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## IS CONFUCIANISM COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY?

### I. INTRODUCTION

In January 1958, four great Confucian philosophers of the twentieth century—Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai (Carson Chang)—published in Hong Kong and Taiwan a *Manifesto to the World on Behalf of Chinese Culture*.<sup>1</sup> At a time when Mainland China had been converted to Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought, the Manifesto affirmed the spiritual life of the Chinese cultural tradition in the form of Confucian learning on the heart–mind and nature of humanity (*xinxing zhixue*). It expressed the authors’ continued faith in and commitment to the vitality of this tradition and its future, and suggested that there was much that the Western world could learn from the Chinese cultural tradition. As regards to Chinese culture itself, the Manifesto pointed out that

the direction of progress to be taken should extend the attainment of moral self-realization to the fields of *politics*, of knowledge, and of technology. In other words, China needs a genuine *democratic reconstruction*, and scientific and technological skills. For this reason, China must embrace the civilization of the world; for this will enable her national character to reach higher planes of perfection and her spiritual life to achieve a more comprehensive development.<sup>2</sup> (Emphases added)

It is clear from the Manifesto that the “civilization of the world” to be embraced refers to liberal constitutional democracy (LCD) and modern science and technology as practiced in Western modernity. The Manifesto therefore serves as the point of departure for many scholars who tackled the issue of the relationship between Confucianism and liberal democracy.<sup>3</sup>

Half a century has passed since the Manifesto was published. In the meantime, the world and China have both changed beyond recognition. Mainland China has gone through the turmoil of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and is experiencing

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an economic revival unprecedented in modern Chinese history. Hong Kong has passed from colonial rule to autonomy under Chinese sovereignty and is experiencing a strong popular demand for democracy.<sup>4</sup> In Taiwan, authoritarian Nationalist rule has given way to a full Western-style liberal democracy.<sup>5</sup> Liberal democracy has also been introduced to South Korea whose culture used to be Confucian.<sup>6</sup>

The fact remains, however, that Mainland China today is not practicing the kind of Western-style democracy envisioned by the Manifesto. Is this kind of democracy compatible with Chinese tradition in general, and with the Confucian tradition in particular? The issue is perhaps as alive today as it was fifty years ago. It is the purpose of this article to revisit the Manifesto in light of progress in scholarship since then and the intellectual climate of today. The article will first examine the relevant arguments in the Manifesto. It will then discuss the issues raised by it in light of the views of scholars subsequently writing on the issues. The article will conclude by reassessing the Manifesto and outlining a possible Confucian approach to the political philosophy of China's future political development.

## II. EXAMINING THE MANIFESTO

The thesis of the Manifesto as far as China's political development is concerned is that not only are there seeds for or germs of democracy within the Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition ("Proposition 1"<sup>7</sup>), but the establishment of an LCD in China is the internal requirement or necessity of the development of the Chinese cultural tradition itself ("Proposition 2"). According to Proposition 1, Confucianism is compatible with LCD. According to Proposition 2, the development of LCD in China will (to quote from the passage in the Manifesto quoted at the beginning of this article) "enable her national character to reach higher planes of perfection and her spiritual life to achieve a more comprehensive development" than ever before. It seems therefore that Proposition 2 is a stronger claim than Proposition 1.

As regards Proposition 1, the authors of the Manifesto adduce as evidence both ideas and practices in the Chinese tradition which are considered to be consistent with the spirit of democracy. The arguments for Proposition 2 are more complicated, and conclude as follows:

The capacity for self-determination by the moral agent requires the possibility of his/her political participation. Here we see a fundamental contradiction between the moral spirit in Chinese culture and the monarchical system. The contradiction can only be resolved by a

constitutional democracy that affirms that all are equal political agents (*zhuti*). Thus constitutional democracy is required by the internal development of the moral spirit in Chinese culture.<sup>8</sup>

In line with the Confucian faith of the authors, the Manifesto privileges the moral consciousness and assumes that the subject (*zhuti*) in traditional Chinese culture is primarily a moral subject (agent). It is believed that it is the inner requirement of the development of Chinese culture in this modern age for this moral subject to become a political subject and a cognitive subject as well, so that China can embrace democracy and science. For this purpose, one of the authors of the Manifesto, Mou Zongsan, developed an interesting theory of the “self-negation” (*kanxian*) of conscience (*liangzhi*), which holds that in order to develop (*kaichu*) democracy and science in the Chinese cultural tradition, the conscience needs to undergo temporarily a process of self-negation.<sup>9</sup> Traces of this idea can be found in the Manifesto itself, when it suggests that the moral subject should temporarily forget itself in order to become a purely cognitive subject.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the arguments in the Manifesto find resonance in more recent writings. There is indeed considerable support for the basic position adopted by the Manifesto among intellectuals sympathetic to Confucianism today. It has become widely recognized, even among scholars committed to liberalism (e.g., Lin Yu-sheng [Lin Yusheng], Chang Hao [Hao Chang, Zhang Hao])<sup>11</sup>, that there are resources within Confucianism that can be employed in support of LCD. Lee Ming-huei (Li Minghui) points out that

... the debate between Neo-Confucianism and Chinese liberalism has become past history. ... There is no irreconcilable or fundamental contradiction between the basic beliefs of Neo-Confucianism and liberalism.<sup>12</sup>

This is not to say that there is unanimous agreement that the approach adopted by the Manifesto toward democracy (or LCD) is the correct one from the perspective of Confucianism itself. For example, Jiang Qing, a leading Confucian writer in Mainland China, has criticized the neo-Confucian philosophers (i.e., the authors of the Manifesto) for succumbing to the May Fourth approach of wholesale Westernization.<sup>13</sup> In his view, the Western-style democracy is tied to a specific history and culture and is not universally valid. Thus it is worthwhile today to reflect critically upon the 1958 Manifesto and explore further the issues raised by it.

### III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

How do we study the question of the relationship between Confucianism and LCD? Several methodological issues need to be resolved

first if the study is to be fruitful. First, we need to define carefully what we mean by “Confucianism” and “LCD.” Second, since Confucianism has not generated LCD in Chinese history, the question of the “compatibility” between Confucianism and LCD arises.

Let us consider first the definitions of Confucianism and LCD. As Joseph Chan has pointed out,<sup>14</sup> LCD can mean either a political philosophy or a political system that actually works. From a practical point of view, it seems that it would be more fruitful, at least to begin with, to study the relationship or compatibility between Confucianism and LCD as a political system. The latter has already come into existence in many parts of the world, not only in countries belonging to Western civilization, but also in countries spread across all continents. Given the diversity of the culture of countries practicing LCD today, it seems safe to conclude that LCD as a set of political institutions is compatible with many different cultures, traditions, and religions.

The more difficult methodological question is what we mean by Confucianism. For example, the sociologist Ambrose King (Jin Yaoji) has drawn a distinction between imperial (or institutional) Confucianism and social Confucianism. While the former has perished, the latter has survived to a considerable extent in the form of principles and norms governing social behavior.<sup>15</sup> Lee Ming-huei also points to the existence of a “deep-level” Confucianism which operates not at the conscious level but exerts an influence on the mentality, mode of behavior and pattern of thinking of the Chinese.<sup>16</sup> Social psychologists have demonstrated by empirical research that Confucian concepts are still very much alive in social relations and moral reasoning among the Chinese.<sup>17</sup>

Two even more useful categorizations are those developed by Jiang Qing and Lin Anwu. Lin<sup>18</sup> distinguishes between “lively” (*shenghuo-hua*) Confucianism (ethical values and norms for people’s daily life), imperial Confucianism, and critical Confucianism. He points out that classical Confucianism was originally mainly of the “lively” and “critical” strands, but imperial Confucianism became dominant from the Han Dynasty onward. Jiang Qing’s classification scheme<sup>19</sup> includes “life” (*shengming*) Confucianism or “heart–mind–nature” (*xinxing*) Confucianism, political Confucianism (which follows Xunzi in recognizing the darker sides of human nature, emphasizes the rites [*li*] rather than benevolence [*ren*], deals with the practical tasks of the construction and maintenance of political and social institutions and which includes a critical dimension, as exemplified by the *Gongyang* learning on *Chunqiu* [*the Spring and Autumn Annals*] and much of Han Confucianism generally), and politicized Confucianism (which is an ideology serving only the interest of the rulers, as exemplified by

Ancient Text Classics school [*guwen jingxue*] of the Han, and which has been dominant most of the time in Chinese history).

It is quite obvious that imperial Confucianism or politicized Confucianism is incompatible with LCD. Does that mean that in studying the question of the compatibility between Confucianism and LCD, we should disregard such strands of Confucianism? There seems to be a tendency to do this not only in the Manifesto but also in more recent studies.<sup>20</sup> However, as pointed out by Jiang Qing,<sup>21</sup> are we doing justice to Confucianism if we confine it to the pre-Qin texts, and then only extract from them passages that speak against tyranny and in favor of “government for the people” (or even “government of the people,” though clearly not “government by the people”)?

Jiang himself speaks very highly of “political Confucianism” and believes that it contains extremely rich resources which can be used to construct a new political system for China that is consistent with the Chinese cultural tradition and with Confucian ideals and that is not merely an imitation of Western LCD.<sup>22</sup> Although we may not agree with his interpretation or assessment of “political Confucianism” or its practical relevance to the task of political reconstruction in contemporary China, his criticism of the approach of confining Confucianism to a small scope, as well as his critique of the neo-Confucian philosophers’ (particularly Mou Zongsan’s) attempt to derive the Western-style of democracy from “life Confucianism,” is fairly powerful.

It should also be noted that ideas do not exist in a vacuum but always in a sociopolitical and historical context. Certain ideas contained in classical texts may be noble, but the practice of subsequent interpretation, implementation, and development of those ideas cannot be ignored. As in the case of the great world religions, Confucianism is a living tradition that has evolved in the course of centuries and millennia, and has involved itself in inextricable connections with systems of political power and social organization. No great systems of thought can be free from political manipulation, as the existence of power and of ideas (the sword and the book)<sup>23</sup> are both fundamental facts in human social existence. The “complicity” (here I use the word in a neutral but not negative sense) of Confucianism in the exercise of political power in Chinese history must be squarely faced. Imperial or politicized Confucianism need not be considered a bad thing, because political power in itself is not evil.

As Jiang Qing has pointed out, political Confucianism had indeed served to legitimize imperial rule in the Han Dynasty, but this may be seen in a positive light because the imperial system was appropriate to the circumstances of China at that time as a political system that could maintain social order and serve the needs and well-being of the

people.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, Xu Fuguan viewed the growth of autocracy in the Han as resulting in the decline of the original spirit of Confucianism even as it was co-opted as a state philosophy.<sup>25</sup> Both Jiang and Xu can be right at the same time, because there is no perfection in human history. Compromises and sacrifices are inevitable, and it is worthwhile to study how they impacted on Confucianism over the ages before the idea and practice of the Western-style of democracy became conceivable. This argues for a broad view of Confucianism.

Take the example of the concept of the “Three Bonds” (*sangang*) developed by Han Confucianism. The approach adopted by many contemporary scholars<sup>26</sup> is to dismiss it as a deviation (under the influence of the Legalist and Yinyang schools) from classical Confucianism which emphasized the reciprocal obligations in and mutuality of the relationship between king and minister, father and son, husband and wife. However, it seems that the significance of the “Three Bonds” in the history of Chinese Confucianism, particularly Song–Ming neo-Confucianism,<sup>27</sup> deserves deeper investigation. It may well be the case that the Three Bonds, and related norms of acceptance of and obedience to authority in a hierarchical society, constitute distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture that still survive to a considerable extent even today. It has often been said that in Confucian culture, people are more readily submissive to authority (whether in the political, familial, or social context) and are less willing to question or challenge it or to insist on their rights against it. Is this indeed an element of Confucianism, or, is this an obstacle to China’s democratization that needs to be confronted? Are there other similar obstacles that can be attributed to Confucianism?

Scholars concerned with the challenge of China’s modernization have advocated the “creative transformation” of the Chinese tradition (Lin Yu-sheng)<sup>28</sup> or the “modernistic reinterpretation, readjustment, revision, or re-vitalization” of traditional values (Charles Weihsun Fu).<sup>29</sup> The study of the compatibility of Confucianism with LCD necessarily involves a critical assessment of the Confucian tradition for the purpose of deciding whether, and, if so, how it should undergo creative transformation. On the other hand, this is not to say that anything in Confucianism that is found to be incompatible with LCD must be automatically rejected and discarded. As Chenyang Li (Li Chenyang) has rightly pointed out:

It is a simple-minded fallacious inference that, since democracy is good, anything that is undemocratic must be bad. An argument can be made that in the United States and throughout the democratic West, healthy society has been threatened precisely by the diminishing of traditional values similar to these undemocratic Confucian values.<sup>30</sup>



The question therefore concerns not only the creative transformation of the Confucian tradition to meet the challenges of Enlightenment and modernity,<sup>31</sup> but also whether, and, if so, how Confucian values (i.e., those worth preserving in the process of creative transformation) and modern democratic values or institutions can coexist in China's political system in future.

#### IV. THE CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF CONFUCIANISM

The Manifesto argues in favor of the compatibility between Confucianism and LCD. Useful studies have been done by scholars in recent years to strengthen further the "compatibility" thesis, for example, the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy (Lee Ming-huei,<sup>32</sup> Joseph Chan<sup>33</sup>), that between Confucianism and rights (Lee Seung-hwan,<sup>34</sup> Chung-ying Cheng [Cheng Zhongying]<sup>35</sup>), and that between Confucianism and human rights (Yu Kam-por,<sup>36</sup> Joseph Chan,<sup>37</sup> Heiner Roetz,<sup>38</sup> Huang Chun-chieh [Huang Junjie],<sup>39</sup> Lee Ming-huei<sup>40</sup>). It would be worthwhile to go one step further to formulate an overall view of the compatibility between Confucianism and LCD, with special reference to points of possible incompatibility.

The essence of the Confucian approach to personal, social, and political life can probably be captured by the paradigm of "inner sagehood and outward kingliness" (*neisheng waiwang*), although the term first appeared not in the Confucian classics but in *Zhuangzi*.<sup>41</sup> "Inner sagehood" refers to the Confucian emphasis on self-cultivation so as to develop one's true humanity and to realize one's nature (and thus to know Heaven and realize the Dao).<sup>42</sup> But Confucianism is not only concerned with personal "salvation." Confucius said: "Now the man of [*ren*], wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."<sup>43</sup> The *Great Learning* (*Daxue*) refers to the gradual expansion of one's sphere of moral practice from self-cultivation to having an orderly family, participating in the government of the state and finally bringing peace and enlightenment to the world. Hence the ideal of "outward kingliness," which refers to serve to the community and contribution to humanity by holding positions of power. The Confucian conception of power is that "[p]olitical authority is a trust conferred by the Mandate of Heaven upon the government for the welfare of the people."<sup>44</sup> Those in positions of power are subject to more rigorous moral requirements than ordinary people. The greater the political power, the heavier the moral responsibility.

At this point there seems to be little incompatibility between Confucianism and modern LCD. Although political authority in the LCD

no longer comes from Heaven, such authority is still a trust for the welfare of the people. The Confucian emphasis on the moral responsibility of power holders and the particularly onerous moral demands on them is relevant to democratically elected politicians in the same way as it was applicable to monarchs and scholars–officials. It would also be perfectly legitimate to encourage politicians or would-be politicians in an LCD to engage in self-cultivation so as to improve their abilities and moral qualities and become persons of character and integrity instead of mere opportunists or dealers of power and interests.

But when we move on from the moral responsibility of power holders to the relationship between them and the people ruled by them, some incompatibility between Confucianism and LCD arises. Kant once wrote:

A government might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the people, like that of a father towards his children. Under such a *paternal government* (*imperium paternale*), the subjects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon . . . [the] kindness [of the head of state] in willing their happiness at all. Such a government is the greatest conceivable *despotism* . . . [where] its subjects . . . have no rights whatsoever.<sup>45</sup>  
(Original italics)

It is written in the *Great Learning* (*Daxue*):

If a son is filial to his parents, he will be loyal to his lord. . . . If he is kind to his children, he will take good care of his people. Kang Gao said: “A lord should take care of his people as his children.” . . . He has the same likes and dislikes as the people, so he is like a parent to the people.<sup>46</sup>

Confucianism as it evolved in Chinese history became associated with a paternalistic conception of government. It was supposed that parental functions were to be performed by a good government with regard to the subjects. Thus the emperor was known as the “monarch–father” (*junfu*), and officials known as “fathers–mothers–officials” (*fumuguan*). The Chinese terms for “ministers” (*chenzi*) and “subjects” (*zimin*) both include the character for “son” (*zi*).<sup>47</sup> Filial piety at home was supposed to form the basis of loyalty to the state. Thus it is written in the *Book of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing*):

Hence filial piety begins with the service of our parents, proceeds to serve the emperor and is consummated in establishing ourselves in the world and achieving attainments. . . . Therefore, when they serve their rulers with filial piety, they are loyal. . . . The relation of loving father and dutiful son is rooted in the nature of man, and is a source from which springs the principle of righteousness between an



enlightened ruler and his loyal ministers. . . . Confucius said: “The superior man serves his parents with filial piety, from which develops loyalty to the sovereign.”<sup>48</sup>

In the course of the development of the Confucian tradition in the imperial era, the analogous conceptions of the father–son relationship and ruler–subject relationship mutually influenced each other, so that in the end both became one-sided relationships of domination and subordination in which the superior party could exercise absolute authority and demand absolute obedience from the inferior party. This is what Lin Anwu called the “fallacy of the misplaced Dao,”<sup>49</sup> or the degeneration of the Confucian ethics of reciprocity and mutuality into an ethics of absolute obedience.

Lin’s analysis of the dynamics of the interaction of Confucian ethics and political power in traditional Chinese society leading to the failure of the original ideals of Confucian ethics is revealing.<sup>50</sup> He points out that Confucianism originally intended to build upon the existing “kinship-based natural connection” of Chinese society a “personalistic moral connection,” which represents the spirit of Confucian ethics.<sup>51</sup> However, after imperial rule was established, a sociopolitical and ideological system gradually emerged which had as its core a “domination-based political connection” and as its background the “kinship-based natural connection,” and which turned the “personalistic moral connection” into its instrument.<sup>52</sup> The Confucian ideal that the sage should be king was turned on its head and the emperor was considered sacred. The monarch, the father and the sage became one, and the monarch

became the top of the pyramid of the soul of the Chinese people, the source of all values and the ultimate basis of all judgment. Obviously, this situation led to a serious “fallacy of the misplaced Dao” in Chinese culture.<sup>53</sup>

Since the “personalistic moral connection” was captured (though not completely and therefore subject to resistance from time to time) by political power and its ethics of conscience turned into an ethics of submission, the powerful or the superior party in the social hierarchy could in the name of Heavenly Reason require subordinate and inferior parties to give up their interests and desires, thus resulting in the phenomenon of “killing people by Reason” (*yili sharen*).<sup>54</sup>

Lin’s analysis is insightful because it demonstrates how Confucian ideas and values have developed in the course of Chinese history and been turned into instruments for political and social control. Unless we subscribe to anarchism or adopt Foucault’s critique of power knowledge, we need not assume that any idea that has lent itself to use for political and social control is bad, because political and social

control is not necessarily bad, and some form of political and social control is essential for human existence in society. The task for us today is to attempt to understand fully the true role played by Confucian ideas in Chinese history, and then to promote their creative transformation to meet the challenges of modernity.

Lin himself has put forward some ideas for such creative transformation. He suggests that the “personalistic moral connection” can revitalize itself; the vertical axis of “kinship-based natural connection” should give way to a new horizontal axis of intersubjective interaction, so that a new “contract-based social connection,” a “public space,” and a civil society can emerge. The ethics of citizenship would take the place of the traditional ethics of “people under Heaven” (*tianmin*).<sup>55</sup>

Although Lin’s ideas are expressed through his own unique terminology, they seem to be similar to the basic thrust of the Manifesto that China should develop LCD. But is he then advocating some form of “wholesale Westernization”? Will there be any role for Confucianism in the Chinese political system and civil society of the future? Will Confucianism be no more than a philosophy of personal self-cultivation in the private sphere, and the public sphere will be governed by principles of LCD and civil society imported from the West? What will be left of Confucianism after its “creative transformation”? This is ultimately a question concerning the relationship between the Confucian tradition of Chinese culture and China’s future political order. It seems that this is the question which Mou Zongsan’s theory of the “self-negation” of conscience seeks to answer. We therefore revisit here this theory of Mou’s.

In Mou’s view,<sup>56</sup> traditional China only had a Way of Administration (*zhidao*) but not a Way of Politics (*zhengdao*). The Chinese cultural tradition, particularly Confucianism, has generated and developed fully rationality or reason in its “intensional” meaning or “function presentation” (also referred to as the “spirit of syncretic fulfillment of reason”) (e.g., the content and application of the spirit of democracy and respect for human rights). What it lacked was rationality in its “extensional” meaning or “constructive presentation” (“frame-presentation”) (also referred to as the “spirit of the analytical fulfillment of reason”) (e.g., the form and institutional structures of democracy and respect for human rights). Confucian ethics and Confucian doctrines about human nature, human relationships, and, in particular, the moral obligations of rulers, exemplify the intensional aspect of rationality. However, it was in the West that the extensional aspect of rationality first matured, and this aspect comprises elements such as democracy, human rights, constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, parliamentary institutions, and the rule of law,

thus constituting the Way of Politics (*zhengdao*). Mou points out that this development in the West is not culturally specific to the West, but has universal significance and general applicability for all rational human beings, people, and cultures.

Mou believes that China in the past has developed a matured “Tradition of the Dao” (*daotong*), and what it needs for the future is to develop also the “Tradition of Knowledge” (*xuetong*) and the “Tradition of Politics” (*zhengtong*). The creation of the two new traditions is to be achieved by the “self-negation” of conscience.<sup>57</sup> The theory of the self-negation of conscience was apparently designed to explain (i) how it is possible for science and democracy (i.e., the Tradition of Knowledge and the Tradition of Politics, or the cognitive subject [*zhuti*] and the political subject mentioned in the Manifesto) can emerge from a Chinese cultural tradition whose essence (in Mou’s view) lies in moral consciousness and its self-realization, (ii) the autonomy of science and politics relative to moral reason, and simultaneously (iii) the ultimate subordination of science and politics to moral reason as the source of all human values and the foundation of all human endeavours. Thus Mou calls democracy (together with science) the new form of “outward kingliness,” hence preserving the basic structure of “inner sagehood and outward kingliness” which is taken to be the unchangeable essence of Chinese culture and of Confucianism.<sup>58</sup>

Mou’s insight is that he recognized the deficiency of the traditional Chinese approach of treating politics as merely an extension of morality and not developing an autonomous science of politics and law. This represents an important self-criticism of the Confucian tradition of *minben* (people-as-the-basis) politics, benevolent governance (*renzheng*) and rule by virtue (*dezhi*). However, the question remains as regards to what extent the political domain should be autonomous and independent of moral reason which in Mou’s framework remains ultimately supreme.

It is almost certain that by the self-negation of conscience in developing the political subject and the domain of democratic politics, Mou did not mean that political actors can be Machiavellian and totally disregard moral norms when participating in politics. According to Chung-ying Cheng, Mou’s self-negation of subjectivity involves the development of intersubjectivity and objectivity and an enlargement of the subject; a new level of human action is created at which the subject retains its original faculty of moral judgement. Thus “self-transcendence” or “transcendental integration” may be a more accurate description of the process than “self-negation.”<sup>59</sup> In the context of political philosophy, I would suggest that Mou’s theory may also be interpreted to mean that in designing a new political order for China’s

future, the mode of reasoning should not be limited to traditional moral thinking such as that which affirms the innate goodness of men and their potential to be sages, stresses the importance of self-cultivation, and places the highest hope on a “sagely monarch and a wise and virtuous prime minister” (*shengjun xianxiang*). Instead, the new mode of reason should be realistic in recognizing that human beings (including participants in politics) are self-interested and even egoistic, that power corrupts, that separation of powers, checks and balances, the Rule of Law and institutional protection of human rights are essential, and that political accountability need to be democratic (i.e., accountability to the electorate rather than merely to one’s conscience or Heaven). As pointed out by He Baogang:

According to Confucianism, . . . politics is an instrument for moral improvement, rather than a function for the articulation of individual interests. . . . *the very essence of rule by moral example is antipolitics*; that is, it precludes the kinds of activities associated with using power competitively in support of different values. . . . *one of the purposes of democratic institutional design is to avoid personal morality*, . . . making it in the interests of even a bad person to act for the public good. . . . Institutional design should economize on virtue . . .<sup>60</sup>  
(Original emphases)

The question remains of what, if any, link exists between the domain of politics and that of moral reason after they have become separated? Here the Neo-Confucian philosophers such as Mou, Xu, and Tang do have an answer although Non-Confucian liberals may not accept it. It is that the liberal democratic order should rest upon a moral foundation that is deeper and greater than and transcends the autonomous principles of political institutional design that are based on the articulation and integration of political interests or the satisfaction of economic desires. In this moral foundation lies the human dignity, conscience, moral reason, or heart–mind that seeks to fulfill itself through individuals’ self-realization and thus realize the Way of Heaven. Thus the liberty (“negative liberty” in Isaiah Berlin’s sense) and equality of the liberal democratic order are not ultimate values. What is ultimately significant is the realization of the human being’s “positive freedom” in the pursuit of the good, the noble, and the transcendent, in virtue and duty, and in cultural creativity. This is not to say that it will be the modern state’s job to “teach” the people how to realize their positive freedom. The autonomy of the political sphere recognized by Mou and the Neo-Confucians is, I believe, large enough to accommodate the moral neutrality of the liberal democratic state with regard to visions of the good life, the priority of the right over the good (as far as the exercise of state power is concerned) and of principles of justice based on an “overlapping consensus.” It is in civil

society that Confucian promotion of its vision of the good life should take place.<sup>61</sup>

#### V. WHAT FORM OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY SHOULD CHINA ADOPT?

Although as discussed above, Confucianism and the Chinese cultural tradition as creatively transformed can support LCD as a political system, it does not follow that the precise form that LCD should or would take in China would be the same as that in other countries. Countries practicing LCD exist all over the world, and differences exist in terms of the detailed arrangements and operation of their political, constitutional, and legal systems, economy, and social structure. Even at the level of political philosophy, there is no universally accepted theory used to justify LCD. For example, liberalism and communitarianism are competing schools of thought in the Western world, yet both of them support the basic framework of the liberal constitutional democratic state. Their difference only lies in their conception of human individuality and identity, their interpretation of the scope of liberties to be recognized by the state, or their views on how democratic life can best be promoted.

It is therefore possible for contemporary Confucian philosophers to develop their own theory of LCD and to construct the detailed structure or form of the LCD that is suitable for China. What is missing in the Manifesto is any consideration of whether China can or should develop its own unique form of the LCD, or whether it can or should simply replicate a Western form of LCD. The Manifesto has apparently overlooked the possibility of significant variations of the form of the LCD.

Since the Manifesto was published in 1958, Western LCD has gone a long way. Some of the ills of modern LCD have now become apparent. Examples include excessive claims of rights, excessive litigation, excessive consumerism, overemphasis on economic growth, neglect of moral and spiritual cultivation, denial of meritocracy, poor political leadership, demagoguery, domination of the mass media by the vulgar, rising crime, increasing family breakdown, increasing pollution, increasing gap between the rich and the poor, etc. Many of these problems cannot fairly be attributed to liberal democracy but are associated with the form which contemporary capitalist and technological civilization has taken. However, they do show that LCD as a political system is often powerless in solving these problems, some of which are aggravated by excessive emphasis on liberty, rights, autonomy, equality, and democracy which are sometimes used to justify the unrestrained pursuit of self-interests or selfish interests and the satisfaction of unlimited cravings and desires.

As China develops its political system and works out its precise form, it should have regard to both the positive and negative aspects of overseas experience in the practice of LCD. Confucian philosophy will have a role to play (not only in lending support to LCD as discussed in the Manifesto and above but also) in counteracting the excesses of liberty and equality and in demonstrating that there are other values that matter as well. Therefore a way forward for China seems to be building an LCD in which a proper balance is struck between liberal democratic values and nonliberal democratic values (such as Confucian values) which are worth defending.

For example, Lee Seung-hwan<sup>62</sup> has pointed out that the Western notions of human rights and “negative liberty” only provide a minimum moral standard; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human self-realization, which depends on the cultivation of virtues and the exercise of “positive freedom”—the freedom from one’s inner constraints and lower desires and the freedom to realize what is really right and good. Thus a “mutual criticism of liberalism and Confucianism concerning the relation between rights and virtues”<sup>63</sup> would be constructive. Such mutual criticism would enable Confucianism to move forward and transform itself to meet the challenges of modernity, instead of simply returning to the *Gongyang* tradition of political Confucianism as advocated by Jiang Qing. On the institutional level, Daniel Bell<sup>64</sup> and Joseph Chan<sup>65</sup> have both suggested that the Confucian perspective of meritocracy has a worthwhile role to play in an LCD, and that it may be given effect to by some form of examination system for the recruitment of political elite. It may be arguable that in the mutual criticism of and possible synthesis between Confucianism and liberalism, a limited degree of paternalism may be justified that is commensurate with the moral responsibility of a political elite with specialized training, knowledge, information, and skills relevant to the art of government.

## VI. CONCLUSION: A POSSIBLE CONFUCIAN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR CONTEMPORARY CHINA

We may now draw the threads together. From the discussion, it may be seen that the Manifesto is by no means out-of-date today. Its assessment that there are seeds for democracy within the Chinese tradition and that there is no fundamental contradiction between LCD and the Confucian tradition (at least when interpreted in the best light) can still stand today, and has indeed been confirmed by more recent scholarship. Its belief that the development of LCD in China represents the internal requirement of the self-perfection of



the Chinese cultural tradition and will enable its moral ideal to better realize itself is as inspiring today as it was fifty years ago, or perhaps even more so in the light of positive political developments in the last two decades.

Whether such “internal requirement” can be proved is, of course, somewhat arguable,<sup>66</sup> depending on how one interprets the essence or spirit of the Chinese cultural tradition in general and the development of Confucianism in particular. However, the desirability of LCD as a goal for China’s political development at least in the long term may be recognized even if one is not a Confucian. The significance of the Manifesto is therefore that it demonstrates how it is possible for Confucians (or Neo-Confucians) and liberals or democrats to join forces in working toward the development of LCD in China.

Being an initial attempt to tackle the difficult issue of the relationship between Chinese culture, Confucianism, and China’s political development, the Manifesto is not without limitations and deficiencies. Although it recognizes that the Chinese cultural tradition emphasizes or perhaps overemphasizes the moral subject (*zhuti*) and has not sufficiently nurtured the political subject and the cognitive subject, it has not fully considered the possible obstacles to China’s democratization posed by China’s cultural tradition and Confucianism as it has evolved during millennia of imperial rule. The Manifesto provides a rather optimistic and one-sided account of the necessity and even inevitability of democratization in China.

Although there is some self-criticism of Chinese traditional culture, it is not self-critical enough. As discussed in this article, the “complicity” of Confucianism in the maintenance of imperial rule in traditional China needs to be squarely faced. How Confucianism has performed in history and how it interacted with political power and social organization need to be fully studied. Unless the obstacles to China’s democratization that are latent in Chinese culture or the Chinese mind are fully understood and clearly identified, it would not be easy to remove them. Most thinkers would agree that some form of “creative transformation” of the Chinese tradition is necessary for China to undergo modernization and democratization. The problem is to work out what is the creative transformation required, and how it may be achieved. The task remains as challenging today as it was fifty years ago.

This article has therefore advocated a balanced approach to the study and evaluation of the Confucian tradition, not only extracting from it resources that are conducive to the future development of LCD in China, but also identifying in it elements that have negative implications. This is not to say that because liberal democracy is good, anything that runs counter to liberty or democracy is bad. What is

necessary is an impartial study of the different elements and values in the Chinese tradition and in Confucianism, including those that stand in a positive, neutral, or negative relationship to liberty, autonomy, equality, democracy, rights, etc. Only then will we be in a position to think about what form of LCD will be appropriate to China, what elements and values need to coexist with one another, and what kind of creative transformation is desirable for the Chinese tradition.

Apart from not being self-critical enough regarding the Chinese cultural tradition and Confucianism, another limitation of the Manifesto is that it advocates LCD in an uncritical manner, and does not indicate any awareness of the possible drawbacks of LCD either as a political system or as a political philosophy. Half a century after the Manifesto, we are now more conscious of such drawbacks, in the light of the excesses of certain liberal democratic practices and of the communitarian and other critiques of liberalism. It would appear that a dose of Confucianism might be healthy for a society with an LCD. Confucianism and liberalism should therefore engage in “mutual criticism” (in Lee Seung-hwan’s words) for the purpose of working out an LCD that does not lose sight of humanistic, moral, and spiritual concerns.

Finally, this article suggests that Mou Zongsan’s theory of the “self-negation” of conscience for the purpose of developing science and democracy in China is not without insight and inspiration even today. As far as political philosophy is concerned, the significance of the theory is that it recognizes that political science and politics may legitimately enjoy autonomy from—though not total independence of—Confucian ethical theory in the traditional sense. Such autonomy makes much room for large-scale borrowing and absorption of Western political and legal thought for the purpose of supplying the theoretical foundation as well as working out the institutional arrangements for an LCD in China. But this system of political thought and practice need not and should not be completely independent of Confucian ethical thinking, which can still serve as its ultimate moral foundation and affirm that the ultimate purpose of this system of political thought and practice is to serve the moral self-realization of human beings. Thus Mou Zongsan wrote of “Idealism as the Basis of Liberalism.”<sup>67</sup> What is the precise nature of the interface between the autonomous system of political thought and practice and its moral base in Confucian philosophy remains to be worked out.

It is perhaps not difficult to grasp intuitively the significance of Confucian ethics for an LCD. Imagine an LCD in which people (the electorate) are dominated by “low-level” desires (for sensual satisfaction, material wealth, etc.), greed and selfish considerations, and poli-

ticians competing for votes or exercising power are motivated by nothing other than the will to power, glory or wealth. Politicians use unscrupulous albeit lawful means to win votes, and after winning power engage in Machiavellian practices to maintain and strengthen their power. This is not in theory impossible, because there is nothing in the institutional structure of LCD to prevent it from happening. It is possible to understand the LCD as a market for votes in which voters and politicians behave according to their self-interests. What those interests are will be entirely up to the individuals concerned.

It can therefore be seen that LCD can turn into something that defeats completely the Confucian ideals of human development. There is nothing in the concepts of liberty, equality, autonomy, rights, and democracy that can prevent the scenario above from materializing. But the Confucian concepts and practices of personal cultivation and human development, of *li, yi, lian, chi*,<sup>68</sup> and of the moral responsibility of holders of political power can contribute to avoiding such a scenario. Here we see that traditions, cultures, religions, and philosophies of life like Confucianism do matter. They provide answers to the eternal questions about the meaning and significance of human existence and about the source of value, answers which LCD, either as a political system or a political philosophy, cannot provide. If liberal democracy is to serve humanity and to flourish together with humanity itself, it must be anchored in a culture, tradition, religion, or philosophy that upholds the higher humanistic, moral, and spiritual ideals of humankind. This was the deep insight and firm belief of the Neo-Confucian philosophers who authored the 1958 Manifesto on Chinese Culture and the World, and this could be the inspiration for a Confucian political philosophy for China's future.

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#### ENDNOTES

The author is grateful to Dr. Yu Kam-por, members of the "Confucian ethics" study group organized by Dr. Yu (at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University in 2003–4), and Dr. Joseph Chan for their intellectual sharing and moral support, without whom this article would not have been written. This article is a condensed version of the paper the author presented at the Symposium on Confucian Ethics organized by Dr. Yu and held at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, June 28–29, 2004. The author is also grateful to Professor Chenyang Li for his kind invitation to contribute to this issue, and to Professor Chung-ying Cheng for his valuable comments on an early version of this article.

1. The Manifesto was first published in 1958 in Hong Kong and Taipei in the magazines *Minzhu Pinglun* (*Democratic Critique*) and *Zaisheng* (*National Renaissance*). The full Chinese version has been republished under the title of *Zhongguo Wenhua yu Shijie* (*Chinese Culture and the World*) as an appendix in Tang Junyi, *Shuo Zhonghua Minzu*

- zhi Huaguo Piaoling* (*On the Withering Away of the Fruits of the Chinese Nation*) (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1974), 125ff. (Also published in Tang Junyi, *Zhonghua Renwen yu Dangjin Shijie* [*Chinese Humanities and the Contemporary World*] [Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1975]; *Tang Junyi Quanji* [*Complete Works of Tang Junyi*] [Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1991], vol. 4, part II; and Zhang Junmai, *Zhong Xi Yin Zhexue Wenji* [*Essays on Chinese, Western and Indian Philosophy*] [Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1981], 849ff.) An abbreviated English version of the Manifesto has been published under the title of “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” in Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai), *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought* (New York: Bookman, 1962), 2:455ff. For an English summary of and commentary on the Manifesto, see Hao Chang, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China,” in *The Limits of Change*, ed. Charlotte Furth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 276–302.
2. Chang, *Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*, 469.
  3. See, e.g., Li Minghui (Lee Ming-huei), *Ruxue yu Xiandai Yishi* (*Confucianism and Modern Consciousness*) (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1991), 1–18; Li Minghui, *Dangdai Ruxue zhi Ziwo Zhuanhua* (*The Self-transformation of Contemporary Confucianism*) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Wenzhesuo, 1994), 1–21; Li Minghui, *Mengzi Chongtan* (*Re-exploring Mencius*) (Taipei: Lianjing, 2001), 143–50; He Xinquan, *Ruxue yu Xiandai Minzhu* (*Confucianism and Modern Democracy*) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Wenzhesuo, 1996), 1–11; Lin Yusheng (Lin Yü-sheng), *Zhengzhi Zhixu Yu Duoyuan Shehui* (*Political Order and Pluralistic Society*) (Taipei: Lianjing, 1989), 337–49; and Joseph Chan’s article in this issue.
  4. See, e.g., Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
  5. See, e.g., Steve Tsang, “The Confucian Tradition and Democratization,” in *Democracy: The Challenges Ahead*, ed. Yossi Shain and Aharon Klieman (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 30–47; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “East Asian Culture and Democratic Transition, with Special Reference to the Case of Taiwan,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35, no. 1 (2000): 29ff.
  6. See, e.g., Hahm Chaibong, “The Confucian Political Discourse and the Politics of Reform in Korea,” *Korea Journal* 37, no. 4 (1997): 65ff.
  7. “Proposition 1,” “Proposition 2,” and “LCD” are named by me.
  8. Tang, *Withering Away*, 166 (my own translation from the Chinese original).
  9. See Mou Zongsan, *Zhengdao yu Zhidao* (*The Way of Politics and the Way of Administration*) (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1991), 55–62. For a summary and commentary on this theory, see, e.g., Wang Dade, “The Interpretation of Mou Zongsan’s Theory of the Self-Negation of Conscience,” in *Mou Zongsan Xiansheng yu Zhongguo Zhexue zhi Chongjian* (*Mou Zongsan and the Reconstruction of Chinese Philosophy*), ed. Li Minghui (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1996), 399ff.; Cai Renhou, “On the ‘Theory of Development’ (*kaichu*) and the ‘Theory of Negation’ (*kanxian*),” in *Ruxue yu Dangjin Shijie* (*Confucianism and the Contemporary World*), ed. Yang Zuhan (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1994), 15ff.; Fang Yingxian, “The ‘Self-negation of Conscience’ and Chinese Modernization,” *Ruxue yu Dangjin Shijie* (*Confucianism and the Contemporary World*), ed. Yang Zuhan (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1994), 29ff.; Yan Binggang, “Mou Zongsan’s Theory of Self-negation and the Problem of Contemporary Culture,” in *Dangdai Xinruxue Lunwenji: Waiwang Bian* (*Essays on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism: Outward Kingliness*), ed. Huang Meiyang and Cai Senchang (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1991), 197ff.
  10. Tang, *Withering Away*, 160–61.
  11. See Lin, *Political Order and Pluralistic Society*, and Zhang Hao (Chang Hao), *Yuan Yishi yu Minzhu Chuantong* (*Consciousness of Darkness and Democratic Tradition*) (Taipei: Lianjing, 1989); Chang Hao, “The Intellectual Heritage of the Confucian Ideal of Ching-shih,” in *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 72–91.
  12. Li, *Self-Transformation of Contemporary Confucianism*, 127.
  13. See generally Jiang Qing, *Zhengzhi Ruxue* (*Political Confucianism*) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2003), particularly chap. 1.

14. See his article in this issue.
15. Jin Yaoji (Ambrose King), *Zhongguo Shehui yu Wenhua (Chinese Society and Culture)* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), 166ff., discussed in Li Minghui, *Self-Transformation of Contemporary Confucianism*, 6–10.
16. *Ibid.*, 8.
17. See the following works by Kwang-kuo Hwang: “Two Moralities: Reinterpreting the Findings of Empirical Research on Moral Reasoning in Taiwan,” *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 1 (1998): 211ff.; “Filial Piety and Loyalty: Two Types of Social Identification in Confucianism,” *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 2 (1999): 163ff.; “Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical Construction and Methodological Considerations,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 30, no. 2 (2000): 155ff. I am grateful to Professor Hwang for sending me the offprints of these works.
18. Lin Anwu, *Zhongguo Jinxindai Sixiang Guannian Shi Lun (On the History of Modern Chinese Thought and Concepts)* (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1995), chap. 1.
19. See Jiang, *Political Confucianism*, 1–249.
20. See generally the works cited in n. 3 above and the following works: Deng Xiaojun, *Rujia Sixiang yu Minzhu Sixiang de Luoji Jiehe (The Logical Combination of Confucian Thought and Democratic Thought)* (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1995); Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections on the ‘Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition,’” in *Chinese Thought in a Global Context*, ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1999), 73ff., esp. 91–100; Heiner Roetz, “The ‘Dignity within Oneself’: Chinese Tradition and Human Rights,” in *Chinese Thought in a Global Context*, ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1999), 236ff.; Heiner Roetz, “Confucianism and Some Questions of Human Rights” (in English), in *Xiandai Rujia yu Dongya Wenming: Wenti yu Zhanwang (Modern Confucianism and East Asian Civilization: Problems and Prospects)*, ed. Liu Shuxian (Liu Shu-hsien) and Lin Yuehui (Lin Yueh-hui) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, 2002), 155ff.; Heiner Roetz, “Rights and Duties,” in *Chinese Ethics in a Global Context*, ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl and Anselm W. Müller (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2002), 301ff.; Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212–237; Joseph Chan, “Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism,” *Philosophy East & West* 52, no. 3 (2002): 281ff.; Yang Guorong, “Mengzi and Democracy: Dual Implications,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 31, no. 1 (2004): 83ff.; Wejen Chang, “The Confucian Theory of Norms and Human Rights,” in *Confucianism and Human Rights*, ed. William Theodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 117–141; and Chung-ying Cheng, “Transforming Confucian Virtues into Human Rights,” in *Confucianism and Human Rights*, ed. William Theodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 142–153. For a similar position in an older work, see Huang Kejian and Wu Xiaolong, eds., *Zhang Junmai Ji (Collected Works of Zhang Junmai)* (Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe, 1993), 468–82; Lu Xichen and Chen Ying, eds., *Jingshen Ziyou yu Minzu Wenhua: Zhang Junmai Xinruxue Lunzhu Jiyao (Spiritual Freedom and National Culture: Selected Works of Zhang Junmai on New Confucianism)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1995), 588–94.
21. See Jiang, *Political Confucianism*, 1–95.
22. *Ibid.* See also Jiang’s latest book, *Shengming Xinyang yu Wangdao Zhengzhi (Faith about Life and the Politics of the Kingly Way)* (Taipei: Yangzhengtang Wenhua, 2004).
23. See generally Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History* (London: Collins Harvill, 1988).
24. Jiang, *Political Confucianism*, 96–249.
25. See generally Honghe Liu, *Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal: Hsu Fu-kuan’s Critical Examination of the Confucian Political Tradition* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001).
26. See, e.g., Tu Wei-ming, “Confucianism,” in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), chap. 3, esp. 193–94.
27. See, e.g., Chang, “The Intellectual Heritage.”



28. See Lin's works cited in n. 3 and n. 20 above.
29. Charles Wei-hsun Fu, "Philosophical Reflections on the Modernization of Confucianism as Traditional Morality," in *Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues*, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), chap. 13, 303.
30. Chenyang Li, "Confucian Value and Democratic Value," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 31 (1997): 183ff., 189.
31. See generally "Confucianism and Liberalism: A Dialogue with Professor Tu Weiming," in *Rujia yu Ziyoushuyi (Confucianism and Liberalism)*, ed. Harvard-Yenching Society and Sanlian Shudian (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2001), 1ff.
32. Li Minghui, *Confucianism and Modern Consciousness and Re-exploring Mencius*.
33. See Joseph Chan's article in this issue.
34. Seung-hwan Lee, "Was There a Concept of Rights in Confucian Virtue-based Morality?" *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 19 (1992): 241ff.; Seung-hwan Lee, "Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues?" *Philosophy East & West* 46, no. 3 (1996): 367ff.
35. Cheng, "Transforming Confucian Virtues."
36. Yu Kam-por, "Human Rights and Chinese Ethical Thinking" (PhD diss., University of Hong Kong, 1996).
37. See Joseph Chan's works cited in n. 20 above.
38. See Roetz's works cited in n. 20 above.
39. Huang Junjie (Huang Chun-chieh), "Confucianism and Human Rights," in *Rujia Sixiang yu Xiandai Shijie (Confucian Thought and the Modern World)*, ed. Liu Shuxian (Liu Shu-hsien) (Taipei: Academic Sinica, Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, 1997), 33ff.
40. Li Minghui, "Confucian Tradition and Human Rights," in *Chuantong Zhonghua Wenhua yu Xiandai Jiazhi de Jidang (The Dynamic Interaction of Traditional Chinese Culture and Modern Values)*, ed. Huang Junjie (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2002), 207ff.
41. See generally Li Minghui, *Confucianism and Modern Consciousness*, preface at 3–4; Li Minghui, *Self-Transformation of Contemporary Confucianism*, v. 12.
42. "Mencius said, 'For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By retaining his heart and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven'" (*Mencius* VII.A.1, trans. D. C. Lau [London: Penguin Books, 1970], 182).
43. *Analects* VI.30, James Legg, trans., *The Chinese Classics* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 1:194.
44. John C. H. Wu, "Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy," in *The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture*, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 213ff., 214–15.
45. H. B. Nisbet, trans., *Kant: Political Writings*, 2nd enlarged ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 74. See also the discussion of this passage in Norberto Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy*, trans. Roger Griffin (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987), 149.
46. Quotations from the last two chapters of *Daxue*; trans. from *Daxue Zhongyong*, with English trans. by He Zuokang (Beijing: Huayu Jiaoxue Chubanshe, 1996), 35, 45.
47. See the discussion in Wei Zhengtong, *Rujia yu Xiandaihua (Confucianism and Modernization)* (Taipei: Shuiniu Chubanshe, rev. ed. 1997) (originally published under the title *Chuantong yu Xiandaihua [Tradition and Modernization]*), 51ff.
48. *The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing)*, trans. Liu Ruixiang and Lin Zhihe (Jinan: Shandong Youyi Shushe, 1993), 29, 35, 43, 51.
49. Lin Anwu, *Dao de Cuozhi: Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang de Genben Kunjie (The Fallacy of the Misplaced Dao: The Fundamental Problem of Chinese Political Thought)* (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 2003), esp. v–xii. See also Lin Anwu, *Ruxue yu Zhongguo Chuantong Shehui zhi Zhaxue Xingcha (Confucianism and Philosophical Reflections on Traditional Chinese Society)* (Taipei: Youshi, 1996), 131–156.
50. See generally Lin's books cited in n. 18 and n. 49 above.
51. Lin, *Confucianism and Philosophical Reflections*, 17–32.



52. Lin, *Fallacy of Misplaced Dao*, x and 119–156; Lin, *Modern Chinese Thought and Concepts*, 95–121.
53. *Ibid.*, 128 (my own translation).
54. Lin, *Modern Chinese Thought and Concepts*, 95–121.
55. Lin, *Fallacy of Misplaced Dao*, 149–55; Lin, *Confucianism and Philosophical Reflections*, 157–197.
56. See Mou's *Zhengdao yu Zhidao*. For a commentary, see Situ Gangsheng, "Mou Zongsan's Theory of Politics," in *Mou Zongsan and the Reconstruction of Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Li Minghui (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1996), 387ff.
57. See the works cited in n. 9 above.
58. On Mou's modernized interpretation of "inner sagehood and outward kingliness," see Li, *Confucianism and Modern Consciousness*, preface at 4; Li, *Re-exploring Mencius*, 164–65.
59. See generally Cheng Zhongying (Chung-ying Cheng), *He Wainei zhi Dao: Rujia Zhexue Lun (Combining the Outer and Inner Ways: On Confucian Philosophy)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2001), essays at 333ff., 398ff., and 413ff. I am grateful to Professor Cheng for his drawing my attention to these essays.
60. Baogang He, "New Moral Foundations of Chinese Democratic Institutional Design," in *China and Democracy*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000), chap. 5, 90–92.
61. See, e.g., Liu Shuxian (Liu Shu-hsien), "From People-as-the-Basis to Democracy," in his book, *Rujia Sixiang yu Xiandaihua (Confucian Thought and Modernization)*, ed. Jing Haifeng (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1992), 17ff.
62. Lee Seung-hwan, "Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues?" *Philosophy East & West* 46, no. 3 (1996): 367ff.
63. *Ibid.*, last paragraph of the article.
64. Daniel A. Bell, "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: A Political Proposal for the Post-Communist Era," *Philosophy East & West* 49, no. 4 (1999): 451ff.
65. See his contribution to this issue.
66. See my discussion of this issue in "21st-century Chinese Political Thought," in *Zhengzhi Lilun zai Zhongguo (Political Theory in China)*, ed. Chen Zuwei (Joseph Chan) and Liang Wentao (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12ff., 18–20.
67. This article of his is collected in Mou Zongsan, *Shengming de Xuewen (The Scholarship of Life)* (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1970), 207ff.
68. It is interesting to note that these four characters were prominently displayed on the banners of the "Red-clothed" demonstrators led by Mr. Shih Ming-teh in the mass movement calling for the resignation of President Chen Shuibian (Chen Shui-bian) in Taiwan in 2006.

### CHINESE GLOSSARY

|                 |      |                  |      |
|-----------------|------|------------------|------|
| chenzi          | 臣子   | kanxian          | 坎陷   |
| <i>Chunqiu</i>  | 《春秋》 | li               | 禮    |
| daotong         | 道統   | li yi lian chi   | 禮義廉耻 |
| dezhi           | 德治   | liangzhi         | 良知   |
| fumuguan        | 父母官  | minben           | 民本   |
| <i>Gongyang</i> | 《公羊》 | neisheng waiwang | 內聖外王 |
| guwen jingxue   | 古文經學 | ren              | 仁    |
| junfu           | 君父   | renzheng         | 仁政   |
| kaichu          | 開出   | sangang          | 三綱   |

|                    |      |           |    |
|--------------------|------|-----------|----|
| shenghuohua        | 生活化  | yinyang   | 陰陽 |
| shengjun xianxiang | 聖君賢相 | zhengdao  | 政道 |
| shengming          | 生命   | zhengtong | 政統 |
| tianmin            | 天民   | zhidao    | 治道 |
| xinxing            | 心性   | zhuti     | 主體 |
| xinxing zhixue     | 心性之學 | zimin     | 子民 |
| xuetong            | 學統   |           |    |
| yili sharen        | 以理殺人 |           |    |

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