

# 새한영어영문학

2001 가을 제 43권 2호



새한영어영문학회

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# 새한영어영문학

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CHAOGITO:

A Caesura of Fable Within Descartes' "Fable"

Lee, Kyoo-Eun

1. Introducing *Chaogito*

What I hope to establish in this essay is the following point: *Chaogito* is not only parasitic on, but can also be viewed as a formulation better reflecting the originary moment of, the *cogito*. The word *chaogito*, short for chaotic cogitation, coined originally by Jean-Luc Nancy, captures effectively both, the figurative (rhetorical and extravagant) and the logical (discursive and controlled) sides of the act of Cartesian cogitation. My reading of Descartes on this matter is initially inspired by, significantly indebted to, and will remain close to, Nancy's (1978 and 1979) in which an intriguing paradox is explored: the question of how the structurally fictional (1978) and topologically invisible (1979) authorial position effects the *intratextual* formation or rather, the consequential emergence (1979), of philosophical subjectivity: the question raised here is, formulated in more general terms, is how the literary and the philosophical intermingle in the texts of Descartes. Also informed by some other illuminating studies<sup>1)</sup> on this intricately interdisciplinary element in Descartes writings, which, I came to believe, still needs further systematic exploring, I set out to look closely into a dialectically economised interplay between the literary and the philosophical in Descartes landscape of thinking. The particular focus of my reading in this essay is on the first three paragraphs of the second *Meditation*<sup>2)</sup> (*Med.* AT VII 24-5/*CSM* II 17-8).

1) Benjamin A. Bruns; Derrida 1990; Irani; Judovitz; Kosman; Lang; Loeb; Mason; Ree 1987; Rudolph.

where the meditators epistemological *psychomachia* territorial war waged against the hypothetical, evil genius (*malin génie, malus genius*)\unfuris.

Pursuing a rhetorico-logical, double reading of Descartes inevitably involves a double focus: Although some extra spotlights will be thrown on the rhetorical dimension of Descartes discourse hitherto left in relative darkness, which I will be explicating in some detailed, phenomenological manner, the reading is to take place not to the exclusion of the discursive or theoretical issues arising in the process, but in a more inclusive or rather, interventive manner, in a similar way that Descartes text, as we shall see, allows Descartes the philosopher to intervene Descartes the rhetorician and vice versa. The specific task of the essay becomes twofold, accordingly.

One, argumentatively oriented, is to make a convincing case, by taking Descartes as an example, that literary elements found in philosophical texts are not merely ornamental or secondary to philosophical argument but, to a certain extent, is formative or generative of it, whether structurally or topologically; secondary in the sense of being ancillary (Greene 65; Flage and Bonnen 6-9)/ auxiliary (Greene 77), temporary (Greene 65)/ tentative (Greene 77), in a word, irrelevant (Greene 67; Wilson 5-11) and yet, on closer inspection, strangely persistent (Greene 67) and urgently (Greene 68) threatening. By arguing for such position, I align myself to both Beryl Lang (1990, 1995) and Nancy (1978, 1979) against<sup>3)</sup> Marjorie Greene, Margaret

2) Although Nancy's main focus of reading lies on *The World* (1978, *Mundus est Fabula*) and *Discourse* (1978 and 1979, *Lanotus Pro Deo*), he also refers specifically to this part in *Meditations* as another relevant case in point (1978: 646n17).

3) Browsing through some standard, scientifically-oriented (i.e. non-deconstructive, straight) studies on Descartes, introductory or advanced, one would notice easily how the question of the rhetorical or the literary has been marginalised in the established, Anglophone Descartes scholarship; how this question has been ignored either in the form of trivialisation of it (as has been noted earlier in the main text) or in the form of no engagement with it. To give only an indication of such barren situation, neither Bernard Williams chapter on Descartes method (32-71) nor John Cottingham's (1986: 22-46) addressed the issue of *how* the method is presented in Descartes text; both of them focused, instead, with a scholarly single-mindedness, on the question of *what* the method is. A more advanced, book-length study on Descartes method, published recently (Flage and Bonnen), has not devoted a single section to the issue at stake, which Greene

Wilson, Flage and Bonnen. With Lang, I share a formal-stylistic concern: I subscribe to the view that the literary style of thinking shapes (1983: 34, 43, 52-9) the philosophical method or form of thinking to the extent that the link between the two is more fundamental than the distinction between them: the point, put differently, is that the evidence (43, 53) of philosophical meaning includes (53) that of the literary or stylistic status of the work. On a more material-generative level, I am with Nancy in contending that, insofar as the material (1978: 650) resources of *cogito*, e.g. the fictive elements in Cartesian hyperbolism, are indispensable to, and remains inexhaustible in, cogitational philosophical discourse, the literary is to be recognised as an enabling condition for the production of the philosophical. The Fable of the Invention of the World (...) included its material *cogito*, its *chzogito*, situated at the extreme, in other words, initial point of fiction (1978: 650). Put conclusively: the key points of contention I seek to establish in what follows, concern (a) an intratextual parallel between rhetorical hyperbolism and discursive hyper-reflectiveness, and (b) the inaugural role the former plays in the structuration of the latter.

The other task of the essay, descriptively oriented, is to understand exactly how Descartes, as Jonathan Réé (1987: 12) puts it, builds anecdote into philosophy instead of just crumbing philosophy into anecdote, which Montaigne the comparatively scatterbrained essayist does, for instance (Réé 1987: 11-3, 16-8; Judovitz 1998: 8-20). The present essay will, when necessary, make reference to, and develop some points made in, the existing commentaries<sup>4)</sup> on Descartes the philosopher-novelist, especially those in which the question of the I in action, the speaking subject, is explored from a specifically narrative point of view. The key question that concerns us is: exactly how Descartes allows the elements of the literary and the philosophical--traditionally conceived as mutually heterogeneous--to be built into each other or knotted together, to the effect of achieving a sense of

(53-87), more than a decade ago, considered at least *threateningly* interesting.

4) such as Dalia Judovitz (1998), L. Kosman, Louis Loeb, and Rees (1987)

building up in his text, notably in *Discourse* and *Meditations*. And this question is two questions asked at once: one, asking (1) *who* such character is, operative as something like a joiner or weaver of the text, and the other, asking (2) *where* he resides or rather, is hidden:

(1) firstly, why Descartes, the author of *Discourse* and *Meditations*, is not just a self-conscious, dreamy rambler but an engineering or architectural thinker, i.e. not just a modernist writer but the modern subject; not only the first real novelist (Rée 1987: 10n14), as has been suggested, but the father of modern philosophy, as the convention dubs him, whose appearance in the historical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit, according to Hegel, is of necessity (251):

(2) secondly, more intriguingly, why the architect-subject, the cogitational I of Descartes, is nevertheless fugitive, the more closely examined, the more consistently elusive.

This twofold riddle, we shall explore later in section §3 and §4, respectively. In exploring the labyrinthine world of philosophical problems this twofold question leads us into, I can share with the astonished Greene the urgency with which he asks his question: we have urgently to ask about Cartesian science: how it can proceed *via* certainties only, yet also *via* hypothesis--mongering and story--telling (1985: 64); but if I am willing to do so, that will be for the wrong reasons.

## 2. Literary Seduction/ Philosophical Resistance

Before setting out a detailed, topographically reading of the evil genius in the *Second Meditation*, which is the practical task of the present essay, it would be necessary to spend some time thinking, in some general terms, about the role of the literary in the philosophical writings of Descartes--the narrative intimacy of Descartes's I, to be more specific. What follows in this section is a preliminary discussion of this issue, which will help us understand the

significance of the question at stake.

Examples of Descartes as a fascinating cross-dresser of genres are abundant in his *oeuvre*. *Discourse* is a notable example. It is, as the preamble defines the work as such, an allegorical story about, rather than a treatise<sup>5)</sup> on, a method of thinking: a story (*une histoire*) or, if you prefer, a fable (*une fable*)<sup>6)</sup>. Of many things that such prefatory, authorial self-definition attempts to do (e.g. to announce, warn, implicate, insinuate, etc.), one thing it does not fail to achieve is to put a reader in an anticipatory mode. In the case given here, the preamble promises--in other words, seduces. A promise: we, the readers, are assured that what is to unfold is *not* some boring scholastic treatise written by a typical, and in this sense nameless, dogmatist. The seduction: having sat close to us this way, armed with aggressive vernacularism (Brunns 68-70; Rée 1987:13), Descartes invites us to listen to the history of his mind (Lang 1990: 4). Here, I, Descartes, the fabulating narrator, will not only speak about a method I invented, but show *the very process* of acquiring that method, as if in a picture:

I shall be glad, nevertheless, to reveal in this discourse the paths that, I have followed, and to represent my life in it as if in a picture (*de représenter ma vie comme en un tableau*), so that everyone may judge it for himself. (Dis, AT VI 4/ CSM I 112)

What the seductive author of *Discourse* promises the reader is not merely

5) I have not put *Treatise on the Method* but *Discourse on the Method*, which amounts to the same as *Preface* or *Note concerning the Method*, in order to show that I do not intend to teach the method but only to speak about it. For, as can be seen from what I say, it consists much more in practice than in theory (A Letter to Mersenne of 27 February 1637, AT I 349/CSM III 53).

6) My present aim, then, is not to teach the Method here which everyone must follow in order to direct his reason correctly, but only to show how I have tried to direct my own [...]. I am presenting this work only as a story or, if you prefer, a fable in which, among certain examples that one can imitate, you will also find many others that you would have no reason to follow; and so I hope it will be useful for some without being harmful to any, and that everyone will be grateful to me for my frankness (Dis, AT VI 4/ CSM I 112, a minor revision of translation).

an entertainment but an entertainment that contains a truth in action, i.e. an allegorical truth. *Discourse*, as a fable or a story, does not substantiate the factual truth. But it *can carry* (*peut porter*) the exemplary signification of a truth (Derrida 326, *emphasis added*). *Discourse*, in this sense, is a display of a truth, a truth in the process of being revealed. It is, in other words, *the fable of frankness?* in which frankness holds a methodological value; here, truth speaks through the first-person narrator, the transparent filter through which truth can be shown. This way, the I of I think, I speak, I represent, etc. in Cartesian discourse becomes the holder of a method.

Descartes method of telling a truth is demonstrative: Descartes shows, rather than writes about, truths. Seen from a compositional point of view, what matters to Descartes the writer is not so much the frozen completeness of each moment of thinking he is to convey in each sentence, as the overall effect of real-time authenticity, e.g. an *effect* of spontaneity (Rée 1987: 20<sup>9</sup>), *emphasis added*/difficult to achieve in spontaneous scribbles, the unedited messiness of which, as Walter Benjamin laments, is worse than a bad photograph(95).<sup>9</sup> The spontaneity of Descartes style is then not natural but staged: it is a product of editorial labour. That is, Descartes text is a carefully crafted<sup>10</sup>, patiently woven fabric, in every hole of which each turn of self-consciousness is caught, fabricated. What the Cartesian lens of writing attempts to capture is such moment of thinking, i.e. the insulated (Lang 1990: 46-8) moment when I am here alone, writing, sitting by the fire...<sup>11</sup>. Each moment of thinking thus captured, arranged and created in

7) Very curiously, Descartes proof is limited to a high degree of credibility (*le degré d'une forte crédibilité*) (Nancy 1979: 25). (Nancy 1978: 644).

8) It probably took Descartes an average of more than a year to compose each days diary.  
9) Nothing is poorer than a truth expressed as it was thought. Committed to writing in such a case, it is not even a bad photograph. And the truth refuses (like a child or a woman who does not love us), facing the lens of writing while we crouch under the black cloth, to keep still and look amiable.

10) You will be amazed that I am taking such a long time to write a discourse which will be so short that I reckon it will take only an afternoon to read (*A letter to Mersenne*, 15th April 1630, AT I 137-8/ CSM III 21).

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such an auto-inscriptive manner, then becomes a cogitational event in itself. Such a self-conscious insertion of the writerly self into the procedural dimension of writing gives rise to a textual exposition of the temporal self, and it is this, textual presence of the temporal self that makes *Discourse* a literary narrative, and more specifically, an autobiographical construct (see also Rée 1987: 7, 17-8, 20). In summary, then: what Descartes presents his readers is not only a philosophy, but a life philosophically *examined*; not only a life philosophically examined, but a life philosophised life, but a *lived*. At stake here is therefore not only a philosophised life, but a narrative display of philosophy in action. Descartes philosophy <sup>is</sup> a philosophy lived in the flesh, and a philosophy lived systematically <sup>in</sup> the flesh. One example of the Cartesian flesh of philosophy, which we are going to examine in detail, is literary narration, e.g. narrative threads of a text.

If *Discourse* is an autobiography, *Meditations* is a diary. A diary being a microcosmic doubling of an autobiography, its narrative density tends to be higher than that of the autobiography. This may explain the extraordinary vividness of *Meditations*. In this soul-gripping philosophical diary, the journal-scribbler records his nocturnal duelling with his alter ego, i.e. the sceptical self in the writer which manifests itself in a couple of different figures, e.g. a lunatic, a dreamer and the evil genius. The most daring figure of these three is the hypothetical evil genius who is *not*, but could become, God, only if he gave up his bad will to deceive his human playthings, and replaced his malevolent intent with benevolence, which by definition (i.e. for being evil), he cannot. The topsy-turvy world of a sceptic, the otherworldly world that mirrors the real world in an astounding way (*Med*, AT VII 19/CSM II 13) distorted way, starts to unfold, when Descartes the sceptic finds himself in the following situation:

11) [...] Although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects which are very small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the senses--for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hand, and so on (*Med*, AT VII 18/ CSM II 12-3).

Already some years ago, I have noticed (*amiradberti*) how many false things I going into my youth, had admitted as true and how dubious were the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realised that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations [...] (*Med* AT VII 17/CSM II 12, *translation revised*).

Then, Descartes uses three more paragraphs for a further exploration of the cosmic significance of that initial suspicion, in other words, the more serious theoretical implications of such epistemological dislocation: towards the end of the fourth paragraph, he finds himself dumbstruck by a larger implication of what he had been suspecting ever since--The result is that I begin to feel astounded (*obstupescam*), and this very feeling of stupor (*stupor*) itself only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep (*Med* AT VII 19/CSM II 13, *translation revised*). This sentence heralds the beginning of an epistemological chaos, the unfolding of an insomniac narrative, with which the first *Meditation* ends (*Med*, AT VII 19-23/CSM II 13-5).

Descartes the insomniac is awakened in two different ways. If what causes him to *become* alert is the transgressive force of hyperbolic imagination, what makes him *stay* alert is the reflexive recognition of that force. The former can be described as the rhetoricians insomnia, lively and pointy; and the latter, the philosophers, relatively morbid. Levinas's twofold description of insomnia captures just that, aptly: the excess of consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of the possible (Levinas 120): when the imagination is agitated, there occurs, immediately, a reflexive controlling of that agitation (analogous to a reflex action). On the one hand, Descartes the rhetorician enthusiastically invites a chaotic self into his textual space; on the other hand, Descartes the philosopher jealously guards his house of being from the intrusion of an unruly guest (e.g. a lunatic, a dreamer and the evil genius).

Berel Langs delicate analysis of flow and block in Descartes text (1990: 45, 49-52, 57-8, 64), for instance, shows this twofold movement of Cartesian consciousness in some detail: an intratextual clash between the image of

narrative flow and that of architectural block: a textual interweaving between a train of reasoning (*Rules*, AT X 369-370/CSM I 15-6) and the logical steps of reasoning, between the chaotic fluidity of hyper-reflection and the formal stability of reflexion. David Appelbaums analysis of the stop in Descartes, i.e. that which breaks an onrushing momentum and opens experience to another point of view (ix), is another good example worth mentioning here.

What emerges from this line of reading is a *double* face of Descartes: the rhythmico-rhetorical side of Descartes and the geometrico-logical (see Warner 6-12) side: on the one hand, Descartes the rhetorician who seduces the reader as well as himself with the lure of excess, and on the one hand, Descartes the philosopher who resists that excess. And the point to note is that the two heterogeneous faces are inseparably linked to each other as in the facial map of Janus. In other words, in Descartes text, the philosophical (or the logical) and the literary (or the rhetorical) supplement each other, albeit in some intriguingly incongruous manner.

With Lang, I subscribe to the view that this intratextual clash<sup>12)</sup> of opposing images bears witness to an irreducible Cartesian impulse (49-50) of self-reflection. Take note, for instance, the formative role the paranoiac imagination plays in the making of the sceptical mind: the focus of Descartes suspicion *moves* from the particular to the universal, from the large number of individual cases of falsehood to the whole edifice that, supposedly, supports such global network of elaborate and coherent illusions. One thing that such step-by-step escalation of self-doubts illustrates is that an evolution of the sceptical mind requires a hyperbolic imagination as its breeding ground, i.e. as its material resource. Pushing this point further, one can even say that, seen in terms of textual production, literary paranoia and

12) Interesting to note, in this regard, is Jeff Masons evocation of a pair of opposing images of block vs. flow in describing the clash between the analytic philosophers approach to philosophical texts and the continental philosophers or (more literary-minded, critics): the river of rhetoric sinks beneath the sands (9) on which the analytic philosophers build their philosophical houses; the analytic philosophers had no explicit rhetorical legs to stand on (14).



philosophical rigour are more homogeneous than heterogeneous, dialectically intimate with each other: the suggestion here is that there is an inseparable link between the speculative force of Cartesian cogitation and Descartes quasi-pathological obsession with the real. This, of course, is not to contend that the two terms can be reduced to the same. The point is rather: precisely by virtue of being irreducible to each other, they can *interact* with each other in the actual production of philosophical texts.

The present essay is not committed to guarding the image of deductive steps of reasoning against that of seductive<sup>13</sup> flow of narration. On the contrary, it attempts to show how the two *intersect*: how the conflicting forces of Cartesian impulse interact with each other; how the two different yet mutually supplementary dimensions come to be interwoven to create a fabric of Descartes text that is both fabulous and solid--fabulous as fables narrated by a fanatic of rightness (Rée 1974: 17), and at the same time solid as philosophical writings.

The case in point I will be focusing on, as has been indicated earlier, is the evil genius entry into Cartesian meditation; to be more specific, *the way* in which that problematic figure enters Descartes's text. Here are the first three paragraphs of the Second *Meditation* (*Med.* AT VII 24-5/CSM II 17-8), to which the rest of my discussion will refer constantly:

So serious are the doubts into which I have been thrown (*conjectus sum*) as a result of yesterday's meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them. I feel as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool (*in profundum gurgitem*<sup>14</sup>) which turns me around so that I can neither stand on

<sup>13</sup> as in the seduction of language (Husserl 1934: 364/362) contaminating the purity of judicious, otherworldly rationality: 'It is easy to see that even in (ordinary) human life, and first of all in every individual life from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates is originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association.'

<sup>14</sup> gurgel: an abyss, gulf, swirl (of water); a bottomless abyss

the bottom nor swim up to the top. Nevertheless, I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I started on yesterday. Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if (*quasi*) I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognise something certain [...]. Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth: so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however, slight, that is certain and shakeable.

I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies [...]. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.

Yet (*Sed*) apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am having? But surely, why (*Quare vero*) do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author (*author*) of these thoughts? In that case am I not, at least, something? But (*Sed*) I have just said that I have no sense and no body. This is the sticking point (*Hoerco tenentis*<sup>15</sup>): what follows from this? [...] But (*Sed*) there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing as long as I think I am something (*ut nihil sim quatenus me aliquid esse cogitabo*). So after considering everything thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist* (*Ego Sum, ego existo*), is necessarily true (*verum*) whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (a minor revision of translation)

<sup>15</sup> sticky in the sense that these two problems would always recur alternately in succession.

### 3. I, Descartes, Am Res Chaogitans

Who is Descartes? Is he a rhetorician or a philosopher? or both? Our first question concerns the I<sub>s</sub> in the passage quoted, shown or hidden: what this question attempts to capture is the originary identity of the self-conscious, and therefore self-duplicative, authorial subject in Descartes text.

The world of authorial self-consciousness engenders two worlds from within: the abyssal world of conjectural as if, i.e. fiction, and the stable world of is, i.e. reality; and the point at which the clash between the two worlds take place, consistently and persistently. Descartes describes as sticking. Descartes the thinking subject is that which *holds* these two worlds together at once. This sticking point of chaogitation, like a blackhole sucking everything (Kolakowski 68) into itself without presenting itself as such in any visible form, is, as Descartes himself puts it, the Archimedean zero point where the entire earth is shifted: it is around this end point of self-consciousness, projected and posited as such, that the world of as if and that of is are shifted around, intersecting each other. The ego of *ego cogito* passes through this criss-cross point where the fiction ends and reality begins--and also, the other way around.

Descartes is, in other words, a spinner who spins out his thoughts at every turn of but (*Sed, verò*) that is therefore conjunctive and disjunctive at once. That is to say, he is an inventive spinner: what he invented is the Archimedean zero point of thinking on which everything shifts around. When David Hume describes rationalist philosophy as a philosophy found on *a turn* of the mind (7, *emphasis added*), the image he evoke is just that of spinning. The rest of this section seeks to show Descartes as the inventor of that epistemological zero point, i.e. an inventor without inventory (Bruns 65):

[...] (7)inally, it (the mind) is utterly self-possessed, because it possesses and requires nothing but its own native and inward way of proceeding, which in this case is a grammar purified of whatever accrues to it historically. For the first time invention without an inventory is possible.

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Accordingly, our task involves assuming that the nothingness of 0 itself signifies at least something rather than nothing; or, put more extravagantly, believing in a paradoxical power of cogitational self-deprivation, about which Edmund Husserl (1931: 44-5/1-3) speaks in the opening pages of *Cartesian Meditations*--when it comes to philosophical self-reflection, an absolute wealth of truth grows originally from an absolute poverty.

In what sense is Descartes an inventor without inventory?

When we say Descartes the inventor (e.g. the inventor of the evil genius in *Meditations* or the inventor of a method in *Discourse*), we refer to the inventive I that lies both inside *and* outside of the narratives: both Descartes the author *in* the narratives and Descartes the author *of* those narratives: both Descartes a necessary narrative construct existing *in* the narrative as the author of these thoughts and Descartes the author fabricating that narrative, located *outside* of it: to wit, both Descartes the inventor *in* the narrative and Descartes the inventor *of* the narrative. A binarising fussiness with which one pays attention to, and thereby attempts to discriminate, such double genesis of Descartes or double dimension of Cartesian fabrication, may need some justification, in advance: Descartes mixes these two different dimensions and does so rather intriguingly as well as economically. The point to note, put broadly, is that there is an *intratextual* interplay between the inside and the outside in Descartes text.

Look at the passage where the evil genius is expunged, summarily:

Let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am something (*emphasis added*).

And observe here a certain narrative leap: the two I<sub>s</sub> of I am nothing and I am something belong to the same narrative order in which the evil genius exists hypothetically: but the narrative order to which the I of I think belongs, viewed structurally or topologically, is other than or higher than that to which the evil genius does--here, the I of I think is being suddenly wheeled into the existing, previously built-up narrative, *from the outside*. In other words, the I of I am nothing/something exists *in* the narrative as that

which remains deceived, i.e. as that which *is* in the narrative in the form of being deceived; by contrast, the I of I think has to step further outside of that narrative domain in order to see that situation as such in its entirety, again, *albeit* hypothetically. To use the binary framework introduced earlier, this is the point where Descartes the inventor of the narrative suddenly breaks--or enters (Nancy 1978: 638)--into the narrative space previously created by Descartes the inventor *in* the narrative, and rescues the suffering protagonist from the narrative hell: to use Ree's phrase, the protagonist becomes fused with (1987: 14) the narrator: in other words, a master inventor intervenes in a situation that its alter ego invented.

What we are reading here is a case of a structural appropriation of *Deus ex machina*: what is being used in the text, to be more specific, is not so much the power of God as his *topos*, i.e. the trope of the beyond, the outside. What the act of I think causes is a shift of authorial focus from the observed I (him, the victim of the self-harassing narrative) to the observing I (me, the superman figure flying in from the textual sky and rescuing him). And a reason why such a narrative leap or shift may, nevertheless, not be readily apparent to the reader is that it is obscured by the indiscriminate use of I.

Such indiscrimination is, however, not so much defective as generative: generative of the philosophical I. And this can be said in the following sense. To paraphrase, in performative terms, what Descartes thinks when he says *I think* in the sentence at issue: I, Descartes, am rescuing the victim in and of my hyperbolic narrative, with whom I am identifying, with whom I am empathising by filling the spectatorial gap that my hyperbolic imagination has been holding so far: in a word, I am now entering. This I that has been maintaining its narrative distance from what it narrates, ceases to stay as what it has been, as soon as it starts involving itself in the rescue-operation: by leaping *into* the narrative, it also *becomes* a third-person, i.e. a rescuing angel paralleling the demon. The I of I think, at this point, becomes a third-person, in a similar way that an intervening angel becomes a mediating figure between God and humans: this angel, both

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God and humans share. To stay with the analogy, a triadic formula can be established:

the authorial I = God  
the victimised I in the text = a vulnerable human being  
the cogitational I = the angel.

The authorial or directorial I is the larger, instantly withdrawing I who is sending the superman down to the text; and the narrated I, displayed as such in the first-person narrative as a character in action, is the victimised, smaller I who is therefore welcoming the third-person intervention in this, interminable duel of I-You. The cogitational I is, in this sense, a fusion of the directorial I and the theatrical I. This auto-directed, cogitational I, whose constant intratextual emergence in a first-person reflective narrative causes the infinite, topological expansion of the framework of narration, can be also identified as what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call the conceptual personae (60-81/61-85), the becoming or the subject of a philosophy (63/64): Who is I? It is always a third person (63/65). The conceptual personae's derivative of the legendary homunculus, the little person, believed to station himself in the middle of the soul of each *homo sapiens*. Descartes the inventor of the epistemological zero-point is nothing other than this homunculus, the third I/eye.

However, the third I/eye can be given neither a fixed abode nor a fixed identity: it is rather a function, an indexical marker of the happening of self-reflection. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in his reading note (263/210) on Descartes *Optics*, it is a brute being caught in the shifting sands (*l'ère brute enlisé*):

Who will see the image painted in the eyes or in the brain? There must be in the end be a *thought* of this image--Descartes himself realised that we always posit a little man inside man, that our objectifying view of our body always obliges us to search *farther* inside (*plus au-dedans*) for this *man who sees*, whom we thought we beheld beneath our eyes. Yet what he (Descartes? homunculus?)

both?) does not see is that the primordial vision at which one must arrive cannot be the thought of seeing (*persée de voir*)--This thought, this unveiling of being which ultimately is for someone, is once again the little man in man, but this time compressed to a metaphysical point [...] It will be brute being caught in the shifting sands, a being that reverts to itself.

The identity of the Cartesian homunculus or conceptual personae, the Cartesian *I* eye, can be figured out, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, from the way in which it is compressed to a metaphysical point. What is given here is therefore a topological, rather than a material, definition of Descartes: I highlighted here is the conceptual or perspectival distance that the I of I think takes from itself. It is this intratextual, invisible distancing or dancing of the chaogigational I that makes the existence of homunculus irreducible, and the location of its existence, irreducibly compressed. It is within that point of metaphysical compression that two inventors in Descartes pursue each other in optical confusion: the inventor of the narrative leaps into the page in order to catch the inventor in the narrative who leaps out of the page to locate the inventor of the narrative. The endlessness of this kind of self-reflexive movement of the narrative self renders the Cartesian search for truth not only engaging but brutal: the movement is relentless (Irsham 1007-916), i.e. unstoppable. The master inventor of a narrative hovering in the narrative thus invented is an introspective animal, a brute being trapped in a house made of shifting sands.

Having noted the spatial dimension of the zero-point of thinking, let us then move onto the temporal dimension of it. The Cartesian conceptual personae makes a change not only in his topological self-relation, but in its temporal mode of being: that particularly sentence, that particular scene on which we are now focusing, is where the protagonist loses patience, i.e. an

<sup>16</sup> We encounter an imagination methodically, implicitly, and quite ruthlessly uprooting all the traditional and commonplace propose of imagination and cognition. In the Second Meditation, Descartes reduces the self to a placeless (U-topikan?), dimensionless point of pure and dangerously slender, intellectio (1009).

ability to endure. Up to this point, the philosophical person in Descartes has been only standing back, observing how his narrative unfolds; but now, he suddenly mounts the stage--I, Descartes, am now rescuing the victim in my hyperbolic narrative, with whom I am identifying, with whom I am empathising by filling the spectatorial gap that my hyperbolic imagination has been holding so far. Note here the shift of narrative time: how sudden that is, and how necessary. The proper, authorial self-intervention requires not only that the narrative self should split itself into a third-person (he, the victim, who is interrupted) and the first-person (I, the saviour, who intervenes) who therefore becomes a character, another third-person, but that the self-splitting be precisely timed. That is to say, what the act of I think causes is not only a shift of authorial focus from the observed I to the observing I, but a shift of temporal focus from the past to the present, to what Rée (1987: 9, 12-4, 15-6, 18-9) calls the discursive now, the kind of now that is inscribed<sup>17</sup> in a discourse; by a discourse what is meant is a communicatively discursive system, anchored in the subjectivity of speakers (Rée (quoting Emile Benevise) 1987: 13n24, *emphasis added*). In this regard, the discursive time can be contrasted with the chronological now appearing in historical statements.

In fact, the perspectival shift of the I parallels the temporal shift of the I in a mutually collaborative manner: the I of I (might) have been deceived merely catalogues the evidence of (possible) deceptions, as if this I could therefore be transposed or translated, retrospectively, into a historical he; by contrast, the I of I am thinking that I (might) have been deceived, finally, anchors the suspicion itself in the present tense<sup>18</sup> of thinking, that is, in the fugitive present of thoughts own inscription (Rée 1987: 18-9). Therefore, in view of the auto-inscription of the event of cogitation, the cogitational I itself cannot be pushed away any further: this way, there arises the close

<sup>17</sup> the writers present, the moment when the pen, wet with ink, touches the paper (Jacques 173).

<sup>18</sup> According to Descartes, a proposition is perfectly certain now only if I cannot doubt, it now [?] (Gombay 1991: 361).

bond between its temporal and logical character (Lang 1990: 63, *emphasis added*). The point of contention, stated differently, is that Descartes' authorial intervention is not ancillary but violently occupational; and not accidental but precisely timed. Descartes enters into his narrative as a self-conscious autobiographer, and comes out of it as an ontological philosopher with, as Alain Badiou (125-6) would put it, a pinch of truth seized with his ink-stained three fingers; and that pinch of truth is composed of the unerasable traces of chaogitization, neatly dialecticised into the proposition, *Ego sum*. In summary then: the conceptual personae lodged in the discursive now cannot be expelled from the text: it is the spatio-temporal origin of all chaogitational thoughts.

What the I of I am thinking discloses to itself, i.e. discovers in itself, is, as Nancy puts it, the feints (indissociable) reverse side (1978: 640n17): the sticking (Descartes) point: the point where the epistemological specificity of the ego thinking here and now acquires an irreducible ontological weight; irreducible because self-negation at this point is existentially inconsistent (Hindikka 56-9) and in this sense logically impossible. The I of I am thinking has now reached the point where it can no longer pretend *not* to be: it has reached *the point of an impossible feint or fiction* (Nancy 1978: 648), the farthest point of feint (651). It is at this end-point of fiction that the narrative I and the performative I converge, fused (Rée) together: as a consequence of the latter joining--breaking into--the former, the I of I am now something, I exist, firmly refers not only to the I in the existing narrative, but to the I narrating that very narrative. (Recall that the I of I am nothing does *not* yet involve the I narrating the narrative.)

To return: who is Descartes?--an inventor without inventory. In what sense?--in the sense that the whole purpose of invention for Descartes is to dispose of the inventory, i.e. the resultant clutter: to show how one can proceed inwardly, as Bruno said, by clearing away the pathway into the point of the un-inventable, i.e. to the limits of fabulation; here, the invented includes both the material and the modal, e.g. material fictions such as the hypothetical world governed by the evil genius or *The World*, and the

allegorical mode of presentation determining the style of both *Discourse* and *Meditations*. What remains to be seen at that zero point of thinking thus reached, is therefore only a purified grammar (Bruno), a grammar devoid of sentences, i.e. the abstract grammar of I think.

At work here is an exchange economy between the rhetorical (or the hyperbolic) and the philosophical (or the discursive). An analogy between Faust and Descartes may be useful: if Faust's deal with Mephistopheles was to exchange his spirit for eternity, Descartes' deal with his evil genius was to exchange his rhetorical inventiveness for his philosophical subjectivity. It is with such self-directed, discursive aggressivity that Descartes' philosophical self, displayed in impressive literary form (Husserl 1931: 44/2), appropriates the rhetorical resources of his literary counterpart. Doing justice to Descartes' extravagant side teleologically tailored as such, one can suggest that Descartes the philosophical writer is not merely *res cogitans* but more appropriately, *res chaogitans*: If, as Nancy says, the *cogito* resists extravagance (1978: 648), one can observe further, with him, that the *chaogito* invites (as well as resists) extravagance. *Res chaogitans* is a philosophical poet whose reason extends further than his fingertips (*World*, AT XI 21/ CSM I 87) and touches imagination (*Search*, AT X 513/CSM II 408-9); and the touch here is precise, delicate and powerful. The next section, with which this essay concludes, will introduce a space touched by Descartes' philosophical imagination, i.e. the allegorical in Descartes or rather, Descartes as an allegory.

#### 4. I, Descartes, Exist In The Allegorical

Where, then, is Descartes? Our second question concerns the aforementioned narrative gap marked by Descartes' performative leap into his own hyperbolic discourse: the question concerns the originary location of the chaogitational subject, that is, the logico-poetic side of self-duplication. Where, exactly, is that gap? Where does the other, subversive and literary narrative begin? Where is the other opening?

An answer to this question can be found. I suggest, in the recursively self-reproductive structure of allegory: Descartes the cogitational subject exists in the allegorical; or rather, Descartes is an allegory, i.e. a fable. Descartes is an allegory; this means initially that

4.1 what is allegorised--i.e. shown by example--in Descartes story of the I is the irreducible exclusivity of the discursive location of the I; irreducible in the sense that every invention presupposes an inventor as its generic source; exclusive in the sense that the inventor cannot be included in the inventory.

The Cartesian author, the creator of the chaotic world of a sceptic, is generically inside, and topologically outside, the world he creates, in the same way that God is omnipresent in, and yet geographically detached from, the clamorous human world. What Descartes the fabulator has written, in this sense, can be understood as a fable demonstrating the irreducible exclusivity of the discursive position of the inventive I, the allegorical force of which is reinforced by another, more archetypal allegory of divine craftsmanship (e.g. Gombay 1996). The point here, put differently, is that the inventive I alone--to the exclusion of the invented I playing the role of an epistemological victim within such an invented story, e.g. the epistemologically incompetent Descartes harassed by the evil genius--enters into a more secure level of discourse, i.e. into an exclusive level of cogitational discursivity.

However, the *mode* of the cogitational I is entering into the territory of the discursive becomes less decisive, when another, obvious yet intricate, dimension of Descartes allegory is further explored. Here is the second meaning of the proposition, Descartes is allegory:

4.2 Cartesian discourse itself as a whole, is *directly* an allegory, an allegory of overcoming an allegory, or the fable of overcoming a fable (A Benjamin 19-28).

An invented world necessarily requires the inventor who is *outside* his

invention; this is the point noted earlier (4.1). Now, the problem is, this outside is already an inside, when viewed from a position that does not involve either the invented nor the inventor, i.e. totally from outside the text. The thought here, put more simply, is that behind every design, there is a designer. That is, the existence of the inventor is already implicated in an invention: the inventor exists *in* that fictional world of invention, *albeit* hidden: the *intratextual* existence of the inventor of a fiction--again, as *in* the case of Descartes God who must not, by virtue of being perfect, lack in existence--*completes* that invention. Therefore, the discursive position of the cogitational I is not only a necessary fiction (4.1) but a necessary fiction *within* a fiction (4.2): if the I of I think must exist in the Cartesian system of thinking, it exists *only in* that fiction as the ordinary fabulator of it--and *to this extent*, the cogitational I remains still fictive, the existence of which is not only produced but guaranteed by the generative logic of the fictive. This is to suggest that Descartes is a fiction *within* a fiction that dreams of its outside--or rather that Descartes is a site where such a dream of wakefulness unfolds.

Now, to concede this point about the originary fictionality of cogitational discourse (4.2) is to allow a textual self-corrosion to take place; an allegorising move, a turn against the objectively real and the discursively stable, has already taken place. What we are facing here, in other words, is the giddy depths of the *mise-en-scène* of the allegorical that resists philosophical framing. This way, the literary poses a threat to the order of the philosophical, and likewise, the allegorical or rhetorical, to the referential or discursive. The problem at stake concerns the potential, intratextual subversion of the discursive by the rhetorical: Descartes allegory, of overcoming an allegory becomes in itself an allegory that also narrates the *impossibility* of overcoming, i.e. of going beyond, an allegory. To put the same point in more neutral and less threatening terms: Descartes fable *allegorises itself*; here, the word itself is to be read as the *res chagittans*, infinitely subversive force, rather than as a free-standing form or entity; why *infinitely* subversive?--the point where the allegorical attempts to break

out of its mould of the fictive to touch the real is the point where it comes to be caught in, or touched by, another framework of the fictive that is instantly broader than itself. The force of infinite regress, in this case, is that of the allegorical.

This breaking point of chaogitation, this irreducible force of the allegorical, we have already seen in the previous section (§3) in terms of the narrative leap the I of I think makes. One crucial point of contention to be rehearsed here concerns the narrative duplicity of the Cartesian I: the status of the irreducible I of I think, pronounced as such, becomes ambiguous, seen from a narrative point of view, in that it refers to both the narrative I (the inventor *in* the narrative) and the authorial I (the inventor *of* the narrative). Put the same thought differently, the I of I think *thinks* it is outside its discourse, and yet, the problem is, it is *still* inside its discourse, regardless of what it thinks: it still belongs to the realm of the fictive *insfar* as, first, simply, it originates from there, and second, more significantly, the allegorical structure in which the cogitational I emerges cannot be simply discarded. This is because, without such narrative build-up, the differentiated (see Weissman 149-150) status of the cogitational I cannot be recognised as such. The force of chaogitation is therefore that of infinite doubling, of infinite self-harassment.

In summary then: in view of the structurally self-duplicative dimension of Cartesian fable, the proposition that Descartes the subject is an allegory, can be understood in a more conclusive, quasi-dialectical manner:

4.3 Descartes I is three Is knotted together around the invisible fold of the I

4.31 *the narrated I*

4.32 *the narrating I in the narrative*

4.33 *the authorial I behind the narrative*

The authorial I of 4.33, the subject position of which can only be hypothesised in an allegorised space of thinking, Rée calls an ironic I kept on a leash (1987: 28)(see also Loeb) and another commentator, a melancholic

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I playing a philosophical fort-da game (Iriam 1007) with itself, infinitely. The leash in this case signifies the irreducible allegorically or narratively of Cartesian discourse on I.

This way, the zero point of cogitation seen from a tropologico-generic, rather than a formal-logical, point of view, taken as that which figures the location of the subject, becomes the imaginary turning-point within a twofold or manifold discourse. It is here that the fleshed, self-doubling, author disappears into an allegorical anonymity of the abstract subject position: The point of the fable's invention is the subject (Nancy 1978: 652). Such a hinge point, located as such, is the invisible apex of a tropological spinning that controls the structure of a narrative, where both the disappearing author and the emerging subject are caught at once: it is the point of enmeshment where, as Nancy puts it, the fiction enters into the fable (Nancy 1978: 638): it is the frontier--the farthest point--of the logico-poiesis of chaogitation, where the poetics of self-transgression intersects with the dialectic of self-recognition, where the former is inserted into the latter, as fiction is introduced not upon truth or besides it, but *within* it (Nancy 1978: 638). The mode of fictions entering into the fable is, in other words, that of insertion or intersection rather than of parasitic apposition or confrontational opposition.

Descartes the philosopher enters into a fable with a view to getting out of it; he writes a fable in order to overcome it. As if in a contemove, however, Descartes the rhetorician enters into a fable to get entangled up further in what Paul de Man (1984: 69-72), quoting Gerard Genette, refers to as the revolving door-like structure of allegorical autobiography, in which a figurative moment constructed in an autobiographical narrative brings to the fore continuously, rather than blocking off summarily, another hidden point of the emergence of the fictive, thereby preventing the autobiographical ego from securing the ontologically stable, self-referential moment of self-discovery or self-recognition. For instance, the I that announces its victory over the evil genius on the grounds of its projected, topanalytic superiority, thinks that the farthest point of the fictive it occupies can then

be transformed into a point where the discursive necessarily intervenes, i.e. the Archimedean point of speculative observation. Now, the point of contention I have been seeking to establish in the course of a de-constructive reading of Descartes I, is that such an instant illusion of the outside the illusion that the I of I think has stepped outside the realm of the fictive and occupies the position of orchestral centrality--is shattered when the self-reflective I of I think recognises, again, that the farthest point of the fictive, still, remains inside the fictive; hence, the metaphor of revolving-door, the ordered complication of the inside and the outside.

To conclude: what Descartes, the philosopher, does here is to pick out, i.e. to rescue, the intratextually cornered I of I think from the narrative hell and place it anew in the centre of a different order, i.e. in the order of the discursive<sup>19</sup>. Descartes the philosopher knows how to exploit, to his discursive end, the rhetorical function of the fiction of the evil genius--how to use an intratextually constructed illusion of the outside as an allegorical index to an extratextual position of the cogitational self, ontologically privileged as such.

Now, observe the other side of the coin. What Descartes, the rhetorician, shows is an allegory of a conflict: exemplified in his text is a way in which the thinking egos discursive need for a secure point of self-reference represses its rhetorical desire for a further self-allegorisation. The clash at stake between a need and a desire is analogous to a psychological conflict between the reality principle and the pleasure principle: the thinking egos discursive need for a self-referentially secure, topologically detached, ontological anchor is the philosopher-geometricians need for a divine or transcendental referent to buttress the axiomatic (Judovitz 96); and it suppresses, if not completely eradicates, the rhetorical egos irreducible desire for self-transgression--irreducible in the sense that the transgressive desire creates another house within the Cartesian house of philosophy. It is, therefore, not as if the rhetorical-allegorical ego were a complete stranger to

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the discursive-logical ego. The chaogitational egos overflowing desire for infinite self-allegorisation is generated, after all, by the built-in *tropological* force of the text which pushes the fabulatory I beyond its discursive limits.

If there is a cryptic rhetorical lesson Descartes the rhetorician shows allegorically, it could be, put in the words of de Man, something like this: the specular structure has been displaced but not overcome, and we enter a system of tropes *at the very moment* we claim to escape from it (1984: 72, *emphases added*). Descartes celebrated methodological scepticism results from discursive reasons teleological control or economical subtraction (Badou 126) of rhetorical excess; by contrast, his rhetorical scepticism, demonstrated as such, comes from meta-consciousness narrative urge to display its excess, its own surplus value, its transgressive gestures to transcend the methodologised boundaries of reflexive rationality. And what we have been referring to as the allegorical dimension of Descartes text demonstrates, *albeit* silently, the excessive desire of the *cogito*, that is, the meta-desire of the *chaogito*. A secret of thinking is allegorised in Descartes story of the I: the strange resistance of the being of *res chaogitans* to its hermeneutic self-exhaustion.

〈 관련대 〉

<sup>19</sup>) de Man (1986, *Pascals Allegory of Persuasion*) provides an interesting, rhetorical analysis of a performative move of such kind discoverable in Pascals text.



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## 국문요약

## 케이오기토(CHAOGITO):

## 데카르트에의 “우화”속 우화의 휴지

## 이 규 은

총 4장으로 구성된 본 논문은 르네 데카르트(Rene Descartes)의 「성찰」(Meditations) 2편에 “사악한 천재 (evil genius, malin genie)”의 모습으로 극적으로 등장하는, 생각하는 자아의 변종-인식논리적 지위를 우화적, 혹은 이야기구조적, 관점에서 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 본 논문의 관심은, 보다 광범위하게 말하자면, 문학과 철학의 관계를 고찰하는 데에 있으며, 여기서 읽기의 초점은 수사적 확장성 과 논리적 엄밀성간의 관계, 그들간의 상호환원 불가능성 및 상호 협력성이다. 이러한 문학적인 데카르트에 대한 논의를 통해서, 철학적, 진술적 작가로서의 데카르트의 윤곽이 보다 선명하게, 그리고 다차원적으로 드러날 수 있으리라 믿는다.

1장은 장뤽 뉘시(Jean-Luc Nancy)가 이미 소개한 적이 있는 Chaogito 개념 (Chaos와 Cogito의 합성어) 및 기존의 연구성파들을 간략하게 설명한다. 여기서, 영미계통의 데카르트 논의가 “문학적” 혹은 “수사적” 요소들을 부차적인 것으로 간주해왔다는 것이 문제로서 제기된다. 이에 맞서 본인은 (구구절절 장황한 자기) “이야기(들을 철학적으로) 쌓아가기”의 테마가 왜 중요인지, 그리고 어떤 점에서 흥미로운지를 배경으로서 설명한다. “문학적 유혹/철학적 저항”을 부제로 하는 2장에서 그 문제가 본격적으로 다루어지는데, 여기서 본인은, 데카르트의 철학적 글들이 일기 혹은 자서전 형식으로 쓰여졌다는 점을 강조하면서, 이 문제를 “장르”와 “방법”의 불가능성의 관점에서 논의한다.

3장에서는 구체적 독서가 이루어진다. 사악한 천재의 발명은 다른 이가 아닌 생각하는 나 자신, 따라서 나는 그것의 발명자로서 존재할 수밖에 없다라는 데카르트의 코기토 논리에서 우리는 몇 가지 중요한 논점들을 추출할 수 있다. 첫째, 여기서 생각하는 “나”는 이야기 안에, 그리고 동시에 밖에 존재한다. 여기서 “나”는, 이전까지는 가설적 공간 안의 논리적 자리에 불과했지만, 갑자기 이야기 속으로 (밖으로부터) 개입함으로써 존재론적 추체성을 획득한다. 즉 갑자

기, “나”, “여기” 없어서 끝쓰는 이, 데카르트가 지시적으로 등장한다는 말이다. 둘째, 이것은, 서사적 관점에서 볼때, Deus ex machina를 구조적으로 이용한 경우라고 하겠다. 코너에 몰린, 즉 극한점 (zero-point)에 도달한 생각은, 시간성의 관점에서 볼 때 또 역시 현시시간 (now-time)의 즉시적 지시성에 의존해서만 그것의 존재론적 실체성을 확보할 수 있다. 그렇다면, 데카르트가 픽션의 도구를 사용해서 가설적 사고를 추구해온 이유가 있다면, 그리고 그 이유를 하나로 응집할 수 있다면, 그것은 픽션의 한계가 어디까지인가, 즉, 픽션이 포기되어야 하는 지점이 어디인가를 찾아내기 위함이라고 하겠다. 이 역설은 가히 폭발적임과 동시에 생산적이다. 자기성찰적인(reflective) 자아의 인식론적 중심성을 강조하는 데카르트 철학에서, 자아의 존재론적 실재성은 수사적 언어의 포기를 통해서만, 즉 간접적, 부정적으로만 입증될 수 있다. 그러나, 데카르트의 텍스트 자체는 수사적 독법에, 언어의 분출에, 항상 열려있지 않은가?

움직일 수 없는 “나”의 형이상학적, 사변적 추체성은 텍스트 “밖”에 있는 자, 기라는 신화를 토대로 구축된다. 4장에서 본인은, 결론적으로 데카르트적인 자, 기는 우화적으로 읽혀질 수 있다, 혹은 더 강하게 말해, 그렇게 읽혀져야 한다, 는 논점을, 제라드 쥐넷 (Gerard Genette) 및 폴 드만 (Paul de Man)이 도입하는 우화적 자서전으로서의 글쓰기의 개념을 빌어서, 제시한다. 한마디로 말해, 생각하는 “나”는 픽션 안의 픽션이다.