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which exceeds the finitude of our modes of thought, to infer a greater cause with an infinite formal reality (i.e., the Cartesian God from the Third Meditation). Instead, if we can confront the given at all, we would be confronted by that greater, divine cause — or, as Marion literally has it, causa sui (160). Since the epoché, or the phenomenological reduction, is supposed to be the method by which one brackets the determination of the world by the application of concepts — causal or otherwise — in order to get to phenomena as such, Marion seems to think that the epoché is the way by which to confront givenness and, a fortiori, the divine. Phenomenology, accordingly, becomes a kind of 'revealed theology' (72-3, 241-5, 321-4), such that givenness wins up amounting to revelation in the very literal, Christian sense (4, 234-41). In a slogan, Marion revises 'the principle of all principles' of phenomenology as follows: 'so much reduction, so much givenness' (14).

Being Given is a dense and difficult display of erudition by a world-class scholar, and the present review surely comes no way close to doing it full justice. Nevertheless, though Marion's display may count sufficient as a phenomenological interpretation of certain theological strains of modern philosophy, it cannot be construed a justification of those strains. But that is, of course, what Marion is after. Since, in turn, his conversion of phenomenology into a kind of theology (or at least into a method of worship) depends for its plausibility on that interpretation of just those theological strains, the transition from 'so much reduction' to 'so much (divine) givenness' (my interpretive addition) cannot be defended without circularity.

Michael K. Shim
Denison University

Martin Beck Matustik and William L. McBride, eds.
Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy After Postmodernity.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1874-2);

'In the last analysis, this book should be regarded as a milestone, not as a conclusion' (xix); the editorial intention and ambition behind Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy After Postmodernity have been fulfilled.

Projected on April 01, 2000, at an all-day symposium in West Lafayette, as a tribute to the seventy-year old scholar apparently too 'young to retire' (cf. Don Ihde, xix), this volume has been brought to light by Martin Beck Matustik and William stand as essays by a giving in various critical inters or indirectly, and after, no series of solic wards an On gomena to a l Human Scier (1986), The R (1992), Philo bly, the recer question of l Cartesian sel radically, wi leave us in w company con vertigo that i Read agai the anthology Madison's w — readily re tive interacti distinct, sub one hand, wh action, and fi which has a the post-Car Rortean phil pluralized he sality'. All e, searching po of re-specify not be simp pioneer's 'Re creating a q A notable ac Whether tutored vari cannot be d can and mu ean efforts : standard-be openly, as a

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and William L. McBride, whose editorial skills and collegial collaboration stand as exemplary. They masterfully orchestrate eighteen highly original essays by a group of engaging philosophers, Schrag included, who are exploring in various ways post-phenomenological philosophy, especially of post-critical intersubjectivity. Evidently, all the contributors are inspired, directly or indirectly, by this American Socrates: his life-long attempts to think with and after, not simply against, the postmodern, an endeavor concretized in a series of solid, ground-breaking monographs — Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude (1961), Experience and Being: Prolegomena to a Future Ontology (1969), Radical Reflection and the Origin of the Human Sciences (1980), Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (1986), The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge (1992). Philosophical Papers: Between and Between (1994) and most accessibly, the recent Self after Postmodernity (1997) — that aptly singularizes the question of how to work, not just ‘think’, with the remains of the modern Cartesian self at this point in time when the various moves to ‘decentralize’ it radically, whether Heideggerian or Sartrean or Derridian or Foucauldian, leave us in want of alternatives from which to choose and work. Schrag and company come along with a suggestion, ready to deal with the postmodern vertigo that is nearly physical as well as metaphysical.

Read against this background that is at once historical and biographical, the anthology as a whole — divided into four thematic parts preceded by Gary Madison’s useful overview as well as Matustik and McBride’s introduction — readily reveals the post-Schragian praxiological ontology of communicative interaction at work: ‘American Continental’ in its ethos and praxis, it is distinct, subtly yet clearly, from any Germanic-Habermasian model, on the one hand, which tends to privilege hermeneutic action over pragmatic interaction, and from any Franco-Levinasian-Derridian model, on the other hand, which has a tendency to romanticize the introverted pessimism or ‘excess’ of the post-Cartesian stranger; Also worth noting is that it differs from the Rortean philosophy of radical contingency in that, not content with ‘randomly pluralized horizontality’ [13], it promotes a focused, contextualized ‘transversality’. All eighteen pieces, thus put together, expand and deepen the leader’s searching position of ‘in-between-ism’, contribute, colorfully, to the given task of re-specifying the locus of the post-postmodern self that cannot and must not be simply jettisoned or hastily expanded; stitched at the end by the pioneer’s ‘Response to Contributors’, all the small contributions end up creating a quilt of thoughts; even here, Schrag remains a quiet go-between. A notable achievement it is.

Whether the Schragian position, strengthened and complemented by its tutored variants, is tenable at all is a debatable matter that need not and cannot be discussed closely here. What the reasonably delighted reviewer can and must show, however, is the multi-faceted modalities of pro-Schragian efforts manifest in this text that serves a dual function: both as the standard-bearing frame of reference for Schrag scholarship and, more openly, as a field of ‘transfigurative’ interaction that, in the true Deweyan
spirit of transformative experimentalism, tests its viability 'on site', on and on. As the organizational logic behind the volume shows just this twofold structure, force rather, of the Schragite project yet to come, the rest of this review will explicate it briefly in summary, following the order in which the essays are introduced and linked, by 'order' what is meant is the 'four Schragian figures' [xvi]: transversal rationality [Part 2], the self after post-modernity [Part 3], the fourth cultural value sphere [Part 4] and communicative praxis [Part 5].

Part 2 begins, quite appropriately, with Descartes, more precisely, with a remembered problem, "Where Are You Standing ...?": Descartes and the Question of Historicity, in which Robert Scharff sets out to destabilize our 'postmodern' assumptions about Cartesian Rationality, recalling Schrag's classroom adventures into transversalism. The four essays that follow it are by Sandra Bartky on Foucault's repressive demarcation of modernity; by Hwa Yol Jung on transculturally-projected ethical ecologism; by Edward Casey on the powerful instantaneousness, clarity even, of an ethical glance as a formative condition of affective community (this piece, frankly, is the most fascinating of all, but another truth to be told, it makes no single reference to Schrag, which, for having proven that things do escape or else compromise editorial attention, is disconcertingly comforting); and finally by Bruce Wilshire on the genocidal capacity of the 'rational animal', the thinking self.

Part 3 opens seamlessly with a close analysis of the post-deconstructive dynamics of the Schragian self: so we have Bernard Dauenbauer focusing on 'discourse, action and community', a much-rehearsed thematic trio of pragmatism that, properly played, can still work as a useful reminder of the pitfalls of transcendentalism, some 'actual' political implications of which, e.g., feminist, have been articulated by the subsequent essays, first, by Linda Bell, 'Calvin Hears a Who', and then by Martin Dillon, 'Romantic Love'.

Part 4, the weakest link, bears the strongest topical relevance to today's global situation, where the inseparability of religion from culture has become a pressing everyday issue. Merold Westphal's timely reflection on the religious dimension of ethical responsibility and John Caputo's re-reading of Kierkegaard in light of Derrida's ethico-theological intervention both leave the reader wanting more, seriously more — another minor flaw.

Part 5, which approaches that question of culture-formation from a linguistic, specifically rhetorical, point of view is relatively substantial: Michael Hyde, the post-Heideggerian, on 'fitting' communication, David Crownfield, the post-Derridian, on the topological interplay between Derrida and Schrag, Lenore Langendorf, the revisionary Aristotelian, on the 'making' of a discourse, and Victor Kestenbaum, the Socratic pedagogue, on the revival of Socraticism in the work of Schrag — each shows that the task of philosophy after Calvin Schrag is not in a certain notion it projects, but in the very interaction it promises.

Kyoo Lee
University of Memphis

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