is difficult to imagine how—or whether—that many units could regulate their relations in any meaningful way. Paradoxically, forcible incorporation of myriad small polities into larger ones during earlier centuries may have made possible relatively stable interactions among sovereign states in modern times.

—Empires stir the global economy.

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LEGACIES

—Empires stimulated an enormous rise in long-distance trade, resulting in a global economy.

The volume and variety of commodities transported from one continent to another rose dramatically during the centuries of European dominance. One should not attribute this phenomenon wholly to colonial rule. Europe's private profit sectors were more directly involved in overseas commerce than public sectors, and maritime trade did not always require the flag. But metropolitan governments did a great deal to influence the extent, direction, and composition of trade. This was most obvious with mercantilist policies in phase 1, but no less important in phases 3 and 4 when decisions based on a Eurocentric interpretation of comparative advantage created and then reinforced the concentration of industrial production in metropolises.

The persistent tendency of Europeans to assert formal control over other parts of the world is itself the clearest indication that, despite the technological and economic advantages they so often enjoyed over others, in the final analysis they lacked confidence in the workings of the free—that is, uncoerced and politically unregulated—market. Public sector institutions were set up to ensure a higher prominence for trade and to guarantee Europeans a higher portion of gains from it than would have occurred had outcomes been driven by the market alone.

Much is made today of globalization as if it were a recent phenomenon. To say this is to ignore the history of most of the world. For most ex-colonial countries a high degree of openness and vulnerability to economic trends elsewhere—including flows of capital and advanced technology—has been a reality for centuries. Political independence may be a necessary condition for changing an inheritance of economic dependence, but it is by no means a sufficient condition. Trade patterns between an industrialized north and a primary product-producing south are difficult to change in the postcolonial era, in large part because they have deep roots in the formative colonial stage of the globalization process.

—Overseas empires spread a transformative stance toward nature. As rapid economic development becomes a universal goal, an urgent question is whether the physical environment can withstand the sustained assaults mounted on it in all countries.

The development ethos pervading today's world can be traced to the explore-control-utilize syndrome impelling five centuries of European expansion. Settler nationalists in phase 2 and non-European nationalists later (with the virtually unique exception of Gandhi) did not critique this syndrome. Instead they enthusiastically adopted it, viewing independence as a way to continue and if possible accelerate the transformation of nature. This point was eloquently made by the Indonesian nationalist Soetan Sjahrir in his intellectual biography *Out of Exile*:

For me, the West signifies forceful, dynamic, and active life. It is a sort of Faust that I admire, and I am convinced that only by a utilization of this dynamism of the West can the East be released from its slavery and subjugation. The West is now teaching the East to regard life as a struggle and a striving, as an active movement to which the concept of tranquillity must be subordinated. . . . [Struggle and striving] signify a struggle against nature, and that is the essence of the struggle: man's attempt to subdue nature and to rule it by his will.³²

The larger the number of people holding this view, the more must one question the confident assumption of earlier eras that nature can be manipulated with impunity. The harmful environmental consequences of colonial development were manageable for the most part. The same cannot be said of the postcolonial world, in which ex-metropolises and ex-colonies alike redesign the landscape so their citizens can live longer, more comfortable lives. Might nature, under continuous and accelerating assault, launch a lethal counterattack? The triumph of the syndrome that drove imperialism may at some point become a Pyrrhic victory.

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The Moral Evaluation of Colonialism

Was European colonial rule good or bad? The subject matter invites normative judgments, for at issue are the lives and livelihoods, the well-being and worldviews of hundreds of millions of human beings. People do not need to know much about colonialism to hold strong opinions about its moral status.

It is one thing to say that an ethical evaluation of colonialism is appropriate. It is quite another to decide how to carry out that evaluation in a thoughtful, sensitive, consistent, and thorough way. The good or bad question is deceptively simple. Even if one retains the narrow definition of colonialism used in chapter 16, the subject's scope is so vast and the forms colonial rule took so varied that rendering an overall verdict seems fruitless. Edmund Burke told Parliament that "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people." Is there a method of indicting—or vindicating—the peoples and governments of western Europe for an immense range of activities spanning several centuries? The answer, from the standpoint of social science methodology, is that there is not. But from a broader standpoint this response is unsatisfactory, especially if it excuses one from moral reflection on the past. People make ethical judgments not only on personal and interpersonal matters but also on large-scale phenomena like imperialism and colonialism. The issue is not whether they should engage in macro-level moralizing but how carefully and persuasively they do so. What is their frame of reference? What standards do they use? What evidence do they cite to support their position? How well do they deal with opposing viewpoints?

One way to proceed is to convene, as it were, leading critics and defenders of empire and construct a debate between them. Placing their arguments next to one another permits a close examination and critique of each side's evidence, logic, normative standards, and visions of what might have happened had overseas empires not existed. One can see whether critics and defenders directly engage or talk past each other, are deeply and irreconcilably at odds or agree on many points. The

imagined debate that follows shows that protagonists argue past each other much of the time, each side ignoring the claims of the other when it is convenient to do so. This implies that if both sides addressed the same features of colonialism, took evidence from the same historical cases, and were prepared to accept each other's counterfactual assumptions, they would find they were not as far apart as they think they are.

WHERE DO CRITICS AND DEFENDERS DISAGREE?

In constructing this imagined debate I rely heavily on twentieth-century authors located at one end or the other of the spectrum of informed opinion. Although their examples are taken mainly from Asian and African territories acquired in phase 3, the basic arguments apply to other times and places as well. Prominent critics include Aimé Césaire, Walter Rodney, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, and Andre Gunder Frank. Among prominent defenders are P. T. Bauer, L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Alan Burns, Margery Perham—and, earlier in the century, Albert Sarraut and Frederick Lugard.¹ I then turn to authors occupying a middle ground. Some conduct cost-benefit analyses and identify features on both sides of the ledger. Others stress the moral ambiguities and contradictions inherent in colonial rule.²

Critics and defenders of empire accentuate their differences. But agreement exists and should be identified because it shows that the debate is not all-encompassing. The two sides concur that colonial rule should be judged by whether it helped or harmed the non-European subject population. Neither side disputes that governments and private interests in metropolises acquired valuable resources that would not have been as readily or cheaply available had empires not been in place. Neither side denies that European settlers generally fared quite well, at least after the initial hardships of relocating in strange lands. There is debate over how much metropolitans and settlers gained in income, wealth, and status, with gains set far higher by critics than by defenders. But from the standpoint of moral judgment this disagreement is immaterial. Defenders do not argue that colonialism was justified solely or primarily because Europeans benefited from it. Rather, they try to show that, in situations in which one assumes or can demonstrate that rulers did gain, non-European subjects also benefited. For critics the key issue is what happens to non-European peoples—and does not happen to them, to the extent that resources non-Europeans rightfully possessed were wrongly taken away. Since both sides concentrate on how the colonized fared under European rule, so shall I.

To a surprising degree critics and defenders concur over factual matters. When disputes over facts do arise they are treated as peripheral to the main argument. In one such dispute, the French government estimated the number of Algerian Muslims killed following the Sétif massacre of 1945 at 1,020 to 1,300, while nationalists in

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TABLE 17.1.

	<i>Per capita income</i>	
	<i>Before contact</i>	<i>Fifty years later</i>
Indigenous people	100 (in currency X or its equivalent)	300 X
Europeans	400 X	1,000 X

see evidence not only that exploitation had not occurred but that the opposite was at work. Indigenous per capita income rose, so the colonized were better off than before contact. Indigenous people gained by a higher percentage over the precontact base than did Europeans (200 percent to 150 percent), and the ratio of indigenous to European income rose from 1:4 to 3:10. Different operational indicators of a term thus permit the two sides to keep arguing despite their agreement that exploitation is immoral.

Did colonial government contribute to economic exploitation? Critics point out that government's coercive powers were used to support private profit ventures, including land alienation by settlers. Where official policies had their intended effect of keeping indigenous labor costs below free-market levels, forcing people to carry out unwanted tasks, restricting the best-paying jobs and contracts and the most productive land to Europeans, undercutting local artisans through discriminatory tariff policies, and so forth, the public sector made possible otherwise unattainable levels of exploitation. Defenders see government using its coercive and legal powers to create orderly, predictable, relatively peaceful settings conducive to productive activity. Without protection for private property rights, they argue, far less European capital and technology would have been invested overseas, with results benefiting all parties.

Should exploitation be measured in subjective as well as objective terms? Suppose the hypothetical island's indigenous inhabitants did not consider themselves poor before contact but did do so afterward, because of their close proximity to far wealthier Europeans. A growing sense of impoverishment thus coincided with rising prosperity. For critics, the way people think and feel about their circumstances should count, in this case on the negative side of the ledger. Defenders tend to discount subjective factors as irrelevant or misleading, especially when objectively measurable indicators point in the opposite direction.

Disagreement over how much exploitation occurred leads critics and defenders to use different terms to describe conditions in ex-colonized countries. Critics refer to *underdevelopment*, seen as economic stagnation or regression linked to highly unequal distributional outcomes as a result of advanced capitalist countries' actions. In Rodney's words,

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All of the countries named as "underdeveloped" in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural resources and labour.⁴

From this perspective, even if incomes of colonized people on the island rose from 100X to 300X, the gap that matters is between 300X and the far higher income the colonized should have received had the surplus over subsistence not been so unfairly distributed and so much of it siphoned off to the metropole.

Defenders reject the concept of underdevelopment because it ignores the contributions of European factors of production, relies on questionable zero-sum assumptions, and depends too heavily on counterfactual speculation. Defenders prefer "development," referring to actual as opposed to hypothetical increases in per capita production and consumption.

An advantage of using these two terms is that semantic and measurement disagreements between critics and defenders are made explicit. The extent of disagreement is less clear when both sides use the same word—like "exploitation"—to point to different phenomena.

—*Selection of comparative frames of reference*

Evaluation is ultimately an act of comparison. In effect, one places phenomenon X next to a real or imagined scenario suggested by standard Y and concludes that X is better or worse than the situation derived from standard Y. Obviously, the standard selected can profoundly influence the judgment reached. The opposite can also be true. That is, people may start with their conclusions, then work backward to select the standard leading them toward those conclusions. Critics and defenders of colonialism are highly selective in choosing comparison standards, employing those that reinforce conclusions each side has already reached. For example, critics describe non-European societies in positive ways, leading the colonial experience to look bad by comparison. Defenders describe non-European societies in negative ways, enabling European takeovers to appear as an improvement over pre-colonial realities.

Here is the contrast as drawn by Césaire:

Every day that passes, every denial of justice, every beating by the police, every demand of the workers that is drowned in blood, every scandal that is hushed up, every punitive expedition, every police van . . . brings home to us the value of our old societies. They were communal societies, never societies of the many for the

few. . . . They were democratic societies, always. They were cooperative societies, fraternal societies. I make a systematic defense of the societies destroyed by imperialism.⁵

While Rodney does not portray the past in such glowing terms, he stresses the organizational and technological achievements of African peoples, using Europeans' descriptions to support his argument:

Indeed, the first Europeans to reach West and East Africa by sea were the ones who indicated that in most respects African development was comparable to that which they knew. To take but one example, when the Dutch visited the city of Benin they described it thus:

"The town seems to be very great. When you enter into it, you go into a great broad street, not paved, which seems to be seven or eight times broader than the Warmoes street in Amsterdam. . . . These people are in no way inferior to the Dutch as regards cleanliness; they wash and scrub their houses so well that they are polished and shining like a looking glass."⁶

In contrast, defenders of colonialism use a standard relying heavily on worst-case scenarios. Their precolonial world is better described in Hobbesian than Rousseauian terms. Among features described are social practices repressed on humanitarian grounds when Europeans took over, including human sacrifice, slavery, killing of twins, persecution on allegations of witchcraft, widow burning, and live burial of criminals. Civil war, brigandage, anarchy, and despotism figure prominently in the story. Here is how Lord Lugard frames the comparison:

When I recall the state of Uganda at the time I made the treaty in 1890 which brought it under British control, or the state of Nigeria ten years later, and contrast them with the conditions of today, I feel that British effort—apart from benefits to British trade—has not been in vain. In Uganda a triangular civil war was raging—Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Muslims, representing the rival political factions of British, French, and Arabs, were murdering each other. Only a short time previously triumphant paganism had burnt Christians at the stake and reveled in holocausts of victims. Today there is an ordered Government with its own native parliaments. Liberty and justice have replaced chaos, bloodshed, and war. The wealth of the country steadily increases.⁷

When compared with this panoply of evils European rule appears quite attractive.

Justifying British rule in India, Theodore Roosevelt wrote, "There is now little or no room for the successful freebooters, chieftains, and despots who lived in gorgeous splendor, while under their cruel rule the immense mass of their countrymen festered in sodden misery. But the mass of the people have been, and are, far

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THE MORAL EVALUATION OF COLONIALISM

better off than ever before, far better off than they would be if English control was overthrown or withdrawn.”⁸

Critics regard the denial of self-government as one of colonialism’s most pernicious features. In their view, forcibly preventing people from shaping their collective affairs is intrinsically wrong, regardless of whether popular engagement in civic life has results an outside observer may or may not like. Denial of self-government was especially obvious in colonial situations, where the power gap between rulers and ruled was marked by observable racial and cultural differences. Insult was added to injury when Europeans claimed colonized peoples were incapable of governing themselves. How could non-Europeans refute these insulting charges—or at least test their validity—when the very people leveling the accusation refused to permit experiments in self-rule?

While not denying that power passed at some point from a few non-Europeans to a few Europeans, defenders doubt that political participation was widespread in precolonial times, above all in large states where democratic norms were unknown and communications technologies too poorly developed to gauge popular opinion even if rulers wanted to do so. Defenders question whether, from a democratic perspective, replacement of autocratic indigenous monarchs by autocratic Europeans was a retrograde step.⁹ Defenders add that when non-European rulers were culturally or physically distinct from their subjects—as in the Ottoman, Mughal, and Inca empires—their replacement by another group of foreigners, this time from Europe, did not constitute a loss of political autonomy. Autonomy had already been lost. Karl Marx, in some respects a defender of British rule in India as well as a penetrating critic, wrote of the subcontinent that “what we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.”¹⁰

When discussing economic changes introduced under colonial rule, critics point to instances in which land and other productive assets used by indigenous peoples were confiscated. People deprived of their traditional means of livelihood suffered declines in living standards as well as a profound threat to their way of life. Critics contrast precolonial patterns in which people worked for their own benefit with colonial economies in which slave and corvée labor further enriched the most privileged elements.

Defenders tend to ignore such instances or minimize their economic and moral meaning, dwelling instead on the introduction of technologies, commodities, animals, and crops that improved living standards for many non-Europeans.

Adam Smith's chapter entitled "On Colonies" in *The Wealth of Nations* draws this comparison:

Before the conquest of the Spaniards there were no cattle fit for draught either in Mexico or in Peru. The lama was their only beast of burden, and its strength seems to have been a good deal inferior to that of a common ass. The plough was unknown among them. They were ignorant of the use of iron. They had no coined money, nor any established instrument of commerce of any kind. Their commerce was carried on by barter. A sort of wooden spade was their principal instrument of agriculture. . . . In this state of things, it seems impossible, that either of those empires could have been so much improved or so well cultivated as at present, when they are plentifully furnished with all sorts of European cattle, and when the use of iron, of the plough, and of many of the arts of Europe, has been introduced among them. . . . In spite of the cruel destruction of the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are, probably, more populous now than they ever were before.¹¹

Another way to evaluate European rule is to compare colonies with territories not formally taken over. This raises the question whether colonial rule was a necessary condition for sustained economic development in non-European regions. Twentieth-century critics and defenders alike concur that economic development is desirable.¹² They agree that economic and cultural interchange between Europeans and other peoples can have positive outcomes for all concerned. The debate is whether development would have taken place to the extent and at the pace it did had the informal influence of European merchants and missionaries not been reinforced by formal rule. Césaire writes of the nineteenth century that "the technical outfitting of Africa and Asia, their administrative reorganization, in a word, their 'Europeanization,' was (as is proved by the example of Japan) in no way tied to the European *occupation*. . . . the Europeanization of the non-European continents could have been accomplished otherwise than under the heel of Europe."¹³ Japan's successful defensive modernization thus becomes a standard for comparison with territories deprived of similar opportunities for self-initiated development. For Césaire, Japan demonstrates that a bad means (colonialism) is not necessary for a good end (economic development).

In contrast, Gann and Duignan cite Ethiopia, where defensive modernization did not occur despite external security threats, as the standard for comparison with European accomplishments in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁴ By implication the Ethiopian case shows that in many places modernization would not have taken place had Europeans not initiated it. Defenders throw out a challenge to critics: "If you accept modernization as a desirable goal, you may have to accept a means to attain it in materially and technically backward societies that you find abhorrent. If you reject

the colonial means, you are condemning the most likely prospect of progress."

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It was colonialism that brought the world. Had it not been for the Western world, the Asian states would have remained in the past. Instead, the world has recovered from the 19th century and is now a science and technology from other

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Another way to draw comparisons is to contrast a society's experience of colonial rule with what one imagines its history would have been had it remained independent. There is no way, of course, to prove or disprove the validity of counterfactual thought experiments. But it is the very freedom to unfold a favored scenario without fear of contradiction that makes hypothetical speculation so attractive when contentious issues are debated. Nothing can prevent colonialism's critics from imagining a rosy alternative past, or its defenders from imagining a grim alternative one. In general, critics posit a non-European setting in which the costs of Europe's political dominance are absent but the benefits of its informal influence are present. This scenario leaves open the option of defensive modernization by indigenous leaders if only Europeans had not prematurely grabbed power. The Malaysian scholar Hussein Alatas writes,

It was colonial bondage which blocked the flow of assimilation from the Western world. Had there been a free intercourse between independent Aceh and the Western world from the 16th century onward, Aceh and similarly other Indonesian states would have reached an advanced state of development by now. Instead, the Dutch destroyed Aceh by a prolonged war. Until now, Aceh has not recovered its former status. . . . Like Japan, Russia, Turkey, and Thailand, by the 19th century [Indonesian] states would have recognized the benefits of modern science and technology from the West, as they did recognize similar benefits from other societies in the past.¹⁵

In contrast, defenders assume that had Europeans not ruled, their presence in other sectors of overseas societies would have been minimal. The defenders' scenario is the Hobbesian state of nature allegedly obtaining in the precontact period. Defenders lament that colonial officials are not given credit for preventing bad things that would have occurred absent foreign rule. G. B. Masfield of Britain's Colonial Agricultural Service writes, "No glory attached to the service for the famines that never occurred, the pests and diseases that did not devastate crops, and the steep hillsides that were prevented from being exposed to the disaster of soil erosion by their painstaking labours."¹⁶

—*Emphasis on selected aspects of the colonial situation*

The vast scope of the colonial enterprise permits critics and defenders to focus on those features that strengthen their respective cases while deemphasizing or ignoring features stressed by the other side. Thus critics underscore psychological and cultural dimensions, above all else the legacy of humiliation and individual and collective self-hatred among the colonized. Loss of pride in one's culture and the

declining integrity and autonomy of non-European cultural life under the triple assault are deemed among the most morally indefensible consequences of colonialism. Defenders spend virtually no time discussing such matters, focusing rather on European economic and technological accomplishments. During the first 50 years of rule in colony X, goes the usual defense, 3,100 miles of railroad track were laid, 16,480 children attended secondary schools, 6 new crops were introduced, and exports rose fourfold. These changes benefited everyone, including non-Europeans.¹⁷

This is a classic instance of protagonists arguing past each other. Critics emphasize subjective aspects of colonialism that are difficult to measure, while defenders cite readily measurable objective indicators. Critics praise cultural practices and values abandoned as societies set out toward European-style modernization. Defenders praise adoption of cultural practices and values consistent with modernization. Critics mourn the precipitate decline of cultural diversity. Defenders celebrate the global spread of a few cultures they consider superior and the cross-cultural communication made possible by widespread adoption of European languages. Critics talk about what happened *to* the colonized, defenders about what colonizers did *for* the colonized. Critics view the world from the ground-up perspective of subject peoples coping with deeply disruptive changes arbitrarily imposed by foreigners. Defenders view the world from the top-down perspective of rulers working diligently, under trying circumstances, to bring about progress in societies incapable of transforming themselves.

Césaire contrasts the way evaluation is framed by opposing sides:

They talk to me about progress, about "achievements," diseases cured, improved standards of living. *I* am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out. They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad tracks. . . . I am talking about millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life—from life, from the dance, from wisdom. . . . I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkys.¹⁸

Even when the two sides converge on the same topic and appeal to shared values, they manage to evade each other's arguments. Césaire and Rodney mourn the deaths of thousands in forced-labor railroad construction gangs. The French, writes Rodney, "got Africans to start building the Brazzaville to Pointe Noire railway, and it was not completed until 1933. Every year of its construction, some 10,000 people were driven to the site—sometimes from more than 1,000 kilometres away. At least 25% of

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the labour force died annually from starvation and disease."¹⁹ On the other side, Gann and Duignan write that "an ordinary freight train used nowadays in Africa will do the work of 15,000 to 20,000 carriers for one-fifth to one-tenth the cost. The steam engine thus relieved the sweating African porter from his age-old labors. . . . Africa's scarce manpower could at last be used in pursuits more profitable to the economy than head portage."²⁰

These writers agree that reducing the burden of exhausting physical labor is a good thing. Critics correctly point out the increase in this kind of labor, leading to tragic loss of life, during the railroad's construction. Defenders correctly point out the reduction in heavy labor, leading to widely shared economic gains, after construction was completed. One side examines railroads before they were operative but not afterward; the other does the reverse. Neither directly engages valid observations made by the other.

Nor does either side seriously engage the problem of morally assessing technologies with multiple, contradictory uses. A rail line carries trade goods that undermine some occupations and foster others. It can end the economic and intellectual isolation of a hinterland and simultaneously integrate a colony with the international economy on unequal, dependent terms. Trains carry troops dispatched to crush a colonial rebellion and nationalists bent on mobilizing mass disaffection. Can condemnation or praise summarize the complex, often unintended impacts of new transport and communication technologies?

Railways, telegraphs, wireless, and the like, writes Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography, *Toward Freedom*,

were welcome and necessary, and because the British happened to be the agents who brought them first, we should be grateful to them. But even these heralds of industrialism came to us primarily for the strengthening of British rule. They were the veins and arteries through which the nation's blood should have coursed, increasing its trade, carrying its produce, and bringing new life and wealth to its millions. It is true that in the long run some such result was likely, but they were designed to work for another purpose—to strengthen the imperial hold and to capture markets for British goods—which they succeeded in doing. I am all in favor of industrialization and the latest methods of transport, but sometimes, as I rushed across the Indian plains, the railway, that life-giver, has almost seemed to me like iron bands confining and imprisoning India.²¹

—*Interpretation of Europeans' stated intentions*

In assessing the morality of an action one can focus on the intentions of the actor or on the consequences of the act, whether intended or not. Critics and defenders of colonialism disagree on both counts, but their perspectives on intentionality

are instructive. Critics highlight situations in which European motives are crudely self-serving or opposed to the rights and interests of colonized peoples. The implication is that colonialism cannot be good because the motives driving it are bad. Defenders highlight rulers' claims that they are trying to benefit their subjects, for example, by spreading a superior civilization, saving souls, stimulating economic growth, and bringing law and justice and order to societies lacking them. Colonialism cannot be all that bad, defenders imply, if many of the motives driving it are good—or are believed to be so by those whose behavior one is judging.

The debate is joined over statements justifying colonial rule on grounds of altruistic intentions. A typical formulation is by Sir John Malcolm, governor of Bombay in the early nineteenth century. Britain's aim in India, said Malcolm, is "to pour the enlightened knowledge of civilisation, the arts and sciences of Europe, over the land, and thereby improve the condition of the people."²² Was this a typical example of hypocritical rhetoric, designed more to mislead than enlighten? Or did the governor genuinely believe what he was saying? If Malcolm was sincere, was this goal uppermost in his mind or far down on his list of reasons for Britain's presence? Supposing Malcolm was sincere and that the goal was primary, was it proper or improper to propose "pour[ing]" his country's civilization over the civilization(s) of another land? Critics and defenders disagree on all these counts, especially the last. Critics see Malcolm's project as ethnocentric, brazenly arrogant, and ignorant, hence morally indefensible. Defenders see the project as praiseworthy to the extent that Malcolm was motivated by the desire to do good, whether or not one shares his conception of the good. Defenders consider it inappropriate, if not unfair, retroactively to apply the enlightened standards of present-day times and places to the actions of a man in phase 2 Bengal. Defenders might add that policies consistent with Malcolm's goal were moral if they actually did "improve the condition of the people."

HOW FAR APART ARE CRITICS AND DEFENDERS?

The recurring tendency of critics and defenders to talk past each other rather than directly to challenge the other's assumptions and arguments suggests that their positions may not be as diametrically opposed as they imagine. Each side's emphasizing of certain aspects of the colonial situation while ignoring others implies an acknowledgment that its case is strongest on the issues stressed and weakest on those ignored. Likewise, when each side selects a comparative frame of reference that strengthens its position, it implicitly grants that alternative frames of reference might lead to other, unwelcome conclusions. For obvious tactical reasons the two sides prefer *not* to employ the same assumptions and comparative frameworks. But if they had to do so their views might converge.

Suppose both sides refrained from generalizing about colonialism as a single,

THE MORAL EVALUATION OF COLONIALISM

unvarying phenomenon and focused on circumstances under which European rule was least (or most) justifiable. Critics and defenders might agree that each of the following conditions, if it obtained in a territory, would strengthen the case against colonial rule there. By extension, the case against foreign rule would be strongest if all these conditions obtained:

- Prior to takeover there were no customs violating basic human rights.
- Prior to takeover people governed themselves at the local level. If a larger political entity existed its elites were of the same race or culture as their subjects.
- Had Europeans not intervened politically, the territory would have had a good chance of modernizing under indigenous leaders.
- Policies of colonial rulers led to substantial loss of life among the indigenous population (massacres, planned starvation, deliberate introduction of fatal diseases, and so on).
- Colonial policies deprived indigenous peoples of land and other resources necessary to sustain familiar ways of life.
- Colonial rule was marked by high levels of forced labor, non-Europeans being compensated at rates well below those they would have received in a free labor market.
- Forced labor was legally reinforced by slavery.
- Virtually all gains from economic activity accrued to Europeans.
- Non-European per capita income and other quality-of-life indicators fell over time.
- The value of assets transferred from the metropole and invested in the colony was dwarfed by the value of assets transferred to the metropole.
- Europeans did little to develop indigenous human resources over and above what-ever maximized their economic gain.
- Non-Europeans were systematically discriminated against in recruitment to high-paying positions in all sectors.
- Rulers were contemptuous of the race, cultural practices, and historical accomplishments of peoples they ruled, leading many among the colonized to internalize an inferiority complex.
- Rulers failed to introduce institutions permitting subjects to air grievances on a regular basis and in a peaceful manner. Opponents of official policies were harshly repressed.

Critics and defenders would probably agree that the case for colonialism would be strongest if these conditions were absent or the circumstances reversed. Thus people diverging in their overall evaluation of colonialism nonetheless share a substantial set of values.

EVALUATION BETWEEN THE EXTREMES

Not all writers cluster around the far ends of the opinion spectrum. Many occupy positions between the extremes in portraying colonialism as having both costs and

benefits. Exemplifying this balance-sheet approach is Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's first president, who writes of

a strange mixture of advantages and disadvantages, curses and blessings. Colonialism brought greater freedom yet more servitude. The peoples of Africa were freed from certain enemies—disease, ignorance, superstition and slavery—the horizons of their lives were lifted, offering new areas of choice and fresh possibilities of material and spiritual enrichment. Yet the colonialism which threw open certain doors slammed others shut. It engendered in the African peoples a deepening awareness of servitude. New forms of power cast a web about them, hemming them in and subjecting them to strange constraints. . . . all too often [the dominant position Europeans held in positions of leadership and control] was transformed into a philosophy of racial dominance. It appeared that the colonialists had freed them in order to make them servants.²³

The Congo's first premier, Patrice Lumumba, shifted from one end of the spectrum to the other as political conditions changed. Writing in the mid-1950s, when he believed that Belgium would develop the country in the interests of all and that *évolués* like himself would serve as intermediaries between top officials and the populace, Lumumba was almost obsequious in praise of Belgian rule:

To whom do we owe our liberation from that odious trade practiced by the bloodthirsty Arabs and their allies, those inhuman brigands who ravaged the country?

At a time when our people were suffering from these atrocities, when they were being decimated by sleeping sickness and . . . when thousands of the inhabitants of the country were being carried away in chains to be sold like cattle in gruesome markets . . . Belgium, moved by a very sincere and humanitarian idealism, came to our help and, with the assistance of doughty native fighters, was able to rout the enemy, to eradicate disease, to teach us and to eliminate certain barbarous practices from our customs, thus restoring our human dignity and turning us into free, happy, vigorous, civilized men. . . .

As regards the mistakes that were made, I have already said that they are inherent in any human activity, be it in Africa, Europe, or any other country of the world. . . . Let us stop railing against these few mistakes.²⁴

Subsequent events in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa profoundly radicalized Lumumba's views. Responding at Independence Day celebrations to a patronizing address by King Baudouin, the premier departed from the program to launch an impassioned attack on the departing rulers:

[Our struggle was] noble and just, a struggle indispensable for ending the humiliating slavery that was imposed upon us by force.

Considering what we went through during 80 years of colonial rule, our wounds are still too fresh and too painful to be erased from memory. We have known exhausting labor, extracted in exchange for wages too low to enable us to satisfy our hunger, or decently clothe and house ourselves, or raise our children as loved ones.

We have experienced sarcastic remarks, insults, beatings morning, noon, and night, because we were niggers [nègres]. Who can forget that a black person was addressed as "tu"—most certainly not as one would speak to a friend—but because the honorific "vous" was reserved only for whites? . . .

We have known that in the towns there were magnificent homes for the whites and ramshackle huts for the blacks, that blacks couldn't be admitted to the cinemas, the restaurants, and the stores designated for Europeans. . . .

Finally, who can forget the gunshots that killed so many of our brothers, the prison cells into which were brutally thrown those who refused to submit any more to a system of oppression and exploitation?²⁵

A regime that at one point was perceived as a liberator from slavery became at a later point, under other circumstances, an agent of enslavement.

Karl Marx's writings on the British in India illustrate a different kind of cost-benefit analysis. For Marx it is not that some of colonialism's features are positive and others negative, but that the same features assume variable meanings depending on the time frame employed to interpret them. The costs imposed by capitalism and British rule were severe in the short term. But they were also a necessary condition for India's eventual escape from economic and social stagnation. Marx subjects the greedy and often cruel behavior of the British to withering condemnation. But he does the same for traditional social structures the new rulers and industrial magnates are undermining. He writes in 1853 of India's villages,

These small family-communities were based on domestic industry, in that peculiar combination of hand-weaving, hand-spinning and hand-tilling agriculture which gave them self-supporting power. English interference having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, dissolved these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by blowing up their economic basis, and thus produced the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia.

Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness these myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest

possible compass, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. . . . We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.

When uninvited outsiders use morally flawed methods to destroy a morally flawed social structure, what judgment should be passed? Marx continues:

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution.²⁶

Marx advanced what might be termed the doctrine of regrettable yet progressive necessity. We hear echoes of this doctrine when Nehru writes decades later, "I feel sure that it was a good thing for India to come in contact with the scientific and industrial West. Science was the great gift of the West; India lacked this, and without it she was doomed to decay. The manner of our contacts was unfortunate and yet, perhaps, only a succession of violent shocks could shake us out of our torpor."²⁷

In Marx's view, "England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia." This latter mission did not preclude industrial development. On the contrary,

when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry.²⁸

These views placed Marx sharply at odds with his putative disciple Lenin. The German revolutionary theorist insisted that capitalist colonialism plays a historically progressive role, at least in its initial impact on agrarian societies. The Russian revolutionary activist insisted that the impact of advanced capitalism was harmful in

all circumstances, and only harmful. Marx envisaged the diffusion of industrial development to some backward areas under colonialism; Lenin denied such a possibility. As the Marxist writer Bill Warren points out, Lenin's views prevailed in subsequent socialist and communist interpretations of capitalism even though Marx's analysis and predictions were far closer to the mark.²⁹

A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

It would be convenient to side with balance-sheet moderates against proponents of either extreme position as a way to resolve—or evade—unending controversy. But this move is too convenient. I find myself returning to arguments between colonialism's critics and defenders, in large part because persuasive arguments are advanced by both sides. How can this be? One possibility is that I hold mutually incompatible values and am unwilling to make painful choices among them. Another is that, as argued earlier, the two sides are much closer than they imagine and that the zone of agreement between them is terrain I too wish to occupy. Whether explicitly or implicitly, critics and defenders agree that it is morally preferable for people to live rather than to die or be killed; to gain experience in collective self-government; to enjoy a rising material standard of living; and to choose how to allocate their labor rather than have it coercively extracted at below-market rates. Both sides value enhanced opportunities for personal advancement, free of arbitrary discrimination rejecting individuals on grounds irrelevant to a job's responsibilities. Both sides value the exchange of ideas, goods, and services across cultural and racial lines in an open, mutually beneficial manner. Critics affirm the right of individuals and groups not to be humiliated. Though defenders generally do not bring up this matter, their silence when it is raised implies tacit agreement that human dignity has intrinsic moral value.

These widely shared norms are appropriate ones to reframe as evaluation criteria. One way to proceed is to say that in times and places where colonial rule had, on balance, a positive effect on training for self-government, material well-being, labor allocation choices, individual upward mobility, cross-cultural communication, and human dignity, compared to the situation that would likely have obtained absent European rule, then the case for colonialism is strong. Conversely, in times and places where the effects of foreign rule in these respects were, on balance, negative compared to a territory's likely alternative past, then colonialism is morally indefensible.

This way of framing the issue takes into account the enormous variability of colonial situations and permits ethical judgments distinguishing one metropole from another, one time period from another, and one colonized society from another. Using the self-government criterion, for example, one can conclude that in colonies of occupation Britain did a distinctly better job than other metropolises

because representative institutions were available through some variant of the Westminster parliamentary model. By the labor allocation criterion, regimes permitting the slave trade and enforcing domestic slavery were worse than regimes, from phase 3 onward, that outlawed such practices. By the same criterion, colonies that routinely relied on forced labor were more oppressively governed than colonies that did not.

By the material well-being standard, a colony in which indigenous claims to land were respected and non-European incomes rose was better governed than one in which land was alienated and non-European living standards fell. A colony with minimal prospects for modernization under indigenous leadership, whose indigenous incomes were raised by investment of European capital and technology, was better administered than a colony in which the opposite conditions applied.

By the human dignity standard, a regime practicing overt discrimination on the basis of race—which may be considered invariant for a given individual and is presumably irrelevant to job performance—was more immoral than one practicing discrimination on cultural grounds, at least in cases in which cultural assimilation was possible. Both regimes were worse than one practicing less discrimination on either racial or cultural grounds. A colony whose rulers suppressed human sacrifice and widow burning was better governed than one in which such practices were tolerated.

There is, to be sure, plenty of room for dispute over the application of these criteria to particular situations. Even if critics and defenders agreed on what colonial rulers did in a certain time and place, they could still offer very dissimilar assessments of precolonial society. And they could invoke very different scenarios of what would have occurred had a society retained its autonomy. The grounds for contention are legion. Nonetheless, progress will have been made if people with widely divergent worldviews are willing to share criteria for making moral judgments.

Another approach is to assess how well colonial regimes, considered collectively, performed in each major issue area. The obvious problem here is overgeneralization: whatever is said might apply to an imagined "typical" situation but definitely not to all situations. This approach has the advantage, however, of permitting us to identify arenas in which European rulers frequently performed well and others in which their behavior was consistently indefensible. What follows is my attempt to draw up a moral balance sheet, proceeding from most positive to most reprehensible aspects of the overall record.

Colonial rulers performed best in the economic arena. The explore-control-utilize syndrome led them actively to manipulate the natural environment so as to enhance people's material well-being. By introducing capital, advanced technology, new flora and fauna, and profit-seeking individuals and institutions to overseas territories, Europeans took the lead in generating unprecedented wealth there. To the

extent that these factors of production would not have been exported had Europeans not controlled the public sector, colonial rule can be considered close to a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. To the extent that wealth generation depended upon utilizing hitherto untapped resources, Europeans increased the productive capacity of colonies without depriving non-Europeans of resources they would have enjoyed absent foreign rule. In numerous instances—especially territories gaining independence in phase 5—such indicators of non-European well-being as per capita income, access to a wide range of consumer goods, literacy, availability of health facilities, and life expectancy were substantially higher when colonial rule ended than when it began.

The record was clearly worse when it came to distributing gains from growth. Because Europeans controlled the public as well as private profit sector and because the two sectors regularly collaborated for mutual benefit, Europeans could and did allocate themselves most of the benefits of development. In effect they unilaterally decided that *factors of production* they contributed should be generously compensated while the labor contributions of local people should be assigned low priority. A related distributional issue is geographical: a high proportion of the profits from colonial *natural and human resources* was sent to Europe and not consumed or productively reinvested in lands generating these profits.

The record was mixed with respect to labor allocation choices and personal upward mobility. Slavery and forced labor severely constrained peoples' freedom to work for their own benefit and deprived them of income they should have earned from their labors. Discriminatory policies limited upward mobility on grounds that were arbitrary and unrelated to personal qualifications or performance. On the other hand, economic development opened up new occupational options. Even when discrimination limited access to top positions in sectoral institutions, the existence of these institutions created new opportunities for advancement in low- and middle-level ranks.

The colonial record was mixed but, on balance, poor with respect to cross-cultural communication. Diffusion of European languages permitted people from diverse backgrounds who otherwise would not have understood each other to share a lingua franca. Diffusion of literacy and numeracy to societies lacking them permitted a wider expression of ideas across barriers of time and space. All too frequently, however, communication was a one-way street: Europeans commanded, but they did not listen. They insisted that colonial subjects assimilate to their culture while looking askance at assimilation in the opposite direction. When visible differences of race and culture were closely linked to substantial inequalities of power, wealth, and status, the colonized ran a terribly high risk if they dared speak candidly to their rulers. The situation for people on both sides of the dividing line is aptly summarized

by an African proverb: "I cannot hear what you are saying, because who you are is thundering in my ears."

The overall record is uneven but generally poor when it comes to training for self-government. This is not surprising, for administrators had an active interest not only in making key policy decisions but also in retaining the power to make them. Metropoles varied greatly in the training function. Britain did considerably better than Portugal and Belgium, which refused to acknowledge self-government as a legitimate goal and did virtually nothing to prepare subject populations for it. But even the British record is mixed. Where settlers were present indigenous prospects for autonomy were severely set back, permanently and fatally so in North America and Australasia. Britain's indirect rule policies often had the effect, intended or not, of making self-government at the colonywide level more problematic.

On the positive side, colonial public sector institutions operated over a wider area and affected far more people than did most precolonial stateless societies. Local communities with poorly institutionalized governance mechanisms cannot hope to survive in a world of states. Colonialism extended the "self" in self-government far beyond the level of face-to-face interaction. It was the colonial state, moreover, that nationalist movements targeted for capture. Nationalists were able to use available civil and military bureaucracies to govern large areas once they replaced Europeans in top policy posts. In a sense, colonial sectoral institutions played a positive historic role by being vulnerable to capture and redirection by independence movements.

Among the most reprehensible aspects of colonialism, in my judgment, were its deliberate, systematic, and sustained assaults on human dignity. The assertions of cultural and racial superiority accompanying European rule had devastating effects on the self-respect of many peoples. In myriad, unobtrusive ways rulers violated the right of their subjects not to be individually and collectively demeaned. The point was well put in a memorandum from one English official to another in early nineteenth-century India: "Foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence, and often with great cruelty, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we; none has stigmatised the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty, and as fit to be employed only where we cannot do without them."³⁰ The harmful effects of such attitudes were further magnified when colonized peoples learned the lesson too well and came to accept the charge that they were indeed inferior. This psychological complex hampered their will and limited their capacity to live full, satisfying lives.

The imperial project consumed the lives of millions of human beings and blighted the lives of millions more. Its worst aspects—the transatlantic slave trade, plantation slavery, forced labor, sexual exploitation—should not be forgotten or excused. The forests of the Amazon and Congo basins were killing fields, as were

THE MORAL EVALUATION OF COLONIALISM

the Banda islands and Tasmania and lands inhabited by Araucanians, Pequots, and Hereros. A recurring corollary of land acquisition by settlers was that indigenous peoples deprived of access to land lost inherited ways of life and patterns of thought and belief as well. Alienated lands should be thought of as dying fields. Things fell apart for non-Europeans—many things—under the triple assault. But colonialism was not just the sum total of its worst-case scenarios. New crops, medicines, and occupations extended the life spans and enhanced the welfare of millions of subject peoples. New ideas and beliefs were not only comforting and enlightening but also empowering.

These personal assessments may or may not resonate with other people. By its very nature European colonialism ensures continuing controversy not only over its causes, characteristics, and consequences but also over its morality. The challenge in today's postcolonial era is to frame the debate so that arguments are more informed and directly engaged, assumptions and normative standards more explicit, than they were in the past when west European powers confidently strode the world.

APPENDIX

SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERSEAS EMPIRES

Listed here are the 188 states belonging to the United Nations on January 1, 2000. Of these, 125 are countries outside of Europe that were *once colonies of one or more* European metropolises. Bold and light lines mark the duration of imperial rule in these countries. Also listed is Tuvalu, an island chain that gained independence from Great Britain in 1978 but did not join the United Nations until 2000.

Each vertical bar represents two decades, beginning with 1460–79. A country has a line for a twenty-year period if a portion of its currently defined territory—beyond small coastal enclaves—was governed by a metropole during part or all of that period. The test of governance is whether officials appointed by metropolitan authorities (a government or a government-approved charter company) collected taxes or imposed some degree of order through recognizable bureaucratic structures and were formally authorized to control a territory's foreign relations as well as to regulate aspects of its domestic affairs. For more on the definitions of colony and metropole, see chapter 2.

Deciding when colonial rule begins is problematic, especially in the Old World during phase 1. Contestable judgment calls are unavoidable whatever one's criteria. One reason I use twenty-year segments rather than assigning specific starting dates is to avoid conveying an inappropriately concise impression of the takeover process. Even this arrangement risks making a process that was often gradual and subtle appear *more precipitate—and more obvious* to the parties involved—than it actually was.

For small islands I take the year of European arrival if this is marked by territorial claims and/or the start of continuous settler presence. Where the initial European presence on a larger island or continental mainland involved control of a coastal port, I focus on the period when Europeans exercised governmental powers *outside* the original enclave rather than on the date a port city was founded or taken over. Thus I date colonial rule in India from the 1750s, when the English East India Company began collecting taxes in Bengal, not from the early 1500s, when Portugal carved out trading enclaves on the Malabar coast. The colonial era in the East Indies is dated from the 1680s (Dutch control over the Javanese sultanates of Mataram and Bantam), not from the founding in 1619 of the company's

administrative center, Batavia, or from early sixteenth-century Portuguese spice-trading activities.

These criteria generally understate the duration of European informal influence overseas, since even a tiny enclave could have substantial influence on its hinterland. Examples were the slave-trading "factories" along West Africa's coast from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, the criteria overestimate the duration of formal colonial rule in many territories because inhabitants of hinterland areas may have evaded European control for many decades after people in more accessible regions had become colonial subjects.

A country's final bold segment marks the transition from colonial status to independence. Independence could be dated from the year a territory's leaders declared it, the metropole acknowledged it, or the first sovereign state officially recognized it. In the vast majority of phase 5 cases these three criteria produce identical results. Where results diverge I pick the self-selected date, if only because this is what a country's citizens celebrate. The independence date for the United States is listed as 1776, and that for Haiti as 1804, even though Britain and France did not formally acknowledge the change in status until 1783 and 1825, respectively.

A United Nations member state that was part of a larger unit when that unit became independent is assigned the latter's independence date. Thus, Central American countries which in the colonial era were components of New Spain are deemed independent when Mexico broke from Spain, not several years later when they broke from Mexico. Bangladesh is assigned the date for Pakistan, Singapore the date for Malaysia.

Tanzania consists of two territories—Tanganyika and Zanzibar—that united after gaining independence separately.

A country has a light line for the period when it was a quasi colony. This category covers a wide range of relationships with one metropole, Great Britain. I classify Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as shifting from colonial to quasi-colonial status when domestic control of internal affairs in these settler-led territories was formally recognized by Dominion status: 1867 for Canada, 1901 for Australia, 1907 for New Zealand, 1910 for South Africa. These states' *de facto* independence is set at 1931, when the Statute of Westminster relinquished London's control over foreign affairs. Cyprus and Egypt are considered quasi colonies during the decades when they were technically under Ottoman suzerainty while their foreign relations were determined by agents of the British Crown. Their *ambiguous status* ended with formal annexation by Britain at the start of World War I.


Three states—Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—were not formally incorporated into overseas empires and are not counted among the United Nations' 125 ex-colonies. But they are classified as quasi colonies because their rulers *negotiated treaties* retaining control over domestic affairs while ceding jurisdiction over foreign affairs to Great Britain. This status lasted while these treaties were in force. Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Oman might be listed as quasi colonies, on these same grounds, for short periods in late phase 3 and phase 4. But I do not do so because Britain's control over their foreign relations appears to have been more tenuous than with the Arab sheikhdoms.

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Afghanistan
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Andorra
Angola
Antigua and
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei

DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERSEAS EMPIRES


Countries attaining independence from a non-European state following a period of European rule have a bold line only for the years when governed by a European metropole. These countries are Cuba (Spain to 1898; United States), Philippines to 1898 (United States), Eritrea (Italy to World War II, British trusteeship to 1952; Ethiopia), and German possessions turned over to League of Nations mandatory powers following World War I: Papua New Guinea (including former German New Guinea; Australia), Namibia (South Africa), and several Pacific island chains: Marshall Islands (Japan; U.S. after World War II), Micronesia (Japan; U.S. after World War II), Nauru (Australia, with United Kingdom and New Zealand), Palau (Japan; U.S. after World War II), and Samoa (New Zealand). Ethiopia excepted, all non-European powers that were terminal colonial rulers were themselves once European colonies.



APPENDIX

	1460-79	1500-19	1600-19	1700-19	1800-19	1900-19	1980-99
Bulgaria							
Burkina Faso							
Burundi							
Cambodia							
Cameroon							
Canada							
Cape Verde							
Central African Republic							
Chad							
Chile							
China							
Colombia							
Comoros							
Congo							
Congo (ex-Zaire)							
Costa Rica							
Cote d'Ivoire							
Croatia							
Cuba							
Cyprus							
Czech Republic							
Denmark							
Djibouti							
Dominica							
Dominican Republic							
Ecuador							
Egypt							
El Salvador							
Equatorial Guinea							
Eritrea							
Estonia							
Ethiopia							
Fiji							
Finland							
France							
Gabon							
Gambia							


DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERSEAS EMPIRES



APPENDIX

	1400-79	1500-19	1600-19	1700-19	1800-19	1900-19	1980-99
Liechtenstein							
Lithuania							
Luxembourg							
Macedonia							
Madagascar							
Malawi							
Malaysia							
Maldives							
Mali							
Malta							
Marshall Islands							
Mauritania							
Mauritius							
Mexico							
Micronesia							
Moldova							
Monaco							
Mongolia							
Morocco							
Mozambique							
Myanmar							
Namibia							
Nauru							
Nepal							
New Zealand							
Nicaragua							
Niger							
Nigeria							
Norway							
Oman							
Pakistan							
Palau							
Panama							
Papua New Guinea							
Paraguay							
Peru							
Philippines							

Poland
Portugal
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Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon
Somalia
South Af
Spain
Sri Lank
Sudan
Surinam
Swaziland
Sweden
Syria
Tajikista
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad
Tunisia



APPENDIX

	1460-79	1500-19	1600-19	1700-19	1800-19	1900-19	1980-99
Turkey							
Tuvalu							
Turkmenistan							
Uganda							
Ukraine							
United Arab Emirates							
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland							
United States of America							
Uruguay							
Uzbekistan							
Vanuatu							
Venezuela							
Vietnam							
Yemen							
Yugoslavia							
Zambia							
Zimbabwe							

10. Greene, "The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 101.
11. See postwar identity changes as reported in Merritt, *Symbols of American Community*, 1735-1775, 74, 76, 215.
12. See the title of his *British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American Revolution, 1763-1767*. Thomas emphasizes "the almost universal consensus of opinion in Britain on the question of Parliamentary supremacy over America" (364) during these years. Thus, despite repeal of the Stamp Act, "the lesson of the Stamp Act crisis was that there would be very few 'friends of America' in Britain in any future clash with the colonies" (371).
13. Tucker and Hendrickson, *Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the American War of Independence*, 3.
14. Quoted in Humphreys and Lynch, eds., *Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826*, 262.
15. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922*, 159.
16. *Ibid.*, 185.
17. Quoted in *ibid.*, 164. Word underlined by Gandhi.
18. Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, 80.
19. David Strang, "From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization, 1870-1987," *American Sociological Review*, 858.
20. *Ibid.*

Chapter 16. Legacies

1. Wide-ranging discussions of the West's global impact include Toynbee, *The World and the West*; Dawson, *The Movement of World Revolution*; von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization*; and works on modernization by the social scientists C. E. Black, Karl Deutsch, S. N. Eisenstadt, Alex Inkeles, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, and Dankwart Rustow. In the humanities, scholars in the rapidly growing field of postcolonial studies, while suspicious of social scientific approaches, share with modernization theorists an extremely broad conception of the West and its impacts. See, for example, Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*, and Prakash, ed., *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*. One reason it is difficult to know what to make of claims by postcolonial theorists is that colonialism is a vast, catchall category with virtually no conceptual boundaries because it is not clearly defined. Understanding cannot advance if writers fail to specify what their key terms mean.
2. Tetlock and Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*, 3, 4.
3. Stateless peoples like Palestinians and Kurds lack a polity they control. But their problem is not that they are not subject to state authority. On the contrary, they have been incorporated into states—Israel, Iraq, Iran, Turkey—whose governments oppress them. Marginalized peoples commonly respond to oppression by demanding statehood for themselves. If their demands were granted the world would become even more politically homogenous.

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4. These issues are insightfully analyzed by the Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh in "Colonialism and the Two Publics: A Theoretical Statement," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*.
5. Akintoye, *Emergent African States*, 9-10. The authoritarian dimension of colonialism is emphasized in Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*.
6. See my "Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Commins, ed., *Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank*, 179-214. I estimate (189) that employment in regular-line agencies of central and local government grew from 1.9 to 6.5 million between 1960 and 1980. If one adds nonfinancial parastatal organizations, public sector employment rose from roughly 3.8 to 10 million during this period. By 1980 the public sector, including parastatals, probably accounted for half the people formally employed outside agriculture.
7. Data calculated from Gunnemark, *Countries, Peoples, and Their Languages*.
8. Calculated from *ibid.* Russia is the only noncolonized country in which more than one hundred languages are spoken.
9. Information on Sudan, Mauretania, and Togo from Morrison et al., *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*, 631, 560, 660-61.
10. About 5 million Indians in a population of more than 850 million are said to know English well. This tiny pool presumably supplies the bulk of the central government's bureaucrats, scientists, and diplomats. (Estimates from Gunnemark, *Countries, Peoples, and their Languages*, 88-90.) As of 1985 only a quarter of those school-age and older in Africa's officially francophone countries was literate in French. Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1985*, 168.
11. Zartman, *The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community*; Davenport et al., *Europe's Preferred Partners? The Lomé Countries in World Trade*.
12. Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, x.
13. Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*.
14. Stephen Jay Gould, lecture at the College of Wooster in 1987, quoted in Tom Wicker, "The Greatest Tragedy," *New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1988.
15. For international extractive capability, see Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, 195-205.
16. McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World*, 1492-1700, 292.
17. For the large number of posts at the gubernatorial level, see Henige, *Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present*. This study provides data on almost four hundred European possessions.
18. From the introduction to Tilly, ed., *Formation of National States in Western Europe*, 42.
19. Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*, 60.
20. Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 30. See Porch, *The Conquest of Morocco*, 67, for recruitment of social undesirables in France's African Light Infantry, which played a key role in the invasion of Algeria in 1830 and subsequent pacification campaigns.
21. "The expedition . . . was a make-shift expedient for internal political consumption, carried out by a government in difficulty seeking the prestige of a military victory. . . . As the minister of

- war had written as long before as 1827, 'it would be a useful distraction from political troubles at home' and would allow the government 'to go to the country at the next election with the keys of Algiers in its hand.' " Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 5.
22. Of these, Bismarck was the least favorably disposed to overseas expansion. But there is evidence that he thought an assertion of German claims in Africa would help him in the Reichstag elections of 1884. Stoecker, ed., *German Imperialism in Africa*, 33.
 23. The Duchy of Kurland (in present-day Latvia) and the Electorate of Brandenburg (after 1701 the Kingdom of Prussia). Henige, *Colonial Governors*, appendix, 361. Venetian sailors made trade contact with islands off the North African Atlantic coast early in phase 1. Venice and Genoa, of course, controlled extensive networks of trading enclaves in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
 24. Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*, 37-38 (translation supplied).
 25. For the influence of West Indian sugar planters and merchants on Britain's Parliament in the eighteenth century, see Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, 92-93. Persell describes the political influence of French business interests in *The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938*.
 26. Advocates of the high-gain position include Wallerstein, in *The Modern World-System II*; Frank, in *World Accumulation, 1492-1789*; and Williams, in *Capitalism and Slavery*. Advocates of the low- or minimal-gain position include Rosenberg and Birdzell, in *How the West Grew Rich*, esp. 16-20; North and Thomas, in *Rise of the Western World*; and Bairoch, *Economics and World History*, part 2.
 27. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, 102; see chap. 5, "British Industry and the Triangular Trade."
 28. Cameron, *A Concise Economic History of the World*, 160; Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus*, 82-83.
 29. Said, *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism*. See also Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa*; Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*; and Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. Discussing Victorian England in *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context*, McClintock argues that the perceived exoticism of the colonial Other enabled some Europeans to indulge in a highly racialized and sexualized fantasy life.
 30. For a critique of Western intellectuals' unwillingness to apply to non-Europeans behavioral standards routinely applied to their own societies, see P. T. Bauer, "Western Guilt and Third World Poverty," in Bauer, *Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion*, 66-85.
 31. This point applies with particular force to territories in Africa and islands in the Caribbean and Oceania that became independent in phase 5. See Jackson, *Quasi-States*, and Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics*.
 32. Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, 144-45.

Chapter 17. The Moral Evaluation of Colonialism

1. Works by critics include Alavi and Shanin, eds., *Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies"*; Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*; Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* and *Black Skin, White Masks*; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; Nkrumah, *Ghana and I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*; Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin*

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- America and World Accumulation, 1492-1789*; and Murdoch, *The Poverty of Nations*. For defenders, see Bauer ("The Economics of Resentment" and "Western Guilt and Third World Poverty," in *Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion*; Burns, *In Defence of Colonies*; Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning: The End of Imperial Rule in Africa in the Light of British Experience*; Gann and Duignan, *Burden of Empire*; Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*; Ryckmans, *Dominer Pour Servir*; Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*; and Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*. Though many of these works focus on the colonial experience in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Africa, the basic arguments can be readily extended to other times and places. Not surprisingly, many of the critics are non-Europeans who grew up in the colonies, while most of the defenders are Europeans who grew up in metropolises. As the adage goes, where one stands is strongly influenced by where one sits.
2. These authors include Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, chap. 41; Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa*, chap. 3; Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," and other selections in Avineri, ed., *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*; Isichei, *The Ibo Peoples and the Europeans*; and Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. For a carefully reasoned discussion by an eminent philosopher, see Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government*.
3. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 27.
4. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 22.
5. Césaire, *Discourse*, 23. See also Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, chap. 2. Rodney cites (40) the Gold Coast nationalist J. E. Casely-Hayford, who wrote in 1922, "Before even the British came into relations with our people, we were a developed people, having our own institutions, having our own ideas of government."
6. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 57-83; quotation on 81.
7. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 617.
8. Cited in Lewis, ed., *The British in India: Imperialism or Trusteeship?* 8. See the French poem cited earlier, contrasting cruel Dahomean rulers who sold their subjects into slavery with the French, "who delivered us and made us into men."
9. In several situations European rulers took advantage of and further refined exploitative labor recruitment practices dating from precolonial times. Examples are the Inca Empire's *mita* system and the compulsory labor policies of Vietnamese emperors. In such situations, defenders would insist that if Europeans are to be judged harshly the same judgment should apply to their predecessors as well. Defenders would not deny that Europeans violated the moral norm of nonexploitation. But they would argue that this did not, in and of itself, make colonial rule any worse for the subject population than the practices of noncolonial regimes.
10. Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India," in Avineri, ed., *Karl Marx on Colonialism*, 132. The issue is not whether Marx's historical assessment was correct but whether, if one believed that it was, one would be less inclined to criticize any specific foreign elite in India, the British included, on grounds that it was foreign.
11. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 535. It should be noted, however, that Smith attributes these benefits to the initiatives of settlers, not to the policies of colonial regimes. Indeed, his chapter "On Colonies" is an attack on the mercantilist policies and practices of the leading metropolises. Smith thus occupies an ambivalent if not contradic-

- tory position: he welcomes the economic activities of European private profit actors overseas yet criticizes public sector rule that was often a precondition for these very activities.
12. Though Gandhi and Césaire (in the latter's early poems) question the high priority westerners place on material possessions and technological progress. The argument is that materialism undermines other desirable values such as social solidarity, happiness, and spiritual enlightenment.
 13. Césaire, *Discourse*, 24.
 14. Gann and Duignan, *Burden of Empire*, 365-67.
 15. Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, 216. See similar statements about late nineteenth-century African rulers and Western-educated intellectuals in Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism*, 1-27.
 16. Masfield, *A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service*, 102.
 17. See, for example, Bauer on the growth of production, trade, and school enrollment in the Gold Coast from the 1890s to the mid-1950s. Bauer, "The Economics of Resentment," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 53-54.
 18. Césaire, *Discourse*, 21, 22.
 19. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 182. Césaire, *Discourse*, 21-22, speaks of "thousands of men sacrificed" in the construction of this railroad line.
 20. Gann and Duignan, *Burden of Empire*, 241.
 21. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, 277.
 22. Cited in Moon, *The British Conquest and Dominion of India*, 428.
 23. Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa*, 50.
 24. Lumumba, *Congo, My Country*, 12, 13.
 25. Presence Africaine, *La Pensée Politique de Patrice Lumumba*, 198, 199 (translation supplied). King Baudoin described the Congo's independence as "the crowning achievement of the mission conceived by the genius of King Leopold II, undertaken by him with a tenacious courage . . . not as a conqueror, but as a civilizer." Quoted in Young, *Politics in the Congo*, 50-51.
 26. Marx, "The British Rule in India," (*New York Daily Tribune*, June 25, 1853), in Avineri, ed., *Karl Marx on Colonialism*, 93-94.
 27. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, 278.
 28. Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," in Avineri, *Karl Marx on Colonialism*, 132-33, 136.
 29. Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, esp. chaps. 1-5.
 30. Thomas Munro to Warren Hastings, quoted in Moon, *British Conquest and Dominion of India*, 427.

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